Some thoughts on how to improve the selection of brigade commanders

By Lt. Col. Paul Edgar, U.S. Army (Ret.)

Best Defense guest columnist

I often encounter senior officers and NCOs who express disappointment in Army brigade commanders who perform poorly while in command and in positions shortly after brigade command. The disappointing behaviors that they describe usually include:

1) Inability to build and employ an executive, multi-function team or build informal alliances beyond their own organization.

2) Misapplication of tactical and direct-leadership solutions to executive, interagency, and strategic problems.

3) Poor interpersonal skills (perhaps merely a variation of #2).

4) Inability to adapt to strategic ambiguity and non-linear organizations.

Granted, I am describing my perception of perceptions here. Statistics on performance and failure of brigade commanders, if they could be gathered, would probably tell a more moderate story. And, no doubt, the Army has some great brigade commanders. But perhaps part of what puzzles many officers and NCOs is that they intuit that the Army could and ought to do better with this particular selection process. It is also worth noting that the disappointments above echo the conclusions of numerous formal and informal studies on the same or similar topics.

Why do brigade commanders receive this particular criticism? I suggest at least three reasons. Principally, it is the first selection process sufficiently narrow to be scrutinized. The candidates are few enough that every one can receive a close, comprehensive review. The argument that there are always a "few bad apples" is not convincing because there is time and space to take a close look at every one. Second, brigade command is the earnest gateway to general officer and executive national leadership. The Army’s talent pool for institutional and interagency decision-makers starts here. Improving this process equals improving the executive performance of the Army and the Army’s contribution to other parts of the government. It is a worthy investment. Third, the perception (again, statistical data likely tell a more moderate story) is that when brigade commanders or former brigade commanders go bad, they go really bad. In many cases, it appears that their deficiencies were detected earlier, albeit not in their evaluation reports. 

The Army last overhauled its command selection process during its post-Vietnam reforms. Now is a good time for another improvement. Currently, the selection process for brigade command is similar to other centralized boards. The "application packet" mostly amounts to a check mark and five or six sentences on the bottom of the second page of recent evaluation reports. Those evaluations are important and should be given serious consideration. However, the Army can and should comprehensively triangulate the narrative picture of those reports. For many reasons, most unintentional, evaluations tend to become skewed and fail to show the full colors of a talent pool applying to brigade command, or any other board. The Army ought to verify those narratives with tools beyond the current meager selection of official photos and officer record briefs. 

With that in mind, the following suggested assessment tools could provide the means to confirm and balance the narrative of evaluation reports; they could supplement an application for brigade command. These suggestions require relatively little overhead. Most of the resources and systems exist in the Army already. No single tool suggested should necessarily change a selection decision based on evaluation reports. However, the Army could verify their principle assessment of candidates and make a few better decisions each year by implementing these suggestions or others like them.    

Psychological evaluations. The Army’s special operations community has successfully employed professional psychologists in selection and assessment processes for decades. Generally, a psychological component includes a battery of tests, limited field observation, and at least one personal interview. The main point of a "psych eval" is not to weed out sociopaths, although that sometimes happens. Rather, the psychological component assesses characteristics conducive and non-conducive to particular units and roles. Exceptional candidates are turned away for, among other things, demonstrating prominent inclinations that hinder teamwork. This process, minus the field observation, is readily replicated for potential brigade commanders.

Interviews. Boards or small-group interviews are another part of successful military and civilian assessment and selection models. Interviews provide an opportunity to probe candidates’ executive and organizational practices and philosophies, their perceptions of themselves and others, their abilities to express themselves amongst executive peers, and, as necessary, test rank-relevant knowledge.   

Peer-subordinate evaluations. The Army did well when it created an evaluation tool, currently called MSAF360, which collates subordinate, peer, and supervisor assessments. MSAF360 is a personal-improvement tool and has rightly been kept out of formal evaluation channels. Still, it is possible and appropriate to create a parallel system for use in selection processes. A common objection to using peer-subordinate assessments is that performance might equate to popularity. However, if a peer-subordinate evaluation is only one-fifth or one-sixth of a candidate’s total application, it is unlikely to skew decisions inappropriately. The opposite approach, ignoring assessments of peers and subordinates because doing it well is tricky, carries more risk.

Writing samples and letters of recommendation. We can borrow a couple of assessment tools from the academic world. A few months ago, I was fortunate to converse with a prominent military historian about leaders and academic talent. Despite his life-long investment in academia and scholarly contributions to military thought, he sympathized with officers who joined the Army for the sake of adventure, intentionally avoiding a life of academic entrapment. One, or two, or three decades after joining the military, officers find themselves in positions that demand academic, political, or executive management finesse. Unfortunately, those demands are not going away and advanced academic skills help with all three.

By the time an officer is eligible for brigade command, he or she will have at least three years of professional military education or graduate school. Most will have more. By then, an officer should have written at least one paper worth presenting beyond the classroom. Writing is a proven avenue to demonstrate abilities to think, synthesize, and communicate difficult ideas; a profession-relevant writing sample is a reasonable addition to an application packet.

Letters of recommendation, another tool employed in academic and civilian sectors, are also worth considering. Require candidates to obtain a few letters of recommendation beyond normal military circles. Even our young men and women applying to West Point must obtain a congressional nomination. Brigade command is a decidedly bigger appointment than West Point. Letters from senior academic, civilian, or government professionals could help confirm a candidate’s executive maturity and potential. 

It is worth noting that the behaviors mentioned in the opening paragraphs are not exclusive to the US Army. These are negative traits common to the profession of arms. An instructor at the Israeli National Defense College told me about a number of cases that mirror our own. I have noticed similar behavior in officers from at least four other countries. It is a repetitive, observable pattern. 

An organization the size of the Army can always improve many things. Investing in the brigade command selection process is particularly worthwhile. While the poor performers are not ruining the Army, they show up more frequently than they ought for such a small, exclusive population. More than most, the damage that they do resonates beyond military circles. Perhaps more importantly, improving the results of this particular selection process will improve the reputation and executive performance of the Army in years to come. A stronger executive Army equals a stronger total Army and better contributions to the federal government and the nation.   

Paul Edgar is a retired Army lieutenant colonel. He commanded 4^th Battalion, 3^rd U.S. Infantry from 2011-2013. He has worked in Iraq, Afghanistan, Jordan, and Israel. He currently is pursuing a Ph.D. in Middle East studies at the University of Texas.