Iraq and Syria no longer exist, but the real problem is the inability of the U.S. government to formulate strategy (4)
John Batiste is a retired Army major general who commanded the 1st Infantry Division in Iraq in 2004-05 and a brigade of the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia: "I agree that Iraq and Syria no longer exist, if they ever did. It all goes back to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, signed in May 1916, when countries ...
John Batiste is a retired Army major general who commanded the 1st Infantry Division in Iraq in 2004-05 and a brigade of the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia:
John Batiste is a retired Army major general who commanded the 1st Infantry Division in Iraq in 2004-05 and a brigade of the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia:
"I agree that Iraq and Syria no longer exist, if they ever did. It all goes back to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, signed in May 1916, when countries like Iraq and Syria were, with the consent of Russia, defined by the United Kingdom and France. Borders were drawn without regard to religious or ethnic make-up — irredentism at its best. We have firsthand experience with the same phenomenon in the former Yugoslavia.
Should American strategy be based on that recognition? Absolutely. Fast forward to 2001 when the United States government rushed to war without a strategy with the ends, ways, and means in balance.
The real problem was and is that the U.S. government is not capable of developing a comprehensive strategy. The problem then and now is that there is no interagency strategic planning process in the U.S. government, no trained planners in the 18 major departments and agencies in the government, and shockingly, no one in charge of the process. When the president talks about a strategy, he is referring to a strategy developed by the small and politically motivated White House staff, not the interagency. We deserve what we get: A half-baked strategy that does not define success and fails to synchronize the efforts of the entire government. There is no interagency synchronization; focus; teamwork; definition of mission and desired end-state; consideration of all the courses of action; and ultimately, no unity of effort. The strategy to deal with the Islamic State needs to start with a deliberate interagency planning process. Before we can do that, we’ll need to define the process and train planners in each department and agency. When we get this right, we’ll begin to understand that the solution is not an air campaign against IS. Rather, it will involve interagency actions that will certainly include killing IS any way we can, but so much more. We could start with addressing why Americans from Minneapolis would convert to Islamic extremism and tightening up on our immigration policies. A real strategic plan will include specified and implied tasks to every department and agency in the American government. When all we have is a sledgehammer in our toolbox, every problem starts to look like a nail. We have a serious problem. The good news is that with the right process, we can get this right."
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