If Iraq and Syria are on the ropes, that’s why we need to begin working more on workable power-sharing frameworks (11)
Zalmay Khalilzad has served as the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations: "Iraq and Syria suffer from three fundamental challenges. First, their borders are not natural or historic. They are products of the colonial era, and some communities, especially the Kurds, never had strong attachment to these borders. They dream of an ...
Zalmay Khalilzad has served as the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations:
Zalmay Khalilzad has served as the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations:
"Iraq and Syria suffer from three fundamental challenges. First, their borders are not natural or historic. They are products of the colonial era, and some communities, especially the Kurds, never had strong attachment to these borders. They dream of an independent Kurdistan.
Additionally, the idea of national borders runs in contradiction to the Islamist school of thought. Historically, the Islamic regions have been organized as dynasties. Second, there is the sectarian conflict between Shias and Sunnis, which has gained momentum in the last decade. Third, there is a struggle for preeminence among three regional powers — Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. These powers are using sectarian and ethnic militias in Iraq and Syria as pawns in a proxy war.
While the border between Iraq and Syria may have de facto vanished, redrawing the lines across the region to a more "natural" condition by any party would be very difficult and costly, and may not necessarily bring an end to conflict — not least because there are no alternative natural borders that everyone can readily agree to. But it may happen in any case unless broadly accepted internal power-sharing agreements are implemented and there is agreement among regional powers to end their proxy wars.
Internally, Iraq has a political framework agreed by the Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds, but its implementation has faced many great difficulties. In Syria, such a framework does not exist yet. And there is no indication of progress among regional powers to end their proxy wars.
There are three possible directions in which the two countries could go in the near to medium term. The first is that one side crushes its opponents with brute force and then rules through dictatorship. This is obviously a failed model. The second is continued fragmentation and conflict. The third is a political settlement through power-sharing at the center and decentralization of the country’s political system. Regional powers will have a vital role in shaping which direction each country takes.
What should the US do?
The U.S. policy should be to engage other global powers and the three key regional states and push them toward a common understanding that in turn allows for an agreement on a new political framework in Syria, and implementing the one we have in Iraq."
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