Swiftboating in the Islamic Republic

Last week, hundreds of billboards appeared across Iran depicting the U.S. Capitol building among the red tents of an enemy army, bent on destroying a true Islamic government. As the deadline for a deal over Iran’s nuclear program approaches, it is just the latest example of how hard-liners in Tehran are using Shiite history to undermine President Hassan Rouhani’s efforts to strike a deal with the United States.

The billboards were part of an effort by organizations affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to transform the most important Shiite day of mourning, Ashura, into a reason to oppose a nuclear deal. The red tents represent the army that fought Imam Hussein, the heroic Shiite leader whose death is commemorated on Ashura, which occurred this year on Nov. 4. The message was clear: to portray negotiations with Washington as talks with the "murderers of Imam Hussein."

Imam Hussein, the Shiites’ third imam, is one of the faith’s defining figures. He was killed in A.D. 680. along with his 72 companions and family members in a battle near the town of Karbala in today’s Iraq, because he refused to pledge allegiance to Yazid, the Umayyad caliph at the time. In Shiite history, Imam Hussein’s decision is seen as a great contrast to the actions of Imam Hassan, his brother — and the second Shiite imam — who agreed on a "compromise" arrangement in A.D. 661 with Muawiyah, another Umayyad caliph. The compromise prevented a devastating war between Sunnis and Shiites, but solidified the Sunni Umayyad dynasty’s hold on power, at the expense of the Shiites.

The billboard campaign today is just one example of how conservative figures in Iran have tried to use Ashura to weaken public support for a rapprochement with the United States. In the past few days, hard-liners — including Friday prayers leaders throughout the country, who are appointed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — have suggested that Iran should follow Imam Hussein’s path with respect to the nuclear issue. "Obama was wrong when he said that the sanctions made Iran come to the negotiating table," Ahmad Khatami, the Friday prayers leader in Tehran, told worshippers. "We are the followers of Imam Hussein and Ashura, and our way is that of resistance."

This message was repeated by hard-liners across the country. "Yazid [the Umayyad caliph] imposed economic sanctions on Imam Hussein’s relatives to make them surrender, but he failed," said Ahmad Alamolhoda, the Friday prayers leader in Mashhad, Iran’s third-largest city. "We must follow this pattern and avoid negotiating with the enemy because of sanctions."

For the revolutionaries who ascended to power in Iran after the proclamation of an Islamic Republic in 1979, "compromise" remains a negative term, even an insult. They had no interest in emulating "the political behavior of Imam Hassan" — that is, a negotiated compromise — and instead preferred Imam Hussein’s uncompromising pattern. For today’s hard-liners, too, a nuclear deal would represent not only a political setback, but a fundamental repudiation of their vision of the Islamic Republic.

Iran’s hard-liners have used Ashura for decades as ammunition to support their political aims. In 1986, then-Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini invoked the commemoration in the face of international mediation efforts designed to end the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq. "Deceitful individuals," he said, would not be allowed to force an "imposed peace" on the Islamic Republic, similar to what happened during Imam Hassan’s era. Of course, changing political winds would later force Khomeini to change his tune: Two years later, the ayatollah agreed to a cease-fire and a peaceful compromise with Iraq.

In contrast to Imam Hassan’s political life, Imam Hussein’s narrative has always been at the center of the propaganda machinery of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 

In a fiery speech in 2000, Khamenei said that if the United States exerted too much pressure on the Islamic Republic, the result would be the "repetition of the Karbala event" — Imam Hussein’s fight to the death against Yazid — not the "imposed peace of Imam Hassan."

It wasn’t the first time that Khamenei dismissed Imam Hassan’s role in Shiite history. Prior to those remarks, the supreme leader declared that the Iranian calendar year of 1379 (March 2000 to March 2001) would be named after Imam Ali, the first Shiite Imam. The declaration created the impression that 1380 would be named after the second Shiite Imam, Imam Hassan — but the ayatollah simply named that year "Imam Ali" again. When 1381 rolled around, he proclaimed it "Imam Hussein’s Glory," thus skipping the second imam altogether.

But Imam Hassan may be making a comeback on Iran’s political scene. Since Hassan Rouhani assumed the presidency, the complex situation surrounding the nuclear issue has seemingly caused the supreme leader to reassess the imam’s legacy. About a week before Rouhani’s first trip to New York, in September 2013, Khamenei announced his belief in "diplomacy" and the principle of "heroic flexibility" — a concept similar to Imam Hassan’s peace.

Many Iranian media outlets interpreted Khamenei’s reference to "heroic flexibility" as reflecting a desire to reach a compromise with the West over the nuclear issue. If U.S. diplomats hoped that the supreme leader had been transformed into a peacenik, however, they would soon be disappointed: A few months later, Khamenei said that "heroic flexibility" was merely a tactic to "defeat the enemy."

But regardless of how Khamenei interprets "heroic flexibility," it cannot be refuted that the realpolitik of Iran’s current administration has led the country’s leaders to openly reference Imam Hassan’s record, despite the long dominance of Imam Hussein over the country’s political paradigm. Rouhani even said last June that "’heroic leniency’ was harder than ‘heroic Jihad,’ what Imam Hassan did with the peace agreement with Muawiyah [the Umayyad Caliph]."

This reference represents the ideological groundwork that is needed to justify any possible compromise over the nuclear issue. Still, Khamenei’s associates who oppose the current talks are just as vehemently trying to discredit Imam Hassan as a political model. For example, the commander of the Basij — the paramilitary force close to the IRGC, who is directly appointed by the Supreme Leader — responded to those who welcome Imam Hassan’s peace model by saying that the historic peace agreement "took place at a time when people, for the lack of insight, were no longer with the imam and there was no commander to resist [the enemy], unlike today’s Iran, where brave, heroic, and insightful people are present to support their leader at any cost."

The final results of the nuclear talks will determine whether Imam Hassan’s peace will be the beacon for Iran’s foreign policy, or if the country will return to Imam Hussein’s resistance.