What Would Ash Carter Do?

As you might imagine, those of us who work at Harvard’s Kennedy School are pleased that our former colleague Ash Carter has been nominated to be the next secretary of defense. Ash and I don’t agree on certain aspects of U.S. foreign and defense policy (for example, he’s favored a more hard-line approach to Iran’s nuclear program than I would), but he was a terrific colleague and is well-qualified for the job. He’s formidably smart, tough, genuinely patriotic, and has enormous experience and knowledge about defense issues. I don’t envy him this new post, but I support his nomination and wish him well as he confronts some big challenges.

Like all Cabinet nominees, Ash now faces a confirmation hearing in the U.S. Senate. The confirmation process has gone badly off the rails in recent years, but the idea of having the Senate vet presidential appointees is a good one. Among other things, it gives the senators a chance to raise issues they regard as especially important, and it gives nominees a chance to lay out their views on the problems they are about to encounter (The Islamic State? The sequester? Cost overruns? Etc.). This process doesn’t always work as the Founding Fathers intended — i.e., the confirmation hearing for Chuck Hagel was an embarrassment for all concerned — but in theory, congressional oversight could be a “teachable moment” for the nominee, the senators, and the public at large. But, to achieve that, our distinguished senatorial representatives have to ask the right questions.

As a public service, therefore, I offer the following Top 10 Questions to ask Ash Carter at his confirmation hearing.

Question No. 1:

In 2008, you were part of an Iran task force organized under the auspices of the Bipartisan Policy Center. That task force recommended a hard-line approach to Iran’s nuclear program, including the threat of military force if negotiations on the issue did not succeed. Under what conditions would you recommend the use of force against Iran’s nuclear facilities? Given that a military attack could delay an Iranian bomb for only a year or two, and would probably increase Iran’s desire to obtain an actual deterrent, does keeping “all options on the table” make sense?

Question No. 2:

Army Chief of Staff Raymond Odierno has said that the Army must “stand ready to win our nation’s wars. We must win dominantly and decisively.” Yet apart from clashes with minor powers such as Serbia or Grenada, the only clear victory the U.S. military has won since World War II was the 1991 Gulf War. Korea was a draw, Vietnam a clear loss, and the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were costly defeats. In your professional judgment, why does the mighty United States keep losing? Are we fighting the wrong wars, or just fighting them badly? What can be done to fix this problem?

Question No. 3:

You have been a strong advocate of nuclear arms control throughout your career, and U.S. President Barack Obama has said that he eventually wants to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. Given this long-term objective, and the need to set an example for other states, does the United States need a new generation of nuclear weapons? Does it still need to keep thousands of nuclear warheads in reserve? For what purpose? As you see it, what is the minimum number of nuclear weapons that the United States must possess in order to be secure?

Question No. 4:

The United States continues to spend more than 4 percent of GDP on its national security programs. At the same time, many of America’s allies in Europe have allowed their military budgets to shrink and their capabilities to atrophy, forcing Uncle Sam to bear an increasingly disproportionate share of global security burdens. Is there any way to get our allies to acquire more robust capabilities? If we keep spending the money to protect them, why should we expect them to acquire the ability to protect themselves?

Question No. 5:

During the 1990s, you and former Secretary of Defense William Perry reportedly favored the “Partnership for Peace” approach to Eastern Europe, and opposed NATO expansion. NATO expansion has played a key role in undermining relations with Russia and is part of the background to the current crisis in Ukraine. With hindsight, was NATO expansion a mistake, especially after the first wave of new members? What broader lessons should U.S. leaders draw from this experience?

Question No. 6:

A follow-up on Russia. You were one of the architects of the so-called Nunn-Lugar programs of cooperative denuclearization in the former Soviet Union, an initiative that eliminated vast quantities of nuclear material and made it less likely that former Soviet weapons would be acquired by terrorists. Russia has now suspended these programs in response to Western sanctions over Ukraine. Given the stakes involved, what should be done to resolve our current differences with Moscow and get these invaluable programs back on track?

Question No. 7:

The Obama administration has repeatedly said that it wants to “rebalance” U.S. security commitments toward Asia, in part to respond to China’s rise. Yet concrete manifestations of this policy have been modest, and Washington keeps getting distracted by minor conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere. As a result, some of America’s Asian allies are wondering if the rebalance is real or not. What will you do in the next two years to make “rebalancing” a reality?

Question No. 8:

From 1945 to 1990, the United States acted like an “offshore balancer” in the Middle East. It had security commitments to several different states in the region, but it kept its air and ground force presence to a minimum and intervened only when the local balance of power broke down. The U.S. military footprint in the region grew significantly after the first Gulf War, beginning with “dual containment” in 1993 and later with the Bush administration’s ill-fated efforts at “regional transformation.” Today, the region is more unstable than ever, and we face a terrorism problem that is partly a reaction to our past involvement. Given the costly results of these policies, is it time for the United States to go back offshore and over the horizon, and let our regional allies uphold the local balance of power mostly on their own?

Question No. 9:

Sexual violence has been a recurring problem in the U.S. military for some time now. According to the official DOD report on sexual assault in 2013, reports of sexual assault continue to increase, with more than 3,300 reports being submitted in fiscal year 2012. More than 6 percent of active-duty women and more than 1 percent of men reported “unwanted sexual contact,” and surveys suggest that the actual incidence of sexual assault — including rape — is in fact substantially higher. The Department of Defense has instituted a number of programs to address this problem, but they do not appear to be working very well. What else needs to be done?

Question No. 10:

In 1961, president (and five-star general) Dwight D. Eisenhower gave a famous speech warning the nation of an emerging “military-industrial complex.” More than 50 years later, an interlocking network of military officers, civilian defense professionals, intelligence agencies, and defense contractors exerts enormous influence on U.S. national security policy, aided and abetted by politicians and think tanks whose campaign funding or annual budgets come from some of these same sources. Was Eisenhower’s warning correct? Is it possible to have a rational discussion of national security policy when the marketplace of ideas is so heavily skewed toward one side?

To be honest, I don’t expect any member of the Armed Services Committee to ask Ash Carter any of these questions, but it would sure be interesting if they did. And I’d love to hear his answers, especially if he hasn’t been coached to be as bland and noncommittal as possible. Sadly, saying as little as possible (or saying things you don’t really believe) is often the best way to get confirmed, but it deprives taxpayers and voters of the opportunities to know what top appointees really think. Alas, that is what passes for serious debate here in the Land of the Free, but maybe this time I’ll be pleasantly surprised.

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