Beware the Malaise

To paraphrase Leo Tolstoy, all unhappy people are unhappy in their own way. And their unhappiness does not necessarily mean they have the will or the wherewithal to pursue regime change. But there’s a worrying trend that threatens to roil nations on the brink of instability. The recent drop in oil prices has led to cuts in domestic spending in Venezuela, sparking new concerns about civil unrest. Nigeria, another major oil exporter, faces a similar challenge, amid declining state revenues that compound already existing public dissatisfaction with the political order.

Findings from the 2014 Pew Research Center Global Attitudes survey suggest similarly high degrees of public disaffection, frustration, and resentment toward the established political and economic order in a number of key countries. Not surprisingly, this disgruntlement is particularly evident in the tumultuous Middle East. What bears watching, though, is that this discontent is also spreading in parts of Latin America and Africa.

None of these results are dispositive, but they also can’t be ignored: some of the most tumultuous upheavals in recent history (see: Spring, Arab) were long predicted, yet took most observers by surprise. Still, the evidence of political and economic dissatisfaction should be interpreted with great caution — as warning signs — not necessarily as forecasts of coming upheaval.

Yet history also suggests that those who shrug off public discontent with political and economic systems do so at their own peril. As might be expected, in many countries, political satisfaction is closely tied to views about national economic conditions. Societies where people say the economy is doing poorly are more likely to be unhappy with their current political system.

The recent poster child for this relationship between economics and political stability is Thailand. In spring 2014, a mere 21 percent of the public was happy with the economy, while some 70 percent were dissatisfied with the political system. Such dissatisfaction extended beyond economic performance. There was also public resentment towards how the rich exercised power in the Thai political system: Fully 72 percent of those surveyed thought that higher-income people had too much influence on politics. Subsequently, Thailand was ravaged by political turmoil, culminating in a coup d’état in May 2014. Even though the coup may have been instigated by these higher-income people, Thailand is not out of the woods. “Although calm has prevailed since the military coup,” writes Alastair Newton of Nomura Research, “there is no guarantee that this will persist … especially if the economy continues to underperform.”

There is also widespread unhappiness with the economy and the political system in the Middle East, where a median of 61 percent in the six countries surveyed are dissatisfied with how the political system works in their country. In Lebanon, for example, only 9 percent say their economy is doing well, while 90 percent are dissatisfied with politics and 61 percent voice the view that high-income people have too much influence on the political system. In Tunisia, just 11 percent are pleased with the economy, 70 percent are unhappy with the political system, and 77 percent believe that the rich have undue influence on politics. It may come as no surprise, then, that only 17 percent of Tunisians report a high degree of political engagement, which includes things like voting, attending a campaign event, or contacting a government official. Similarly, in the Palestinian territories, only 23 percent are happy with the state of the economy, 71 percent are frustrated with national politics, and 61 percent complain about the power the wealthy exert over politics.

While the public outside the region and their policy elites focus on the implications of the depredations of the Islamic State, publics in the region are sending a clear message of dissatisfaction with the state of their economies, the dysfunctional nature of local governance, and the corrosive influence of their economic elites on politics. This suggests that many populations in the region may be receptive to an Islamic State that promises a new religion-based ethic for running both the economy and the government.

In Latin America, a median of 59 percent gives their national political systems a thumbs down. Political discontent is especially strong in Colombia, where three-quarters of the public are dissatisfied with the political system (despite estimated GDP growth in 2014 of 4.8 percent, only 39 percent say the economy is in good shape). And 83 percent grouse about the political influence of the well-off. Such frustration may contribute to low political participation among Colombians: just 29 percent report high engagement in politics.

Roughly seven-in-ten Brazilians also express disaffection with the functioning of their political system, possibly a result of 0.1 percent GDP growth in 2014, a statistic that undoubtedly contributes to only 32 percent being satisfied with the economy. Fully 79 percent say that higher-income people have too much influence in the political system, and only 30 percent of Brazilians say that they are very active in politics. Nonetheless, in October, Brazilians reelected the government of President Dilma Rousseff, suggesting that however great their dissatisfaction, people often prefer stability to change.

General discontent with the political system is relatively modest in the seven African nations surveyed: a median of 50 percent are unhappy, and 49 percent are satisfied. But disaffection runs high in the West African nations of Ghana (65 percent) and Nigeria (60 percent), amid low satisfaction with the economy (26 percent in Ghana, 39 percent in Nigeria). In both societies, 68 percent of the public say that the rich exert too much influence over politics. And Ghanaians report the lowest political participation in the region, with just 24 percent saying they are highly engaged political participants.

This witches’ brew of general public malaise, economic frustration, and political resentment will be tested in the Nigerian presidential election on March 28. Coming at a time of falling oil prices and open Christian-Muslim warfare in northern Nigeria, coupled with President Goodluck Jonathan’s controversial decision to seek re-election despite already serving one-and-a-half terms (under a two-term limit in the Nigerian constitution), suggests the potential for serious unrest.

Public dissatisfaction with economic conditions, the political system, and the influence of the wealthy, accompanied by low citizen participation in political activity, is hardly a prescription for stability. But predictions of future political and economic instability are fraught with uncertainty. Public opinion may be only one indicator. Nevertheless, last year’s experience in Thailand suggests such public disgruntlement may be a harbinger of upheaval.

The immediacy of the challenges posed by the Islamic State, Ukraine, and the Iran negotiations can distract policymakers’ attention from the more widespread and pernicious challenge posed by public frustration with political and economic systems that are not delivering for them. These warning signs will be ignored at our peril.

Paula Bronstein / Getty Images News