Thinking about military structure as the point of departure for adjusting to future
Lately I’ve been persuaded by the argument that the point of departure for the future of the military is how it is structured.
Lately I’ve been persuaded by the argument that the point of departure for the future of the military is how it is structured.
To that end, I’ve started reading along two tracks. The first is business books about the structure of the 21st century corporation. The second is learning more about how European militaries adjusted to the Industrial Revolution. Despite all the talk about how the tank, aircraft or nuclear power revolutionized the military, I think the Industrial Revolution encompasses those all, as well as the railroad and the telegraph.
The transformation of European militaries from small, professional forces that avoided battle to large, mass forces that sought battle began with the French in the 1790s, as I understand it. Every time someone in today’s American military tells you about how hard it is to change now, think of this: The French adjusted their military to the new rules of the Industrial Revolution while fighting major foreign campaigns and putting down some insurgencies, including a pretty serious domestic one. That makes adjusting the U.S. military to the Information Age look not quite so difficult.
What else should I read about how military (or other) organizations respond to major shifts in the means of production?
(more to come)
Wikimedia Commons
More from Foreign Policy


What Putin Got Right
The Russian president got many things wrong about invading Ukraine—but not everything.


Russia Has Already Lost in the Long Run
Even if Moscow holds onto territory, the war has wrecked its future.


China’s Belt and Road to Nowhere
Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy is a “shadow of its former self.”


The U.S. Overreacted to the Chinese Spy Balloon. That Scares Me.
So unused to being challenged, the United States has become so filled with anxiety over China that sober responses are becoming nearly impossible.