Some thoughts on countering ISIS: We need a coalition fighting not just in Iraq but across much of the Middle East

By CW2 Rachid Akhrid, U.S. Army
Best Defense guest columnist

Since 2001 the international community has sought to reduce the threat of Islamic terrorism. However, despite widespread opposition to radical extremism and major military operations which resulted in the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, the situation has gradually deteriorated. Today it appears that the threat has actually grown stronger, which was indicated by the ability of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Army to occupy Mosul last summer and threaten a subsequent advance upon Baghdad. Although ISIS is contained now, it is still conducting offensives in both Iraq and Syria.

Although the United States has been able to expand its coalition, including active support from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Kurds, for now the best case scenario maybe merely containing ISIS. It seems unlikely that ISIS’s ideology will be eliminated from this region within the next few decades.

Currently, despite support from regional groups, the anti-ISIS coalition lacks significant military support from American forces and the Sahwa. After spending billions of dollars and losing many soldiers, fighting for years in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is not currently deploying enough combat troops in Iraq. Meanwhile, the Sahwa have learned from their previous experience. After supporting the coalition, the Sahwa was left to fight ISIS by itself without support from the Shiite-led Iraqi government or the United States — which they feel betrayed by failing to establish a more inclusive government. Many Sunnis believe that the United States gave Iraq to the Shiite, and to the historically despised Iranians.

When ISIS took over parts of Anbar and Mosul, they slaughtered any Sahwa member or tribal leaders that supported the United States or the Iraqi government. Understandably, ISIS is determined not to let Iraq devolve into the kind of internecine conflict seen in Syria, but their effort to do so can only be described as genocidal. Not taking any chances, ISIS executed seven hundred members of the Sheitaat tribe who tried to revolt against the group. In order to make an example, ISIS beheaded some of the Sheitaat, crucified twenty-three others, and displaced most of the community. Even at its worst, al Qaeda did not follow such practices. In Iraq, the atrocities of ISIS have eclipsed those of al Qaeda.

American support to the Iraqi government which is mainly Shia and the Kurds, will not only increase Sunni animosity toward the United States, but may provoke conflict between Shiite and Kurd. Even if ISIS is forced to withdraw, it is certain that Iraq will continue to experience severe instability. Recently, the unlikely coalition of Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, Shiite militias, and the U.S. Air Force won a major victory when it broke a siege of the Shiite Turkman town of Amerli, driving the Islamic State from twenty-five towns.

However, the aftermath is far from what the Americans envisioned. Villages have been torched by militia and most of the houses abandoned and its walls covered in sectarian slogans. The area is now held by peshmerga and Shiite militiamen, which have become the most powerful forces on the ground. Meanwhile, the Iraqi army remains largely inactive until recently, after their northern divisions collapsed during ISIS’s offensive in the summer of 2014.

During the operation to reach Amerli, Shiite militia and Kurdish forces fought under their own banners rather than the Iraqi flag, and when ISIS finally withdrew, the Shiite Militia (Kataib Hizbollah) denied Kurds entry to the town. One peshmerga commander described the Shiite militia as the “Shi’ite Islamic State.” Although this may be an exaggeration, it suggests a legitimate fear that ISIS may eventually trigger a Shiite counterpart. These tensions reflect a struggle for territory which the Shiite-led government in Baghdad claims stake, but the Kurds insist should be ruled separately as part of their autonomous region in the north of the country. Fortunately, thus far, the Kurds have shown little inclination to embrace extremist actions of their own.

In order to stabilize this situation, the United States will need to build a broader coalition that includes the West, Sunni States including Turkey, and also Iran and Syria. Any such coalition must include combat troops (“boots on the ground”) integrated alongside the Sahwa and avoid the birth of another organization that may be even more extreme than ISIS.

The coalition will also need to take action beyond the borders of Iraq, targeting extreme Sunni radicals that are fighting not only in Syria (ie: Jabhat Al Nurah Front) but also in other Arab States such as AQIP (Yemen), AQIM (North Africa), Al Shabab (Somalia), Boko Haram (Nigeria), Ansar Bait Al Maqdis (Egypt) and Ansar Al Sharia (Libya). All of these groups are committed to the creation of an Islamic Emirate, and eventually a Caliphate, and they must be considered part of the same basic organization, even if they refrain from formal integration.

In order to target the roots of this problem, the United States will need to take action within both Muslim and Western nations. The United States will need to encourage Muslim countries to implement an education curriculum which promotes a relatively liberal ideology. Religious leaders in those countries must speak out on how ISIS and other extremist groups distort Islam, denouncing the self-aggrandizing agenda of radical Islamists.

Although the United States needs to advocate for increased democracy in Muslim countries, it may also need to urge those same countries to censor any media promoting extremism, which has become prevalent online (ie: Twitter, Facebook, YouTube). Meanwhile, it is also important to target sources of funding. Charities in the rich Gulf States have been and stil the main source of funding for ISIS and other extremist organizations. Gulf States will need to monitor these institutions, diverting funds away from paramilitary organizations.

At some level, governments must accept that there is a rational economic basis which motivates terrorism, and many youths are radicalized by unemployment and despair over their perceived lack of social mobility. A great deal can be accomplished by educating the populace, preventing propaganda, and disrupting terrorist funding. However, this will not be sufficient, unless action is also taken to reduce poverty. Saudi Arabia and Qatar will need to invest more in impoverished communities, including Egypt and Morocco, and they must provide better working conditions for foreign workers. It is critical that effort be made to modify immigration laws, increase regional employment, and improving the quality of work.

In the West, more effort must be made to integrate Muslims, remembering that most Muslims are not terrorists. Racism, unemployment, poverty and media targeting of “Islamic” terrorism will only alienate moderate Muslims and could push them toward extremism. Unfortunately, individuals of the Islamic faith have faced discrimination and harassment because of their ethnicity and cultural customs.

Most European countries opted to implement a tough “zero tolerance” approach, in order to prevent Muslim citizens from becoming mujahedeen in foreign countries. For example, the British government confiscates the passport of anyone suspected of planning to fight abroad and imprisons those who return. Instead of persecuting former Jihadists, Western nations should paradoxically try to embrace those individuals once they return. Indeed, Denmark has developed a rehabilitation program offering Danish Muslims in Syria an escape route from the conflict, allowing them to return to a civilian lifestyle without the perpetual threat of prosecution. This program, involving collaboration between welfare services and police in Aarhus, offers medical and psychological treatment, alongside educational and employment services. Furthermore, support is provided to the families of those already in Syria, helping them stay in touch via Skype, facilitating liaison with government officials, and providing travel planning supported by consulates and intelligence agencies.

This Danish model offers an alternative, which has proven effective in dramatically reducing the flow of volunteers: by winning “hearts and minds.” Of course, it should also be stressed that this is not merely a humanitarian endeavor. Significant intelligence information can be gleaned from those who have just returned from fighting abroad, and assistance to jihadists should be seen as a rational investment. Western intelligence will thus have a better picture of extremist organizations and be able to identify citizens who participate.

The United States supported secular regimes in the Middle East for years and failed to learn that each time we support dictators in that region of the world we plant seed of hatred against us. The regular citizens in those countries watch us preach democracy and admire our system and then they find out that we support the same brutal regimes that are suppressing them.

Ultimately, both Western and Arabic nations must cooperate in order to address the threat of terrorism. They must develop social programs, joint military operations, and address the legitimate concerns which drive individuals to seek radical changes in society. Of course, the United States will need to lead and substantially fund this effort, but significant diplomatic effort must be made to ensure that other nations are involved as full partners and do not feel that they are being asked to support an imperialist crusade. This renewed effort must be based upon an understanding of how previous attempts have failed. The defeat of al Qaeda, and the rise of ISIS, indicates clearly the critical importance of developing a plan for the future. If we simply eliminate the existing threat, without preparing to build a new society, then we will only encourage the creation of more radical organizations.

CW2 Rachid Akhrid is a Military Intelligence Officer with 14 years of service in the United States Army. CW2 Akhrid immigrated to the United States from North Africa and subsequently served three tours in Iraq. The ideas expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not represent the views of the Department of the Army, the U.S. Department of Defense or the United States Government.                                                                                        

Wikimedia Commons