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5G Explained
Part Two: The Competitive Landscape
UPDATED: Feb. 23, 2021
PUBLISHED: Feb. 24, 2020
Part I of FP’s 5G series Technology and Infrastructure outlined how the extensive infrastructure needed for 5G RANs has led to intense competition among telecom equipment providers and the entrenchment of Huawei in the global 5G infrastructure space. In Part II of this series, we dig deeper into the 5G supply chain, outline how the development of global 5G standards will shift the power dynamics in 5G rollouts worldwide, and break down the global competitive landscape outlining how countries besides the U.S. and China are set to play major roles in 5G development.
Executive Summary

This report was written by FP Analytics, the independent research division of Foreign Policy; access to the executive summary of 5G Explained is made possible with support from Nokia.
5G technology is set to revolutionize the Internet as we know it. It will increase network speeds, enable the Internet of Things (IoT) by bringing billions of more devices online, and advance new technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning. Despite this transformative impact, the majority of businesses still do not know what 5G is and what it could do.
The “race to 5G” has been widely publicized (and the state of development wildly embellished), but the fundamental issues and realities underpinning the transition to 5G technology are still widely misunderstood. Building 5G networks requires extensive global coordination among governments, private companies, and regulatory bodies. It is an ongoing process that will unfold over the next decade at different paces in different countries. As this process occurs, understanding the stages of 5G development in different markets and accurately timing investments will be crucial for businesses. 5G technology will bring broad benefits and widespread risks globally, but there will likely not be one clear-cut winner. Nevertheless, intense geopolitical competition surrounding 5G is developing, and the results of this competition will have long-lasting and far-reaching effects.
While innovation on 4G networks was largely dominated by the United States and other Western countries, since 2012, China has made a coordinated effort to dominate the build-out of 5G networks and determine operating standards around the world. Chinese omnipresence in 5G infrastructure rollout, embodied in its national telecommunications leader, Huawei, has raised security concerns for Western and other countries and has moved the 5G debate from the technical realm into geopolitics.
China’s push to lead in 5G infrastructure development, combined with long-running U.S. concerns over Huawei’s alleged intellectual property theft, prompted President Donald Trump’s signing of an executive order banning Huawei from accessing U.S. supply chains in May of 2019. The move sparked a direct confrontation between the U.S. and China over 5G, putting the two countries directly at odds over 5G technology platforms and forcing other countries to take sides. The U.S. has succeeded in pushing Huawei out of a number of key EU markets, including the UK and France, but Huawei’s omnipresence throughout most of the developing world continues to drive conflict.
Huawei’s competitive position has diminished since the start of 2020, but it still holds some formidable advantages. Huawei’s 2019 revenue was four times greater than Nokia’s or Ericsson’s, and it owns more patents on essential telecom technology than any of its competitors. Further, Huawei played an essential role in the development of 4G networks globally and has its equipment and services already deployed in 170 countries—countries banning Huawei face a high cost for removing its existing equipment. Despite falling behind competitors in signed 5G contracts, Huawei will remain a major player in global 5G development, setting the stage for a prolonged international struggle and potentially fracturing the future 5G Internet into two separate spheres.
In FP Analytics’ three-part Power Map Series, 5G Explained, we break down the key issues surrounding the development of 5G networks and the confrontation between the U.S. and China over 5G by:
- Identifying the key players in 5G technology and infrastructure development;
- Detailing the global competitive landscape, including issues along supply chains, influence on standards, and forces driving investment decisions in markets around the world;
- Pinpointing key national security concerns, many of which are currently going unaddressed;
- Breaking down the emerging geopolitical competition over 5G; and
- Cataloguing a range of risks and opportunities for businesses.
This FP Analytics Power Map provides the most comprehensive assessment of the issues surrounding 5G to date and provides critical 5G analysis across the technical, economic, geopolitical, and security realms. Beyond the hype and hyperbole, this comprehensive overview provides businesses with an indispensable tool to help better understand the risks and opportunities with 5G.
PART TWO OF THREEThe Competitive Landscape
Introduction
Despite being deeply interdependent and commercially and economically intertwined, the U.S. and China’s divergence on 5G carries considerable implications for competition in the 5G space and could contribute to digital decoupling of the economies. Ongoing geopolitical tensions with China, as well the U.S.’s traditional allies, contribute to this divergence. While the U.S. maintains a more favorable regulatory environment for businesses to develop on 5G networks—allowing new market entrants to effectively compete and attract capital—and a deep talent pool, it does not have a coherent overall strategy for rolling out 5G infrastructure or enabling the development of an integrated 5G ecosystem. That makes it difficult to compete against a Chinese model that effectively coordinates government, corporate, academic, and research associations along unified national goals, with limited risk of bureaucratic delays or industrial policy derailment due to regime (or administration) change.
Further, as the U.S. seeks to minimize China’s 5G influence through bans, political pressure, and other measures, recent actions on the part of the Trump administration have actually diminished its leverage and ability to do so. The Trump administration’s expressed rejection of globalism (multilateralism) and pursuit of an “America First” agenda have isolated it from many NATO allies, while policies of disengagement have arguably diminished U.S. influence from Latin America to Asia. As the U.S. pushes back against Huawei’s entrenched position in 5G, South Korea, Japan, the EU, and the UK are all pushing to establish their own positions as global leaders in 5G technology. While the development of 5G has unleashed intense competition already, we are still only beginning to realize the full effects that 5G technology will have on shifting the global competitive landscape and shaping the digitalization of our economies.
Fault Lines in the Global 5G Supply Chain
The full telecom supply chain involves hundreds of companies located in nearly every country in the world, and it reached a market value of $2.4 trillion in 2019. The stability and connectivity of this supply chain are essential to building out 5G networks, as most companies competing in the telecom space rely on suppliers located in different countries. Chinese and American companies represent two critical links in the supply chain; in 2018, U.S. companies exported $146.6 billion of telecom equipment supplies, and China exported $219.7 billion. Critically, China relies heavily on the U.S. to supply semiconductors for its technology, but conflict over 5G, the ongoing U.S.–China trade war, and tensions over the spread of COVID-19 have reinforced the Trump administration’s desire to choke off this essential part of the 5G supply chain. However, Huawei has been able to obtain semiconductors with U.S. parts from other overseas suppliers. In an effort to combat this, in May of 2020, the U.S. Department of Commerce imposed rules requiring overseas semiconductor manufacturers who conduct business with Huawei to obtain licenses from U.S. authorities in order to continue doing business with U.S. suppliers, disrupting both U.S. suppliers’ and overseas purchasers’ operations, and prompting China to double-down on its efforts to develop its own domestic semiconductor industry.
Key Takeaways
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Despite rancor, China and the U.S. are dependent on each other for key inputs
Chinese telecom companies are nearly completely reliant on the U.S. semiconductor industry for inputs that constitute the heart of 5G and other advanced technologies, but the U.S. is also heavily reliant on China both for supplies of raw materials and to drive international demand for semiconductors. While recent actions from the Trump administration have further fractured this relationship, continued decoupling of U.S. and Chinese companies in the global 5G supply chain will result in significant economic losses for both sides.
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China is seeking tech “independence” by 2025
The U.S.–China trade tensions, combined with the U.S. ban on Huawei, are accelerating China’s efforts to develop its own semiconductor industry and drastically reduce its reliance on the U.S. technology. Should it succeed, it could weaken U.S. leverage over China significantly in the long run. However, given the deeply interconnected nature of the American and Chinese economies, a continuation of the current decoupling is likely to create ripple effects across other global companies that rely on American and Chinese companies to drive demand or provide equipment for the 5G supply chain. It also has the potential to delay 5G rollouts and significantly weaken Huawei’s competitive position against rivals Nokia and Ericsson.
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What’s at Stake
Bilateral tensions between the U.S. and China over 5G and trade, which have led to tariffs and security restrictions, are already beginning to distort supply chains, raise costs, and limit access for suppliers and manufacturers around the world. The spillover effects from escalating retaliations between the U.S. and China could force companies caught in the middle to find new suppliers and reorient production chains and may ultimately prolong 5G rollouts globally.
China’s Push to Set Technical 5G Standards Globally
The technology and equipment used to build telecom networks need to be globally standardized in order to be internationally interoperable. Setting these global standards is a collaborative effort by seven standards-setting organizations from Japan, the U.S., Canada, Europe, India, and Korea, and overseen by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). Together, these organizations set standards for mobile networks based on performance and interoperability criteria established by the United Nations International Telecommunications Union (ITU)—and China is seeking to drive that dialogue.
Key Takeaways
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Companies setting the 5G standards are positioned to win big
Companies whose technology becomes the industry standard for 5G infrastructure and equipment will be the default, and those companies will receive royalty payments from other ecosystem participants; such payments can be further channeled into future innovation, further strengthening those companies’ competitive position within the 5G ecosystem. These standards are critically important, because they ultimately determine both the equipment and software that will be used for building 5G networks globally.
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China is heavily influencing 5G standards-setting
Unlike in 3G and 4G, China has been heavily involved in the standards process for 5G. Since 2013, China has claimed more than thirty key positions in the 3GPP, including one of three chairmanships and two of the nine vice chairmanships within the technical specification groups that compose the 3GPP.
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What’s at Stake
China’s influence over 5G standards will guarantee revenue streams for its companies and give Chinese companies a competitive advantage in building applications on top of 5G networks using its equipment. China’s strong position increases the risk that the U.S. will try to enforce separate standards for the U.S. market, leading to market bifurcation and inefficiencies and limiting scale and interoperability across networks.
The Fight Over Spectrum Allocations
“Spectrum” refers to invisible radio frequencies that wireless signals travel over and that telecom companies use to transmit data across their networks. It is a key enabler of 5G and the superhighway for digital applications. However, the frequency of radio waves—or “spectrum bands” allocated by governments for 5G—will in part determine which technology is used to build out, and build on top of, the 5G telecom network. While the global standard for 5G equipment and technology is determined through a formal process in the 3GPP, the global spectrum standard is largely determined through first-mover advantage—despite efforts to standardize it in the global standards bodies. In the case of 3G and 4G, the first country—the U.S.—to have fully deployed stand-alone networks on a new generation of cellular technology has had the spectrum band it operates on adopted as the global standard. Such will be the case for 5G as well.
Key Takeaways
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Vying for first-mover advantage, the U.S. and China are building 5G networks using opposite ends of the spectrum
China prefers to use the “sub-6” standard, primarily made up of low- and mid-band spectrum, while the U.S. prefers the “mmWave” standard consisting of primarily high-band spectrum. The global community is largely split on which spectrum frequencies to develop its 5G networks on, meaning that the country to first launch stand-alone 5G networks to their preferred standard—and begin development on them—will significantly increase the likelihood that their preferred spectrum allocation will be adopted as the global standard.
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A Global Divide on Spectrum Frequencies Could Lead to Two Divergent Systems
As the U.S. and China prefer different spectrum frequencies, countries in Asia and Europe are divided between the two development trajectories. This divide could delay 5G rollouts in some markets, risk companies building to one development trajectory based on spectrum frequency preference and limiting ability to scale, as well as lead to interoperability issues and market fragmentation if two different standards are ultimately used.
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What’s at Stake
The availability of one seamlessly integrated global 5G network. If different spectrum standards are adopted, companies risk needing to develop applications that work with two separate standards, or risk losing out on operating in key markets that have adopted the competing standard.
Regional Competitive Dynamics & Geopolitical Implications
As the world’s two largest economies with considerable influence over trade and economic development globally, the U.S.–China competition over 5G will shape the international landscape and could ultimately disrupt different regions’ abilities to take full advantage of 5G technology. However, the full scale of 5G competition is not limited to the U.S. and China, with major competition in 5G equipment development and network deployment emerging in Europe and Asia.
Key Takeaways
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U.S. retaliation against Huawei will have broad economic impacts
The U.S. decision to restrict semiconductor sales to Huawei as a measure of retaliation against Huawei’s 5G dominance, will have effects that will be felt throughout the rest of the world. Countries relying on Huawei for 5G will be set back on their deployment timelines, U.S. companies selling to Huawei will incur substantial losses, and companies all along the 5G supply chain will potentially need to locate different suppliers and buyers.
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Global conflicts over 5G regulation could limit interoperability
The difference in spectrum preferences between the U.S. and China, and a U.S. refusal to work with Huawei equipment adopted as standard, could potentially divide the Internet into two spheres. Additionally, if another country, such as South Korea, begins deploying stand-alone 5G networks and effectively developing on them first, they would also have a first-mover advantage in setting standards that may be adopted globally. This potential divide could limit interoperability, complicate development for companies on 5G networks, and limit market access based on the adopted standard.
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What’s at Stake
A standardized, interoperable 5G network that allows seamless connectivity and data transfer across international borders. Deepening divides between the U.S. and China on 5G could force countries to develop on different standards, while U.S. retaliation against Huawei through export controls could severely delay global 5G rollouts.
Next in Our 5G Power Map Series: 5G and National Security
The development of 5G networks will span the globe and potentially create billions of dollars in economic gains for countries that are able to leverage development on their 5G networks. However, underlying the opportunity promised by the development of 5G are grave concerns about 5G networks’ general vulnerabilities, the trustworthiness of Huawei and China as global actors, and the potential ramifications for national security. With 5G enabling the broad digitalization of the global economy, the potential opportunities for cyber-attacks from bad actors will be more abundant, and their impacts amplified. In the final installment of FP’s 5G Power Map series, we will outline the potential national security threats for governments around the globe, explain key potential vulnerabilities in 5G networks, and explore the implications of China and the U.S.’s confrontation over Huawei on global security – including breaking down the ramifications of the recent U.S. racketeering charges against Huawei. Crucially, we will explain why 5G networks pose a national security risk for all countries and will outline how country-specific risks can be assessed and prepared for.
Written by Christian Perez. Edited by Allison Carlson. Copyedited by David Johnstone. Design and development by Andrew Baughman. Art direction by Adam Griffiths.

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