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Arctic Competition
Part One: Resource Competition in the Arctic
PUBLISHED ON OCTOBER 13
FP Analytics’ two-part Arctic Competition Power Map provides readers with an in-depth breakdown of how melting sea ice is enabling increased commercial activity and geopolitical competition over resources, shipping routes, and territory in the Arctic. In Part I, we visualize how climate change is physically transforming the Arctic, lay out the scale of potential resources that will be made available, and detail the positions and interests of major players in the region. We provide a thorough walk-through of why the region is gaining increasing commercial and geopolitical importance, and explicitly lay out different actors’ interests in the Arctic, from domestic economic development to securing critical supply chain. As new actors such as China establish their presence in the region, nations are forging fresh political and commercial partnerships across a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape. The impacts of these new partnerships will transform the Arctic and create major political fault lines with the potential to spark future conflict and confrontation.
Executive Summary
Rapidly receding sea ice is enabling access to a range of highly valuable resources across the Arctic. In addition to energy reserves, critical minerals, and fisheries, newly opened shipping routes across the Arctic could potentially help to re-route global trade and enable high-speed Internet connectivity between Europe and Asia. The ability to exploit newly available Arctic resources is drawing increasing interest from both commercial and national actors and is enticing nations, such as China and Japan, to pour both political and financial capital into the region.
When oil prices peaked in 2008, it appeared that a race to secure oil resources in the Arctic was inevitable. However, due to a rapid fall in global oil demand and the high cost of oil extraction in the Arctic, development failed to materialize. Instead, the dynamics of resource competition in the Arctic have shifted toward securing critical minerals, exploiting natural gas reserves, and asserting territorial control over recently opened shipping routes along the Arctic coast. Additionally, the entrance of Asian and European Nations into Arctic affairs has dramatically shifted regional geopolitical dynamics.
The admittance of Asian countries—China, Japan, South Korea, India, and Singapore—as Observer states to the Arctic Council in 2013 significantly expanded the geopolitical landscape of the Arctic. As more national interests converge there, new commercial alliances are being forged. China now looks to Russia’s Arctic energy resources as a means to diversify its energy supply, while European nations are eager to partner with Asian nations to develop high-speed Internet and shipping along the Northern Sea Route.
With new players and commercial relationships emerging in the Arctic, there has been an attendant increase in international tensions. Strengthening commercial ties between Asian and European nations, and deepening levels of Chinese investment across the region—coupled with Russia’s emerging primacy—are generating pushback from the U.S. In May of 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo directly called out Chinese and Russian activities in the Arctic as threats to U.S. national interests and security. Moreover, the wider uncoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies are making the Arctic an arena of great power competition.
Growing tensions over control of critical minerals that are essential to modern technologies, disputed shipping routes, and Chinese entrenchment across the Arctic are also putting pressure on the region’s governance framework. Consisting of an amalgamation of governance organizations and treaties, the region’s governance structures are not designed to contain or mitigate potential great power conflicts. An escalation between the U.S. and China or Russia would divide the region and significantly harm cooperative efforts toward environmental preservation and mitigation of climate change.
Part I of FP Analytics’ Arctic Competition Power Map breaks down key emerging trends across the Arctic by:
- Mapping access and control of key resource bases;
- Breaking down the public- and private-sector actors collaborating and competing for Arctic access and influence;
- Projecting the key points of geopolitical tension and the relative power positions of the actors involved; and,
- Outlining the legal landscape and governance structures in place to mitigate conflict across the region.
FP Analytics’ Arctic Competition Power Map is a powerful tool for businesses and others seeking to understand how emerging great power competition across the Arctic will help shape and influence the wider geopolitical landscape. Part II will map out Russian and NATO military activities in the Arctic and will explore materializing national security risks.
Introduction
Climate change has impacted the Arctic more than any other region in the world, with changes in surface temperatures increasing between two and three degrees over the last fifty years. Rising temperatures are rapidly changing the Arctic’s physical geography and allowing increased access to an immense untapped resource base of 13 percent of the world’s oil reserves, nearly 30 percent of its natural gas, a wide range of critical minerals, and fisheries accounting for 10 percent of the global catch. Melting ice is also freeing up new shipping routes among Asia, Europe, and the U.S., cutting down average shipping times between Europe and Asia from thirty-seven days to twenty-two, and shipping times from the U.S. to Asia from forty-three days to thirty-two. Resource accessibility and expansion of commercial shipping routes are increasing the Arctic’s commercial and strategic importance, as national governments and private industry move to secure greater influence in the region.
For national governments, there are both strong incentives to cooperate on trade and investment across the Arctic, as well as emerging disputes over territory and alliances that are heightening tensions—particularly among geopolitical superpowers, notably Russia, China, and the United States. Russia’s position as the largest and most economically active Arctic state, and China’s growing investment in Russian infrastructure and energy projects in the region are fueling competition and potential conflict. For Russia, the Arctic represents a critical pillar for its economic development, with billions of dollars’ worth energy and mineral resources for domestic use and export, and a means to expand its international influence through control of critical shipping routes between Asia and Europe. To date, Russia has been the nation most heavily invested in Arctic development, and many in Europe and Asia are reliant on Russian natural gas exports, which are predominantly extracted there.
Notably, China has partnered extensively with Russia, as both an importer of Russian natural gas and an investor in infrastructure development along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which could give China access to shorter shipping routes to Europe, saving billions of dollars in shipping costs and strengthening commercial ties to Europe. The opening of the NSR would also benefit Europe, granting easier access to China—its second-largest commercial trade market—and paving the way for high-speed digital connectivity between the two continents by way of submarine Internet cables along the NSR seabed. While not commonly reported, undersea Internet cables will play a crucial role in spurring future tech-based industrial growth in the Arctic, as well as in boosting Arctic nations’ defense capabilities by enabling the monitoring of both the Arctic seabed and cyberspace communications. For the U.S., there is potential to access a range of resources, including critical minerals such as rare earths, copper, and phosphorus. Beyond the potential for resource extraction, the U.S. government views the Arctic as an arena for countering Russian and Chinese international influence and is now seeking to establish a stronger presence in the region for deterrence, as articulated in the Pentagon’s June 2019 Department of Defense Arctic Strategy report to Congress.
As these resource plays and global trends play out, competition in the Arctic is set to be a multi-dimensional and evolving power struggle with commercial and geopolitical implications. In Part I of this two-part Power Map series, we break down the current state of this competition, outline how different actors are positioning themselves, and explore the implications for companies, national governments and the environment.
The Impact of Climate Change and Rapidly Expanding Access to Arctic Resources
While there is no universally agreed-upon definition of what territory constitutes the Arctic, it is generally understood to be the northernmost part of the Earth that lies above the 66°33′ north latitude line in the region referred to as the “Arctic Circle.” This region has played a number of historically significant roles, from Britain’s early attempts to find the Northwest Passage, to Russia’s militarization of the Arctic throughout the Cold War. Today, the impacts of climate change are making this region more critical to global commerce and geopolitics than ever as sea ice melt rapidly degrades natural habitats within the Arctic and makes abundant natural resources more readily available. Russia, China, the U.S., Europe, and other nations are intensifying their focus on the Arctic. Apart from Europe, these three other global powers have each released updated Arctic strategy policy documents in the past three years and have recently deployed commercial, scientific, and/or military expeditions in the Arctic. The large stores of oil, natural gas, minerals, and fisheries held in the Arctic are becoming increasingly accessible, drawing interest from national actors and private industry, while generating pushback from conservation groups that hope to prevent further exploitation of the region and its Indigenous peoples.
Key Takeaways
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The Issue
The Arctic today provides an estimated $281 billion worth of food, minerals, oil, and gas, and climate change is set to increase the economic opportunities across these industries as well as provide new commercial shipping routes. The promise of these resources is attracting national and private interests to the Arctic while threatening Indigenous communities and local ecosystems.
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The Reaction
The abundant resources held in the Arctic have generated interest from myriad commercial and national actors looking to seize on and strengthen regional energy, food, and technology supply chains. These resources include roughly a quarter of the world’s untapped and accessible energy resources, fisheries that currently generate an average of $560 million annually and are set to increase up to thirty-seven times in size due to climate-driven migration, and an estimated two trillion dollars’ worth of minerals held in the Russian Arctic alone.
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What’s at Stake
Commercial industry stands to gain access to billions of dollars’ worth of resources—in the forms of oil, natural gas, critical minerals, and fisheries—while increased economic activity in the Arctic will simultaneously accelerate sea ice melt, ocean acidification, and rising temperatures. The economic potential the Arctic holds is also aggravating political tensions among Arctic nations, Indigenous populations, and environmental groups. While resource extraction in the Arctic is still costly and potentially dangerous due to an inhospitable environment, the increasing global demand for critical minerals and seafood supplies provided by fisheries continues to drive investment into the region.
Arctic Governance and Positioning of Power Players
Overlapping organizational mandates, treaties, and conventions complicate Arctic governance. The patchwork nature of Arctic governance is not effectively designed to constrain great power competition, and China’s entrance into the Arctic—as well as the U.S.’s increased focus on the region—are putting pressure on this framework. In the absence of a more coherent and collaborative governance structure, national interests prevail, with outside forces leveraging bilateral relationships to achieve their aims and strengthen their footholds in the region. The current governance framework has increased cooperation among Arctic states on issues such as climate change, Indigenous rights, and scientific research. However, it is ill-equipped to resolve economic disputes between the U.S. and China, or a potential military escalation between the U.S. and Russia.
Key Takeaways
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The Issue
A fragmented Arctic governance framework, the Trump administration’s strategic prioritization to counter Russian and Chinese influence in the Arctic, and increasing tensions among the U.S., China, and Russia could further disrupt commercial investments. While a patchwork governance framework of international standards, laws, and treaties has proven effective at resolving small-scale Arctic disputes to date, it is ill-equipped to mitigate a major escalation or confrontation between great powers.
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The Reaction
China cemented its status as an Arctic Observer state on the Arctic Council in 2013 and has continued to expand both its political and economic influence in the region ever since. In May of 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo openly condemned Chinese and Russian Arctic activities along the Northern Sea Route at an Arctic Council meeting, citing competing territorial claims. The U.S.’s increasingly hostile relationships with China and Russia are challenging Arctic governance structures and diverting focus from cooperation on climate change and research.
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What’s at Stake
Future access to Arctic resources, shipping routes, and territorial claims. National governments and companies that establish their positions in the Arctic now are likely to influence the reorientation of trade and balance of power in the region. However, competing strategic interests and visions for development in the region could imperil future collaborative governance, which would risk necessary cooperation on trade and development in the region.
Emerging Arctic Geopolitical Competition and Cooperation
Competition for Arctic resources, particularly critical minerals and natural gas, is shaping geopolitics in the region, but direct military confrontation over resources has not yet materialized. Economic tensions in the Arctic today are largely manifesting from China’s investments in the region, Russia’s commercial partnerships and militarization, and territorial disputes. China invested $450 billion in the Arctic from 2012 through 2017, across all of the Arctic nations. Chinese investment is driving development of the Northern Sea Route, for both shipping and submarine Internet connectivity. In addition to creating stronger commercial ties between China and Russia, this development would strengthen Russia’s claim of sovereign control over the NSR, which the U.S. still disputes. The Arctic’s geographic position among the U.S., Russia, and Europe makes it a de facto location for competition to play out among these powers, and Russia’s and China’s investment ambitions are making the region a focal point of competition between great powers.
Key Takeaways
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The Issue
China’s extensive investments across the region are providing funding for the development of the Northern Sea Route and submarine Internet cables connecting Europe and Asia via Russia. The extent of Chinese FDI—and its critical role in Russian development of the Arctic and the Northern Sea Route—is the major point of friction driving U.S. intervention in the region today.
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The Reaction
The U.S. is leading the pushback against China’s increased Arctic presence and its economic partnerships with Russia. Having openly condemned China’s and Russia’s Arctic activities, the U.S. has pressured countries into canceling Chinese-funded commercial projects and has cited Chinese activity as a key catalyst for its renewed focus on the Arctic.
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What’s at Stake
Chinese investments provide billions of dollars in funding for Arctic economic development, with several nations courting investors to shore up local economies. Chinese investment is critical to developing Arctic infrastructure and access resources, and U.S. efforts to deter China’s regional presence will be highly divisive among Arctic nations.
Looking Ahead: Commercial Competition Setting the Stage for Regional Defense Buildup
Melting sea ice is enabling increased access to the Arctic’s abundant natural resources, with tensions growing over the control of Arctic waters and major commercial implications—particularly for shipping routes and future digital connectivity. Additionally, the Arctic’s geographic position among Europe, the U.S., and Russia makes it susceptible to geopolitical confrontations among nations, sparked by events outside of the region. While the Arctic has been a region of international cooperation and peace in recent decades, increased U.S. and Chinese involvement in the region could upset this balance. The U.S. is likely to continue pushing back against China’s increased presence and against Russia’s assertion of control over the NSR and its military buildup. While European nations have been split on accepting Chinese investment, with economic and geopolitical considerations differing across countries, to date they have largely not opposed Russian economic development in the region. However, Russia’s increasing military presence has pushed Europe to begin collaborating with NATO allies to counter military activity in the Arctic. Russia’s military buildup presents one of the greater challenges facing the region, and militarization of the Arctic is likely to increase tensions in the region more quickly than competition over resources. In Part II of FP Analytics’ Arctic Competition Power Map series, we will explore Russia’s increasing militarization of the Arctic, China’s role, and the Arctic’s governance framework’s ability to manage competition among great powers.
Written by Christian Perez. Edited by Allison Carlson. Copyedited by David Johnstone. Design by Jon Benedict. Development by Catherine Snow. Art direction by Lori Kelley. Graphics by Juan Velasco/5W Infographics for Foreign Policy.

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