Russia and the West Keep Misreading Each Other

A war with Ukraine would bring nothing good for Russia, no matter how it plays out. Neither Ukraine itself nor its accession to NATO poses a threat to Russia. A stable and effective democracy in Ukraine threatens the Russian regime, but that’s quite another question. A war would bring Russia enormous human losses, a sharp deterioration in its economic position, an exacerbation of all social problems, total isolation, and the transformation of the country into a military encampment.

Tragically, none of this means a war can’t happen—for reasons linked to the psychology of Russian President Vladimir Putin and his cronies. But don’t make the mistake of thinking that the Russian people themselves want this war—or that they wouldn’t also be victims of it.

The Russian government and Putin personally have been unable to accept reality: the existence of an independent Ukraine. They see Ukraine as a breakaway territory that must be returned to Russia or at the very least be an effective vassal state. This is why Putin keeps repeating the falsehoods that Russians and Ukrainians are one people, that the Russian and Ukrainian languages are one language, and that Ukraine did not exist until Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin created it.

War seems senseless for Russia, but it could break out because the objective of the Russian authorities is not to ensure the security and prosperity of their country but, above all, to achieve grandeur—as they perceive it. For Putin and his inner circle, grandeur means that others fear you and that you can do whatever you want, regardless of laws and agreements. That’s the policy they’ve pursued at home and the one they’re equally determined to force on the world. Putin wants to be seen as the ruler of half of the world, like Joseph Stalin in 1945 or Genghis Khan. He wants to be the architect and founder of a new, anti-Western world order.

Failure to understand Putin’s real objectives makes negotiations with him difficult. The demands that he makes, which his negotiation partners often take seriously, aren’t that important to him; they are just a cover for what is left beyond the framework of the documents—his pursuit of recognition, admiration, and respect. This is what motivates him to amass troops, not implementation of the Minsk agreements.

Putin and his colleagues don’t respect the West; they hold it in contempt, viewing it as cowardly and duplicitous. This is why they made a fundamentally impossible ultimatum and use such hostile language: They think that the West should fear them, the way a law-abiding citizen might fear a street thug. However, their ultimatum did not have the desired effect. We haven’t seen a reiteration of the 1938 Munich Agreement, when the United Kingdom and France ceded Sudetenland to Germany. Rather, the situation resembles 1939, when Britain and France told Adolf Hitler that if he attacked Poland, they would declare war.

There are two factors that could restrain the Russian government from a disastrous decision. The first would be Western sanctions—but not sectoral sanctions, which affect the living standards of ordinary Russians, something the Kremlin doesn’t care about except if it sparks further political discontent. What might be effective would be personal sanctions targeting the people closest to Putin. Most of them have assets and real estate in the West, and their relatives live or spend extended periods of time in the United States and Europe. Their discontent could affect the decisions that Putin makes as well as the regime overall.

The second sobering consideration would be the understanding that the Ukrainian army will put up a fight. Putin’s electorate will not forgive him if their sons and daughters begin coming home in body bags. And the technical preparedness and morale of the Ukrainians aren’t as important as their perception in Moscow. Stereotypes that are common in Russia—that Ukrainians are cowardly and yield to the use of force, while Russians are the strongest people—could play a negative role here. Back in December 1994, when Defense Minister Pavel Grachev was persuading President Boris Yeltsin to start a war in Chechnya, he promised to capture Grozny in two hours with one division. Instead, the Chechen wars lasted many years, cost tens of thousands of lives, and left Russia with a tenuous control of the territory at best. And before Russia’s invasion of Afghanistan, the generals had assured Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev that the Afghan fighters would undoubtedly lose to the Russian army, the best soldiers in the world.

But even if the deterrents are effective, Putin will need a way to save face. He will need to declare his victory, whatever this victory comprises. Prestige is more important for Putin than anything else. If he does not find a solution, Putin may opt for war, no matter how senseless and destructive it would be.

Putin’s influence over the West is bolstered by another perceptual error: Many people in the United States and Europe have a mistaken view of Russian society. In particular, many overestimate the level of Putin’s popular support. His election results definitely don’t reflect real sentiment. Support for Putin and his United Russia party has been consistently declining, as demonstrated by public opinion surveys and focus group discussions.

Furthermore, even Putin’s backers among the public do so for largely negative reasons—a belief that others are even worse and that Putin’s departure would mean a collapse of the social order. Hardly anyone thinks that Putin can make the country better; there is no positive support. The people don’t think that Putin can “make Russia great again.”

The idea of war with Ukraine is also very unpopular. The patriotic fervor that swept Russia with the annexation of Crimea is long gone. Yes, propaganda has been working. Most Russians believe that the United States and Ukraine are inciting the war, and only 4 percent understand that Russia would be at fault if war broke out; however, the majority wants and hopes to avoid war. If a war does begin, there will be no public consensus.

Looking at Russian history, many in the West believe that a dictatorship is natural for the country and that Russians don’t need freedom. But Russian history is not just a series of dictators like Ivan the Terrible and Stalin. There were also leaders like Alexander II, who emancipated Russia’s serfs without a war; Alexander Kerensky, the head of the post-revolutionary government; Mikhail Gorbachev; and Yeltsin. There were the Novgorod and Pskov republics.

And today Russia has European cities and pro-European young people, as well as intrepid citizens who go to jail in the name of freedom—their own and that of others—and in the name of the right to tell the truth. Catherine the Great once proclaimed that “Russia is a European power.” Russians aspire to freedom and deserve it no less than Americans and Europeans.