Turkey’s Balancing Act Between Putin and the West

ISTANBUL—Since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has provided a lifeline of people and money for Turkey—and received plenty of benefits in return.

Over the past year, Russians have flooded into Turkey in droves. Many are buying up property, whereas others came to escape conscription into the army, bank their savings outside Russian President Vladimir Putin’s sanctioned economy, or open businesses; last year alone, Russians opened 1,363 new companies in Turkey. At immigration offices throughout Turkey’s biggest cities, it’s now mostly Russians applying for residence permits, and more than 155,000 of them have been granted, according to Turkish government data. 

Turkey and its economy have mostly welcomed the newcomers and their cash. To an extent, they have—at least temporarily—changed the faces of Turkish cities, such as Istanbul or Antalya. Rent has shot up, but natural gas prices have remained low; coffee shops are crowded with Russian visitors; and even the occasional billboard is now in Cyrillic.

For Turkey, maintaining and even deepening relations with Russia while also maintaining its place as one of NATO’s biggest members is a tricky but much-needed balancing act. Turkey is squeezed between Iran and the West, has a land border with Syria, controls the Black Sea’s only access to the ocean, and has a maritime border with Ukraine and Russia. Since the war began, Turkey has managed to prop up both the Ukrainian military effort and Russia’s war-battered economy. 

On its northern shores, Turkey has supplied Ukraine with drones—used to great effect against Russian forces—and helped negotiate a deal that allows Ukrainian grain to be shipped out of Black Sea ports. At the same time, Turkey has stepped up its purchases of Russian gas and oil and partially helped shield Moscow from punishing sanctions.

For Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, it’s a devil’s bargain born of his own geopolitical, political, and economic needs. Erdogan faces perhaps his most challenging election in May, and Russian support might just help carry him through.

“Russia and Turkey: That’s a marriage of convenience,” said Alper Coskun, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It certainly isn’t an easy marriage.

In 2015, relations between the two nations soured when Turkey shot down a Russian jet that violated its airspace in southeastern Turkey on the Syrian border. In June 2016, Erdogan apologized and signaled readiness to restore ties. A month later, Russia offered help to Erdogan after a failed coup attempt in Turkey. 

To Turkey, Russia offers an opportunity, but it also poses a threat. An aggressive Russia controlling Ukrainian coastal cities certainly isn’t in Turkey’s interest, but neither is the rise of a Kurdish statelet in northern Syria. Since 2014, the United States has supported Kurdish fighters in northern Syria, whereas Turkey claims the Kurdish militias have deep ties with the militant-political Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a designated terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union. Russia has been on the other end in Syria, supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. 

Turkey’s support to Ukraine is not a game-changer in the war though, said independent Moscow-based Russia expert Kerim Has. “Military aid is certainly there, and it shouldn’t be underestimated, but it’s not crossing Moscow’s red lines. Turkey is not sending tanks or fighter jets. It’s at a tolerable level for the Kremlin.”

Economically, especially since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has propped up Turkey’s economy with huge inflows of capital, even turning a blind eye to Ankara’s limited military support for Kyiv. The two countries are currently negotiating a potential gas discount, and Turkey has asked Russia to postpone gas payments until 2024, offering at least temporary economic relief. 

It’s still a two-way street. For the isolated and sanctioned Kremlin, Turkey has become a financial safe haven. Last year, trade between the two countries amounted to an estimated $70 billion, with Turkey one of Russia’s biggest trading partners. At the same time, hundreds of Western companies are looking at circumventing sanctions by opening up offices in Turkey to continue trade with Russia, Turkish newspaper Hurriyet Daily News reported. 

Ahead of Turkey’s May 14 elections, Putin’s moves to empower Erdogan are his best bet.

“Putin doesn’t really have any other choice, so it’s a pragmatic approach,” Has said. “While Erdogan isn’t always a reliable partner for Moscow, Putin doesn’t have a better alternative to work with in Turkey and beyond: All other alternatives are more pro-Western leaders.” 

For Turkey, pragmatism rules too. Geographically and militarily, Turkey places itself with the Western block and has been a vital ally for the West, but economically, Turkey has no other option but to work with Russia. “If Russia cuts gas to Turkey, it would be a disaster,” Has said. “Likewise, if the Turkish economy collapses, European banks will also suffer with the number of loans Turkey has taken from them.”

Still, like all marriages—of convenience or otherwise—there is plenty of history and potential friction on the horizon. Erdogan recognizes Russia as a reality in the Black Sea region, especially with the United States largely absent economically and militarily. “Erdogan has adapted to this: the U.S.’s shifting focus away from the Black Sea region,” said Muhammet Kocak, an Ankara-based independent foreign affairs analyst.

Still, historic animosities and long-term rivalry could return to trump today’s immediate economic and political symbiosis, he said.

“Due to its partnership with Russia, Turkey has addressed its immediate, mostly Syria-related security issues but, at the same time, values its NATO membership and security alliance with the West,” Kocak added. “In the long run, Russia remains a historic competitor and threat to Turkey’s security. These dynamics likely outweigh the economic advantages.”