The U.K. Has a Chance to Stop Backsliding on Climate

Boris Johnson enjoys political theater—and when it came to climate change, he was keen to play a leading role. The then-U.K. prime minister opened the 2021 U.N. Climate Change Conference (COP26) World Leaders Summit by comparing the threat of climate change to the world-ending weapons that regularly appear in James Bond films, arguing that “the tragedy [of climate change is that it] is not a movie, and the doomsday device is real and the clock is ticking.” But Johnson’s typically imaginative oratory underscored a more serious point: his premiership’s impressive focus on tackling climate change as a matter of national and global security, in addition to its “leveling up” agenda.

Of course, more malign forms of drama followed, and so did two prime ministers in quick succession after Johnson’s fall. Unfortunately, both Liz Truss, in office for a mere six weeks, and current Prime Minister Rishi Sunak stepped away from climate leadership of the degree that Johnson promoted, partly due to a return to fiscal conservativism. For a country and a Conservative Party searching for a positive policy platform, fumbling the opportunity to build on the COP26 legacy is a mistake. Thankfully, the forthcoming update to the United Kingdom’s Integrated Review (IR) of security, defense, development, and foreign policy, expected this month, is an opportunity to both remedy this oversight and recapture the sense that “Global Britain” exists, and is willing and able to lead.

The original IR, released in March 2021, notably—and nobly—tackled the issue of climate change and decarbonization in great detail, especially compared to similar national security strategies of U.K. allies, such as the United States, which still devotes comparatively much less attention to the same policy area. The IR emphasized Britain’s diplomatic leadership in the global energy transition, particularly highlighting its commitment to providing up to 11.6 billion pounds in international climate finance between 2021 and 2026. Read in this context, the IR laid the foundations for much of what the U.K. achieved during its COP26 presidency—from Just Energy Transition Partnerships for South Africa and Vietnam, to a burgeoning global reputation on climate diplomacy.

Yet, two years on from the original IR’s release and just over a year after COP26, Britain’s leadership on climate change is fast waning. This was not inevitable. Unlike in the United States, there is no huge gulf between the U.K.’s political parties on climate change, which both Labour and Conservatives recognize as a serious global challenge. But the Conservative Party has a streak of denialism, influenced in part by its transatlantic counterparts. Against the backdrop of war in Ukraine and a global energy crisis, Truss was stubbornly uninterested in the net zero agenda, going as far as appointing Jacob Rees-Mogg, historically an enthusiastic climate-change denier, to the U.K.’s energy portfolio.

Sunak has been less negative, and his recent move to create a Department for Energy Security and Net Zero is clearly a positive step. Nonetheless, so far Sunak remains lukewarm in his climate ambitions. In fact, he chose not to retain COP26 President Alok Sharma in his cabinet, and only attended the COP27 conference following public backlash. Furthermore, his engagement with the energy security debate before the new department’s establishment was primarily from a domestic perspective (as was particularly demonstrated by Michael Gove, the leveling up secretary, approving a new coal mine).

Despite these significant steps back from Britain’s successes during its COP26 presidency, there is an immediate opportunity to rectify this mistaken course. Much of the original IR, written before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the global energy shock, requires updating. Truss recognized this and committed to updating the IR, and Sunak has vowed to do the same. So, while the upcoming update is causing concern among security-focused climate experts, given Sunak apparently does not share the same perspective as Johnson, it is still a critical opportunity to define a strategy toward decarbonization that builds upon the U.K.’s previous achievements.

Primarily, the updated IR needs to build on the momentum Sunak has raised with his new Net Zero Department by explicitly recognizing climate change as an existential threat to British and global security and committing to act accordingly. This approach would put the task of mitigating climate change at home and abroad above most attempts to politicize net zero carbon emission goals, and begin to prepare for some of the difficult behavioral and funding decisions that reality might entail.

Under such a framework, the U.K. Foreign Office and Treasury could engage meaningfully with Barbados’s fast-moving Bridgetown Agenda, a climate and development-focused reform initiative that has the World Bank and other intergovernmental finance organizations in its sights. It would also be a vital signal to the U.K.’s allies, and indeed international climate laggards (many of whom have used U.K. policy confusion as justification for their own slow progress), that the U.K. is serious about building on the hard-won reputational gains from COP26. In addition, by affording the net zero secretary a seat at the cabinet, there is now impetus for the formation of a new climate change subcommittee within the U.K. National Security Council.

If the updated IR sets such clear ambitions on climate action, with obvious links to U.K. and global security, it will likewise provide cover for the domestic and international policy decisions that must follow. A helpful move would be to seize the momentum generated by Sunak’s decision to bring a net zero secretary to the Cabinet table and fully implement the recommendations of former U.K. Energy Minister Chris Skidmore, as laid out in his review into net zero implementation by 2050. Further committing to the necessary investment in domestic climate action would be a similarly effective and practical recognition of the climate and national security link. The U.K. government could then build upon this domestic agenda by actively working with devolved authorities, such as London, that have committed to the more ambitious 2030 net zero goal.

Internationally, it is critical to both the global transition and to trust in U.K. leadership that the government reiterate its ironclad international climate finance commitments as well. The U.K.’s commitment of 11.6 billion pounds between 2021 and 2026 for climate finance is totemic, and that funding must now be deployed effectively. This includes supporting the expansion of the Just Energy Transition Partnerships and prioritizing support for at-risk global south countries, whether via the Bridgetown Agenda generally or the loss and damage fund particularly. Such a move will be critical to the U.K.’s credibility at future COPs and similar summits, particularly against the backdrop of ongoing aid challenges.

As it stands now, even with his cabinet reshuffle, Sunak has not yet defined himself or his premiership. Indeed, the combination of corruption scandals, domestic cost of living and labor crises, and a rebellious parliamentary party have all largely restricted his ability to set out a compelling policy platform at all, and has contributed to the U.K. public’s mixed to negative views of his ministry.

Now that Sunak has demonstrated his willingness to take a stronger stance against climate change and towards net zero with the creation of the Net Zero Department, it is time for a more ambitious climate strategy outlined in the IR. This would enable Sunak to take on an international leadership opportunity, set out a positive green policy vision to the U.K. public, respond to Labour’s popular Green New Deal-type climate platform, and model himself as a modernizing and moderate Conservative figure.

If Sunak wants to be remembered for transformative policy rather than firefighting, using the IR update as a key catalyst for more decisive action on climate change would be an excellent place for him to start.