Why Washington Should Say No to Riyadh

Now that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has clarified what he expects from Washington in return for normalizing ties with Israel—mainly U.S. security guarantees—the question is: Should U.S. decision-makers accept his price?

But first, consider the oddity of the proposed quid pro quo. Saudi Arabia is asking the U.S. government to formally commit to Saudi security—something the United States does only with treaty allies, including NATO members—as compensation for embracing Israel. Again, the kingdom wants protection in exchange for something it would do not for Washington, but for a U.S. partner.

Officials in Riyadh recognize how deep the United States’ bond with Israel is, and they are unashamedly trying to capitalize on it. The Saudis have learned from Arab countries friendly to the United States that if they treat the Jewish state right, they could get handsomely compensated by Washington. Saudi Arabia is not looking for financial assistance from the United States. Rather, it wants protection from the threat of Iran.

As much as the United States cares about Israel, the Saudi proposal should be a non-starter for Washington.

The crown prince’s Saudi-first policy, I learned on a recent trip to the kingdom when I met with senior Saudi officials, has a two-pronged security strategy. Instead of choosing between Beijing and Washington to develop stronger defenses against Iran, he is relying on both, but in different capacities.

The monarch-in-waiting will test whether China, which brokered a Saudi-Iran rapprochement last week, can rein in Iranian aggression. It’s a low-risk and shrewd move. Beijing has leverage over Tehran, given the latter’s reliance on the former’s economic investments and purchase of Iranian oil.

But Mohammed bin Salman knows that diplomacy with no teeth (Chinese or otherwise) has its limits. After all, Beijing has no ability, or desire, to deter or punish Iran should it renege on its promises and resume its violence against Saudi Arabia, either directly or through its sub-state allies in Yemen and Iraq. Hence, the second leg of the Saudi strategy is necessary—a defense pact with Washington.

But as much as the United States cares about Israel—though less so these days given the current Israeli slide away from democracy thanks to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s autocratic policies, which could increase the already higher percentage of U.S. Democrats showing affinity toward the Palestinians, according to the latest Gallup poll—the Saudi proposal should be a non-starter for Washington. The conversation must be grounded, first and foremost, in the United States’ national interests, not Israel’s.

Yet despite the strategic significance of the Saudi relationship, the United States is unable to upgrade security ties to a full-fledged alliance. It also shouldn’t. It’s unable because there’s no political consensus in Washington about the bilateral relationship, which remains a politically toxic issue in the United States. A treaty alliance with any foreign country requires ratification and the “advice and consent” of the U.S. Senate, which isn’t likely to happen.

In addition to the divisive U.S. domestic politics, the strategic case for an official defense pact with Saudi Arabia is flimsy. The United States cannot afford to establish an alliance with Saudi Arabia or any other country in the Middle East (apart from Turkey, which is already a NATO member) and commit significantly more military resources to the region at a time when it is laser-focused on stopping China from becoming a hegemon in Asia. That would be strategically unwise and inconsistent with the United States’ new foreign policy priorities.

But this isn’t an unsolvable dilemma or an all-or-nothing proposition. Riyadh shouldn’t issue politically unfeasible and strategically challenging requests to Washington. If the intent is to improve the country’s defenses against Iran, then there are other ways to achieve that objective.

Riyadh doesn’t need a defense pact with Washington. What it really needs is a more effective and coordinated approach to security, which can be built by working with Washington on elements of the kingdom’s defense restructuring project, conducting joint U.S.-Saudi contingency planning, and investing in all the institutional requirements of a competent defense apparatus that go beyond military equipment.

Today, Washington needs its regional partners to put more skin in the game.

Consider Israel, for example. Contrary to popular misconceptions, the United States does not share an alliance with Israel, and yet the U.S.-Israel security partnership is one of the most effective in the world. That should be the model. (However, creating a collective security infrastructure in Saudi Arabia is a very heavy lift because the U.S. military has never done this with the Saudis or any other Arab partner.)

Importantly, joint U.S.-Saudi security also requires that Riyadh commit to not extending its economic and diplomatic cooperation with Beijing—which Washington can’t and shouldn’t try to stop—to the military-security realm. This means no Saudi investments in major Chinese weapons systems, including (new and upgraded) ballistic missiles, missile defenses, and fighter aircraft; and no Saudi agreement to any kind of Chinese military or security presence in the kingdom.

It’s time for Washington to transition from a system of U.S. guardianship in Riyadh (and the region) to one of real partnership. That is U.S. Central Command’s mandate and emphasis right now. Gone are the days of Operation Desert Storm, when the United States did all the operational planning and the vast majority of the fighting to free Kuwait and defend Saudi Arabia from Saddam Hussein’s army. Today, Washington needs its regional partners to put more skin in the game.

Saudi Arabia has a significant opportunity to upgrade its security ties with the United States. It even has some leverage to push Washington in that direction. But Riyadh must not base its offer to Washington on Israeli interests. That won’t be enough to sway U.S. public opinion and policy in Washington.