Keep Talking to the Taliban

A Taliban-led Afghanistan presents a challenge that will probably confront U.S. policymakers for generations. To craft a successful long-term diplomatic strategy, however, Western diplomats must avoid any misapprehensions that they can control the Taliban’s policies through coercion, public humiliation, or by trying to divide it. So far, the Biden administration appears to understand that attempts to divide the Taliban will fail. But the international community, including Washington, has not yet learned that coercion and shaming will not alter Taliban behavior, however much satisfaction it provides.

It is time for governments to tone down their sanctimonious posturing about women’s rights and democracy—issues they already deemed not important enough to militarily fight for years ago—and instead commit to a constructive diplomatic, humanitarian, and development strategy. This is not an endorsement of Taliban policies, but rather a pragmatic path toward creating the best conditions possible for change that will actually improve human rights.

Calls to isolate the Taliban, add new sanctions, or support the Taliban’s political opposition will achieve little for Afghans. No amount of criticism or statements will change the minds of Taliban leaders about their social policies. This is equally true when it comes from Muslim countries or revered Deobandi scholars respected by the Taliban. Even public statements of praise may be counterproductive if they are caveated with criticism; in fact, Western governments are so discredited by the war that in some instances the support of diplomats is enough to tarnish an idea as a foreign conspiracy or order that the Taliban’s leadership must reject.

Western diplomacy is ultimately accountable to the public opinion of its own citizens, so such statements will continue, even when they are useless or counterproductive. It is understandable that the Afghan diaspora and organizations working on the ground would vocally express their indignation at the Taliban’s egregious human rights violations. However, Western officials must remain focused on the practical realities of the situation and not allow their own sanctimony to impede progress or obscure history. Three consecutive U.S. presidents decided it wasn’t worth remaining in Afghanistan militarily, and most coalition partners left years before U.S. troops finally departed. Western diplomats should now exercise pragmatism and patience.

Initial reports of fierce infighting between Taliban factions proved to be exaggerated following the Taliban takeover. Any hope that a mutiny will foment within the ranks of the Taliban or that the group will splinter misses what made the Taliban so effective over decades of war. Plenty of warlords inflicted themselves upon Afghans in recent decades, but the Taliban’s cohesion is what ultimately allowed it to outlast its opponents. It was a war of gradual attrition, not a swift conquest.

Taliban leaders may grumble and chide their own colleagues about decisions they dislike, but subversion is highly unlikely. The Haqqani network may once have operated as a semiautonomous outfit, but those days are long gone. Of course, the Taliban ethos is better at inspiring the esprit de corps required to fight a common enemy than navigating the difficult compromises necessary to effectively govern.

But the Taliban has a track record of resolving internal disputes, and in some important aspects of governing, such as reducing corruption, it has surpassed its predecessors. As documented by the United Nations, the Taliban is pursuing an agenda of selective reconciliation with its enemies: On January 16, the Taliban announced it had welcomed 475 former opponents back to Afghanistan, signaling an effort to prevent a return to war. But this is still more of a publicity stunt than a true effort at dialogue.

Instead of working with the Taliban on a durable peace, Western officials are meeting with the discredited old generation of warlords and other opposition leaders who want to overthrow the regime. Combined with a relentless series of scathing diplomatic démarches, this antagonistic approach by Western officials seems likely to drive the Taliban deeper into an entrenched posture of reclusiveness.

In this adversarial context, a process-driven Western style of diplomacy reliant on some carrots and more sticks will not move the Taliban. Despite differing opinions on the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement signed in Doha, Qatar—and Washington’s lack of enforcement of the agreement’s conditions before withdrawal—the peace deal still represented a major shift in U.S.-Taliban relations that would have been impossible in the past.

This owes more to Taliban leader Abdul Ghani Baradar and U.S. diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad’s strong relationship than any technical process of negotiations. It also helped that both sides were in tacit agreement that the withdrawal of U.S. troops was the top priority. Some policymakers in Washington propose that technical-level engagement should precede senior-level engagement with the Taliban; but due to the importance of trust-building and relationships with a group such as the Taliban, this approach will fall flat. New relationships must now be forged, and this will take years.

Time presents a greater threat to the Taliban’s current incarnation than any outside pressure. Its current emir, Haibatullah Akhundzada, may remain in power for some time, but in a country with a life expectancy in the low 60s it’s also possible his tenure could be cut short. The hardliners who seem poised to replace him are also elderly; many of the more pragmatic figures in the movement are much younger. It’s important that the international community build the diplomatic inroads necessary to benefit from future changes of leadership. Like in any movement, the Taliban’s leaders of today are not the leaders of tomorrow.

It is questionable whether moderate Taliban members exist, and hopes of a Taliban 2.0 appear to be little more than a mirage. However, there are pragmatists within the group who prize state-building more than the unchecked pursuit of ideological purity. Washington’s bureaucracy failed to move fast enough to take advantage of the brief opening after the fall of Kabul, during which those practical Taliban figures had greater leeway and reached out to the international community. The focus instead has been on occasional meetings with Taliban representatives in Doha, as well as highly publicized conversations with politicians from the former government.

This counterproductive diplomatic virtue signaling elevates some of the most unvirtuous figures of the previous government while squandering what few inroads Washington has with the de facto rulers of Afghanistan. It also diminishes any incentives that may have existed for more pragmatic Taliban leaders to push harder against aging ideologues in Kandahar, the Afghan city that hosts the Taliban headquarters.

Effectively dealing with the Taliban will require a clear ranking of priorities rather than a kitchen sink approach. U.S. policy objectives in Afghanistan focus on three areas: counterterrorism, human rights, and stability. Political “inclusivity,” which in Washington seems to mean including political stakeholders from the former government, rather than ethnic representation, is often pushed as a prerequisite for stability. But Western diplomats are barking up the wrong tree.

Given the disorganization and exile of its political opposition, as well as the near irrelevance of its armed opposition in the country, it is highly improbable that the Taliban will demonstrate any inclination towards inclusivity beyond token ethnic representation that is co-opted into the Taliban movement. Attempting to put the old guard back in positions of power in the name of inclusivity is a pipe dream, and a dangerous vision: Reinserting discredited politicians into the mix would be destabilizing.

Hard security concerns such as counterterrorism and great power competition are clearly the top priorities for Washington, and pretending otherwise is pointless. The Taliban is unlikely to break with al-Qaeda, but that does not mean it wants to see another 9/11 directed from Afghan soil. Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahri’s safe haven in a heavily guarded area of Kabul—in sight but out of mind—demonstrated the nature of the current relationship between the two groups. However, the Taliban must recognize that hosting the al-Qaeda leader (until his assassination via U.S. drone strike in July 2022) in an apartment allegedly owned by the Afghan interior minister made international legitimacy a tall order.

Despite the historical relations between Pakistan and the Haqqani network, led by current Afghan Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, Pakistan has been unsuccessful in persuading the Afghan Taliban to curtail terrorism from its protégé group, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Negotiations with the TTP have only served to kick the can down the road; the group is still able to launch attacks against Pakistani security forces and police. Hundreds, if not thousands, of TTP fighters have crossed the border into Pakistan to carry out such attacks.

The Taliban’s formal and informal statements following attacks, such as the one that killed nearly 100 people at a Peshawar mosque regularly attended by police, show it believes it still has the upper hand. Pakistan will likely be fighting the TTP for years with one hand, while shaking hands with the Afghan Taliban with the other. But Pakistan’s military establishment is in no rush to strike a deal it cannot defend.

Washington is in a better position, however. The Afghan Taliban still values the 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement as a face-saving mechanism to engage with Washington, as evidenced by its occasional references to deal. The TTP is especially keen to deny that it operates from within Afghanistan or threaten the United States, as it fears this could lead the United States to conduct drone strikes, such as the ones that killed the last three TTP leaders. This leaves the door open for limited high-level engagement and cooperation on counterterrorism.

U.S. policy toward a Taliban-led Afghanistan has achieved some positive results. Through the implementation of general licenses to U.S. sanctions that create humanitarian and commercial carve-outs and ensure the continued provision of humanitarian aid, lives have been saved. Contrary to popular opinion, U.S. President Joe Biden took steps to safeguard many of Afghanistan’s foreign exchange reserves from litigation by U.S. plaintiffs. Afghan civil society continues to receive support and engagement from the U.S. State Department. And Washington has learned from the lessons of the past and chosen not to support armed resistance within Afghanistan, despite some in the Beltway advocating for Washington to back the opposition National Resistance Front.

Human rights and particularly women’s rights are still a high priority for the United States. But calls to stop engaging with the Taliban will only reduce the potency of future threats to increase sanctions or remove exemptions. Responsible states should retain what little leverage they do have by continuing to withhold de jure recognition. In order to protect a future for Afghans in a post-Taliban led Afghanistan, or a potentially changed Taliban-led Afghanistan, it is essential to prioritize tangible objectives that Washington and its partners can control, while also maintaining open communication and preserving the existing state institutions.

Limited cooperation with the Taliban on disaster relief, counternarcotics, disability programming, some aspects of education, and public health will improve the lives of Afghans, build an iota of trust between the Taliban and the international community while also increasing the latter’s leverage in the future.

To capitalize on potential opportunities in the future, Washington should prioritize dialogue with the Taliban, as well as continue humanitarian aid at current levels and even consider some forms of development aid. It should also cultivate the next generation of Afghan leaders by providing scholarships, investing in remote learning for girls, and continuing to offer support for Afghan women inside and outside Afghanistan.

This won’t produce magical results. But keeping the door open with the de facto leaders in Kabul while offering some creative solutions for Afghanistan’s people is better than slamming it shut. A decade under the status quo of Taliban rule is an eternity. But an Afghan child born today will only be 10 years old in 2033. Their destiny can only be changed through tangible actions taken in the present, not through statements of condemnation that do more to ease the collective conscience of the West than help Afghans. Social change is likely to outpace political change in Afghanistan. The latter may take years and even decades, but roughly 40 million Afghans who were unable to seek refuge abroad are relying on it.

Continuing to communicate with the Taliban despite its failure to meet international standards safeguards diplomatic engagement from being perceived as a reward for minor improvements or an acceptance of further deterioration. Some may argue that engaging with the Taliban normalizes its policies, but that ship sailed the moment U.S. diplomats publicly sat down with Taliban leaders in Doha in 2018, culminating in an agreement signed in 2020 and a photo op between then-U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Baradar later that same year. Continued outreach is necessary, even if it is laborious and discouraging for now. And eventually U.S. diplomats must sit down with the Taliban in Afghanistan.