Bulgaria Is Stuck in an Electoral Doom Loop

On April 2, Bulgaria will hold its fifth parliamentary election in less than two years—a rate unmatched by any other European country, or even Israel, which has held five parliamentary elections since April 2019.

High levels of political polarization have prevented parties from forming a stable coalition and thus from choosing a prime minister to lead the country. President Rumen Radev has taken advantage of Bulgaria’s political crisis to fill the parliamentary power vacuum and gain control over one of the domains traditionally beyond his constitutional prerogatives: foreign policy.

Unlike the majority of Bulgaria’s biggest political parties, which support Ukraine in its war against Russia, Radev has used his self-appointed platform for pro-Russia ends. The upcoming election is unlikely to break this cycle, but until Bulgaria can find a way to do so, the president will continue to thwart parliamentary will and push his country’s foreign policy away from the European consensus regarding the war.

This polarization has prevented Bulgaria from building durable coalitions, or sometimes even from forming a government at all. Most parties refuse to cooperate with GERB and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) over these corruption allegations. Moreover, the new radical right pro-Russian party (Revival), which also refuses to cooperate with any other political formation, has gotten stronger in recent years.

When parliament is unable to form a government, the president must dismiss the parliament and set a date for a new slate of elections. This process continues until a government is formed, which, in Bulgaria’s case, has been no easy feat, triggering a cascade of snap elections that have exhausted the public and still failed to establish a stable majority.

Between elections, the president, as head of state, appoints caretaker cabinets to fulfill some of the would-be prime minister’s duties. Radev, who has served as president since 2017, has used this prerogative more than any other democratically elected head of state in Bulgaria’s history. Clearly, what should be an exception has become the rule. Since May 2021, presidentially appointed cabinets have lasted twice as long overall as the only regular government in this period, led by Kiril Petkov for 231 days between Dec. 13, 2021, and Aug. 1, 2022.

These appointed cabinets are intended to provide the country with continuity and stability amid political chaos. Since the election spiral started in April 2021, parties have come and gone, and no single party has managed to hold onto power in any meaningful way. Of the five governments—one regular, four caretaker—none has lasted more than eight months.

In the absence of consistent parliamentary leadership, Radev has taken it upon himself to expand his presidential portfolio to include foreign-policy issues. Under normal circumstances, the Bulgarian head of state has very limited foreign-policy powers. The 1991 constitution establishes that the president “represent[s] the State in its international relations” and has the power to conclude international agreements under certain circumstances. He can appoint and dismiss the heads of diplomatic missions and Bulgaria’s permanent representatives to international organizations, and he is in charge of accepting the credentials and letters of reference of foreign diplomats.

Although these prerogatives are not insignificant, in practice, their impact is usually quite limited. The bulk of Bulgaria’s foreign-policy powers belongs to the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs. And historically, when the president and the prime minister’s government have been at odds on foreign-policy issues, the latter has typically had the upper hand.

For example, prior to becoming a member of NATO, it was well known that joining this alliance was neither President Georgi Parvanov’s nor Vice President Angel Marin’s cup of tea. Marin’s 1998 remark that “the forward march to NATO is not healthy for Bulgaria and our army” caused him to be removed from his position as commander of the Anti-Aircraft Missile and Artillery Forces. Despite the presidential duo’s historical lack of enthusiasm, Bulgaria joined NATO under the premiership of Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, the former Bulgarian king, on March 29, 2004.

Similarly, in 2019, the president and prime minister were at odds over the EU’s recognition of Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s legitimate president. However, because Borisov’s government commanded a stable parliamentary majority, he was able to easily overrule Radev’s opposition to the plan.

These dynamics have changed since April 2021, when several factors, including the corruption allegations against the ruling GERB, caused splits within factions and prevented parliament from electing a stable majority, prompting Radev to appoint his second caretaker government. Since then, the president’s foreign policy has clashed with that of the main parties on more than one occasion—but Radev has come out on top. He has further strengthened his hand by filling cabinet roles with those close to him, practically guaranteeing that the country’s foreign-policy apparatus will not push back against his own pro-Russian leanings.

This clash has become especially evident since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The outbreak of war came just a few months after Petkov appointed a cabinet based on a heterogeneous four-party coalition between liberals, socialists, greens, and conservatives. It would not last long, becoming the first Bulgarian government since its democratization to be overthrown by a vote of no confidence in June 2022.

The relationship between Bulgaria and Russia has historically been fraught. Though they haven’t always been friendly, Russia was deeply involved in liberating Bulgaria from the Ottoman Empire’s yoke in 1878, and after Bulgaria embraced communism following World War II, it was one of the Soviet Union’s most loyal allies until the latter’s collapse. In more recent history, however, Bulgaria’s foreign policy has been hesitant toward alignment with Russia, but the country’s dependence on Russian energy supplies has made its politicians cautious on taking firm positions against it. For example, after the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in 2018, Bulgaria refused to expel any Russian diplomats when most European countries did.

When Radev entered the political scene in the 2016 presidential election, he maintained a rather ambivalent position toward Russia, summarized in his famous remark: “A Russian flag flies over Crimea.” Over time, this view has sharpened, and he went so far as to say that Crimea was part of Russia during the 2021 presidential campaign.

Since the invasion, however, most major Bulgarian political parties have taken an anti-Russia stance and have supported sending military aid to Ukraine alongside NATO allies. Unsurprisingly, Radev has opposed these efforts and has openly adopted a pro-Russia stance. Case in point, in December 2022, he accused pro-Ukrainian legislators in Bulgaria of being “warmongers.” Beyond rhetoric, he has used his position to substantively affect Europe’s policy response to the war—seen in February, when he threatened to use Bulgaria’s veto powers to prevent EU sanctions against Rosatom, a Russian nuclear energy corporation. More recently, he announced that Bulgaria would not support a European order for the supply of shells to Ukraine.

These stances directly defy the majority of Bulgaria’s main political parties. In a rather long and conflictual legislative session held in December 2022, Bulgaria’s parliament voted decisively in favor of sending military aid to Ukraine, with the support of more than 70 percent of the members of parliament. The short-lived cabinet of Petkov—the only non-caretaker government of the last two years—had already managed to unofficially do this in the spring of 2022. But when Petkov’s government collapsed after less than eight months, a new caretaker cabinet was appointed in August 2022—putting the initiative back in Radev’s hands. Since then, not only has he refused to sign a joint statement of nine Eastern European presidents supporting Ukraine joining NATO, but he has also appealed—as recently as February of this year—to the current caretaker government to avoid sending any future military aid to Ukraine.

He has done all of this in the face of Bulgarians’ popular outcry, seen in demonstrations of support for Ukraine in both March 2022 and February 2023. Despite this dissonance, Radev remains one of the most trusted politicians in the country, even as he loses some support.

This week’s elections do not look promising for overturning this cyclical status quo—or for any hope of future stability. The latest public statements from the main party representatives seem to confirm many people’s worst fears: Until Bulgaria can build cohesive leadership, the country’s foreign policy will continue to run counter to its parliament’s consensus.