India’s Defense Plans Fall Victim to Putin’s War

India’s armed forces have long relied heavily on Russian weapons and military equipment, and that dependence will not change soon. However, since Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022, the Russian defense industry is struggling to resupply Moscow’s own forces at the front, which have drawn down weapons and ammunition stocks at a remarkable rate. Therefore, Russia will almost certainly not be able to satisfy many export demands for the rest of the decade—with profound implications for the country’s most important arms customer, India.

The immediate effect will be reduced availability for much of India’s Russian-origin defense equipment. That will make replenishing munitions stocks much more difficult and negatively affect operational capability. This marks a significant challenge for the Indian government, whose security focus has shifted to countering China’s assertive behavior and military buildup along the Line of Actual Control, securing the Indian Ocean, and managing continued tensions with neighboring Pakistan.

Before the war, India was already working to diversify arms suppliers, including a shift to greater domestic production. But the sheer amount of Russian-made equipment operated by the Indian armed forces is so great that it will take a long time to make any significant dent—and meanwhile, the vast existing Russian arsenal needs to be maintained and supplied with ammunition and spare parts. Today, according to data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance, more than 90 percent of the Indian Army’s armored vehicles, 69 percent of combat aircraft operated by the Air Force and Navy, and 44 percent of the Navy’s submarines and warships are Russian. Of these vessels, 65 percent carry Russian missiles. For a long time, this dependence came with clear benefits to India because Moscow was willing to provide critical defense technology denied to New Delhi by the West. What’s more, Russian equipment is typically cheaper than Western equivalents and carries few restrictions on end use.

Already faced with long-term structural issues—such as overstaffing and the need for consolidation—and greater global competition, the Russian defense industry is now significantly constrained due to new economic sanctions imposed since the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022. Problems have included brain drain, component shortages, and work stoppages. Russian intelligence agencies now spend time and effort on sourcing components, sometimes settling on inferior or defective substitutes. Reports of the use of convict labor (likely for low-skill positions), the cannibalization of civilian products such as dishwashers for microchips, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s public berating of the minister for trade and industry all suggest that the sector is under immense pressure.

Russia will struggle to solve these problems in the short term and will likely have a severely restricted export capacity for the rest of the decade as its defense industry seeks to adapt to the new circumstances. Some systems may be less affected because they have seen little use in Ukraine, such as air-to-air missiles and naval systems. Nonetheless, Moscow will likely continue to lose ground in export markets as many countries seek to diversify their suppliers or invest in their own production capabilities.

At a time when India faces growing challenges on its border with China, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is already having an impact on Indian operational capabilities. New Delhi has faced delays on the delivery of key equipment, spare parts, and ammunition from Russia, along with payment issues following the global financial sanctions imposed on Moscow.

This has included delays to the delivery of the five S-400 surface-to-air missile systems India had ordered from Russia for $5.4 billion in 2018, with New Delhi still awaiting delivery of the last two regiments. The delivery of all five regiments—normally comprising up to 16 launchers each—is now expected to be completed by early 2024, one year later than planned. Additionally, the return of one of India’s Kilo class diesel-electric submarines from refitting in Russia has been delayed.

These dual challenges—constraints on Russian supplies and an indigenization program falling short of goals—will provide headaches for Indian defense planners for the rest of the decade.

New Delhi, on its own initiative, has also delayed, suspended, or canceled plans to procure additional equipment from Russia. This includes plans to procure 48 additional Mi-17V-5 medium-lift helicopters, for which India will now focus on its domestic Multi-Role Helicopter program instead. In May 2022, New Delhi indefinitely suspended negotiations with Moscow for the acquisition of 10 Ka-31 early-warning helicopters due to payment issues and concerns over Russia’s ability to deliver.

Seeking to improve equipment quality and increase strategic autonomy over the last 15 years, India has also sought to diversify its equipment suppliers. This has included co-development and co-production of equipment through joint ventures between foreign and Indian companies. At the same time, India has been seeking to enhance its own indigenous design capabilities.

U.S. companies have been the major beneficiaries of India’s diversification efforts, with more than $15 billion worth of contracts signed since 2008, including for transport aircraft, anti-submarine warfare aircraft, attack helicopters, and howitzers. French, Israeli, South Korean, and Spanish firms have also won significant contracts during this time, including India’s largest import deal to date: the $8.7 billion deal with France’s Dassault for 36 Rafale fighter aircraft. Previously, in 2005, India had struck a $3.5 billion deal with France for the licensed production of six Kalvari-class attack submarines.

The signing of an Indo-Italian defense cooperation memorandum this month by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which followed the 2021 removal of Italian defense manufacturer Leonardo from a blacklist for past corruption allegations, is likely part of the diversification focus as well. But although India has invested vast sums into these deals, the number of systems acquired so far is often relatively small as a proportion of India’s overall (mainly Russian) inventory. In the case of fighter aircraft, for example, according Military Balance data, the Indian Air Force has 33 frontline squadrons with a long-standing plan to expand that number to 42. The 36 Rafale on order from France are enough for only two of those squadrons, compared to 20 squadrons operating Russian aircraft.

To overcome India’s dependence on foreign arms procurement, the Modi government has prioritized domestic arms production as part of the wider “Make in India” initiative, also known as indigenization. However, the results have been mixed so far. India had aimed to produce $26 billion worth of arms domestically per year by 2025, compared to only $12 billion in 2022. Last year, the goal was quietly revised down to $22 billion. Foreign direct investment in India’s defense sector, which New Delhi had planned to reach a total stock of $10 billion by 2025, had reached only $380 million by year-end 2021. In September 2020, the Indian government attempted to increase the pace by loosening restrictions on foreign ownership in the defense sector, raising the allowed foreign share from 49 percent to 74 percent, with automatic government approval. It did not have a significant effect on the rate of investment.

Another obstacle has been New Delhi import restrictions on 411 defense items because it wants them to be produced domestically, including naval vessels, armored vehicles, and munitions. But it is not clear that New Delhi has rigorously examined local companies’ capabilities to supply the listed systems. Political decisions to prioritize locally designed systems have created tension between the armed forces, defense companies, and the Indian Defense Research and Development Organization, a government agency in charge of military research and development. Indigenous systems developed by the agency and Indian companies have not always met the Indian military’s requirements. In some instances, the desire to produce locally has overridden capability considerations.

These dual challenges—constraints on Russian supplies and an indigenization program falling short of goals—will provide headaches for Indian defense planners for the rest of the decade. Russia’s war has exposed New Delhi as heavily dependent on Russian military equipment—so dependent, in fact, that India could not break off the relationship even in the unlikely event that it wanted to. Where the Russian arms industry is still able to satisfy Indian orders, New Delhi risks falling afoul of Washington, not only risking sanctions, but also damaging an increasingly important strategic partnership as India grows more concerned over China.

India is highly unlikely to reverse plans to increase defense spending on indigenous designs and companies, even though these plans can run counter to urgent operational requirements. Competition to deliver the decreasing range of weapons eligible for import will benefit European, U.S., and Israeli companies. Purchases from Russia will continue where possible, but at a reduced and sporadic pace that prioritizes support for existing systems. Defense procurement is measured in decades, and India will have to learn to live with disruption to its supplies from Russia into the 2030s.

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