Why Rishi Sunak’s Northern Ireland Deal Will Fail

London can please either Brussels or Belfast. It’s choosing Brussels.

By Abi McGowan, a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations.

British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak speaks during a Q&A session with local business leaders during a visit to Coca-Cola HBC in Lisburn, Northern Ireland.

April 4, 2023, 11:23 AM

In late February, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak visited a Coca-Cola plant in Lisburn, a city eight miles south of the Northern Irish capital of Belfast. He was there to sell the deal struck on Feb. 27 that will regulate trade between Northern Ireland, Great Britain, and the European Union. With the deal’s promise of Northern Ireland’s renewed access to the European single market and the U.K. home market, Sunak claimed the region was now “the world’s most exciting economic zone.” But his statement came with many “ifs”: if we get the deal right, if we get this framework implemented, if we get Northern Ireland’s executive back up and running.

Most commentators proclaim that the Windsor Framework, as this deal is called, is a win for Sunak. The deal does mark an improvement in the U.K.-EU relationship, enabling cooperation on pressing issues such as Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and defense. By reducing internal checks on goods that remain in Northern Ireland, the agreement provides a less bureaucratic and more efficient trade environment for firms and consumers. The framework should be welcomed for what it is: an important redress to the functional problems facing the Northern Ireland Protocol, the original Brexit-era agreement that has been governing trade between the United Kingdom and the European Union in Northern Ireland since 2019.

However, Sunak faces a catch-22. For important aspects of the Windsor Framework to be implemented, Northern Ireland needs a functioning regional government. In the United Kingdom, this is called a devolved government. But Stormont, as Northern Ireland’s devolved executive and legislature is known, has been shut down for around 40 percent of the time since its inception in 1999. The central U.K. government in Westminster hopes the Windsor Framework can provide the political momentum to restart Stormont—but successfully implementing the deal is contingent on the functioning of that very same, currently collapsed, government.

Sunak recognized the intractable nature of this situation when he told the House of Commons that the true test of the Windsor Framework would be the restoration of Stormont. While he has created something that could save the United Kingdom from Brexit purgatory, Sunak risks losing the Windsor Framework in the inferno of Northern Ireland’s politics.

In February 2022, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Northern Ireland’s largest unionist party, left the regional government. The move was in protest of the Northern Ireland Protocol, and the DUP refused to return to Stormont unless much of the agreement was scrapped—leaving the region bereft of government. Sunak clearly hopes that the Windsor Framework will convince the DUP to return to government.

Yet the prospects for the DUP’s return to Stormont appear slim. In 2021, the DUP stipulated seven tests for the party to accept the Northern Ireland Protocol, and reiterated its demand for any new agreement to meet these seven criteria as a prerequisite to return to government. The Windsor Framework meets some of the requirements, such as giving Northern Ireland’s legislators input in new EU laws, but it does not meet all the DUP’s demands. On March 23, DUP leader Jeffrey Donaldson said the Windsor Framework is currently “insufficient.”

Beyond how well it can redress the Northern Ireland Protocol’s constraints, the Windsor Framework has another baked-in limitation: Unionists perceive it as a potential threat to the region’s position within the United Kingdom because it weakens Northern Ireland’s links to Great Britain. The U.K. government’s handling of Brexit has left the DUP feeling that London prioritizes Brussels over Belfast.

When the European Union and United Kingdom discussed a new trading arrangement for Northern Ireland in the wake of Brexit, a dilemma emerged. The negotiating parties could achieve only two out of three competing priorities: maintaining the integrity of the European Union’s internal market for goods; avoiding the return of a hard border on the island of Ireland; or avoiding a border in the Irish Sea between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The European Union was committed to maintaining the Republic of Ireland’s position within its internal market, making the first priority essential. The reimposition of a land border was viewed as a non-starter, given that the removal of physical border infrastructure between Northern Ireland and Ireland symbolized a hard-won achievement of the peace process that ended the Troubles of the 1960s to 1990s. Instead, then-U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s government opted to establish a border in the Irish Sea.

By implementing European Union checks on goods from Great Britain to Northern Ireland, the Windsor Framework has established an internal border separating Northern Ireland from the rest of the United Kingdom. Much of the unionist opposition to the framework is not concerned with the technical details of customs checks, but with what this separation represents. Unionists fear that if Northern Ireland continues to diverge from Great Britain, it will lead to the breakup of the U.K. and bring about a united Ireland. According to this logic, anything less than the complete removal of the Northern Ireland Protocol is unacceptable, and any compromise that brings Northern Ireland closer to the European Union could lead down the path to a united Ireland.

The Windsor Framework ostensibly “solves” Brexit for Rishi Sunak’s beleaguered government by “getting Brexit done.” However, rather than wrap up the details of customs checks with Brussels, Sunak should aspire to strengthen the bonds of the United Kingdom itself, given that the seven-year Brexit process has severely strained relations between the U.K. government in Westminster and its devolved governments in Wales, Scotland, and, especially, Northern Ireland.

Rishi Sunak sees the economic “prize” of the Windsor Framework but misses the barrier of Northern Ireland’s political instability. Given the region’s history of conflict, political stability is just as much of a prize to its people as stable, regulated trade. According to recent polling, a majority of people in Northern Ireland want a functional government. Northern Ireland’s long-term success depends on a government that is responsive and dependable.

In the near term, Sunak should make the case for the DUP’s immediate return to Stormont, regardless of whether the party supports the Windsor Framework. As a local journalist has argued, the existential question the DUP faces is whether Northern Ireland’s place in the United Kingdom is better preserved through Stormont or direct rule from Westminster. Sunak should take a clearer stance in negotiating with unionist parties and argue that unionists have the most to lose if Northern Ireland is viewed as an ungovernable state. Specifically, U.K. policymakers should stress the economic concerns at stake. There is precedent for compromise; in 2007, the United Kingdom’s economic concessions paved a return to functioning government.

In order to regain Northern Irish trust, Sunak should also acknowledge that Brexit has impacted Northern Ireland’s civil society and that the United Kingdom can provide critical support. The European Union was a substantial funder of programming to disadvantaged groups in Northern Ireland. After Brexit, civil society organizations had limited access to sources of financial support. Northern Ireland’s non-profit organizations, which provide vital programs from childcare to disability services, are facing a funding cliff edge as provisions from the EU’s European Social Fund (ESF) expired at the end of March.

In the long term, Sunak should consider reforming Northern Ireland’s political institutions. A government that only functions a little more than half the time cannot be considered a success. A critical factor in Stormont’s inconsistency is its unique power sharing arrangement, which requires the largest unionist and nationalist parties to govern together in a coalition. If one party resigns, the whole government collapses. Although the DUP only received 21 percent of the popular vote in the 2022 Stormont election, its veto power has enabled it to block the formation of a government. Northern Ireland’s other main parties all support the Northern Ireland Protocol and Windsor Framework and want Stormont to return. Power sharing should be reformed so that the electoral system does not reinforce traditional political divides or allow one political party to hold Northern Ireland back.

In the face of intransigent politicians, the U.K. government might consider appointing a citizen’s assembly to empower the people of Northern Ireland to consider reforms.

Despite the Windsor Framework’s diplomatic breakthrough, policymakers should not take the framework as a reason to neglect the pressing challenges facing Northern Ireland. The 1998 Good Friday Agreement marked the end of the three-decade conflict known as the Troubles. As the 25th anniversary of the peace deal approaches, the United Kingdom has a window of opportunity to renew its commitment to the peace process.

The U.K. is moving on from Brexit. It should bring Northern Ireland along with it.

Abi McGowan is a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations. Previously, she was the Hillary Rodham Clinton scholar for peace and reconciliation at Queen’s University Belfast. While in Northern Ireland, she was a research consultant for the Irish Secretariat in Belfast.