Nuclear Blackmail Is a Sign of Russia’s Declining Power

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s national address on Feb. 21 attempted to justify the expanding war in Ukraine. Intermixed with imaginative anecdotes about the origins of Russian identity and statehood were claims that Ukraine had become a proxy for Western aggression—and that this demanded the suspension of the implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Ditching the treaty, however, not only undermines global stability but also highlights Russia’s own weakened global position.

The 2011 New START agreement was a continuation of bilateral nuclear arms control efforts between the United States and the Russian Federation, efforts that began when Russia was still the Soviet Union. This agreement was intended to cap the number of deployed offensive strategic nuclear warheads and constrain their delivery platforms as a means of minimizing the risk of nuclear war. Under the agreement, both states engage in yearly on-site inspections, biannual data exchanges, and annual telemetric information exchanges to verify compliance with the treaty. These terms were lauded by the international community as a success for all of humanity, as arms reductions and information exchanges injected a sense of stability to the relations between both parties.

Since the treaty entered into force, the United States has fully embraced the spirit of the agreement and implemented its terms, even during the Trump administration when other nuclear agreements, such as the Open Skies Treaty, wilted. Even today, the United States continues to provide Russia with all required information under New START, despite Putin’s announced suspension; and in 2022, Washington sought to seek post-COVID-19 resumption of inspections. Russia, on the other hand, has continually manipulated the treaty to serve political ends. Using its nonstrategic nuclear arsenal, composed of low-yield nuclear weapons that are not constrained by New START, Russia has continually wielded its battlefield and theater forces to attempt to blackmail its neighbors and the West. Just last year, Russia refused to restart on-site inspections, once again using its nuclear stockpile as a bargaining chip.

Putin’s hypocrisy and the contradictions throughout his February speech point to the collapse of Russia’s own position as a superpower. The crux of Putin’s argument rests on the idea that this is a watershed moment for Russia, and that Western relations have hit an all-time low. But a more confident Soviet Union was far more capable of advancing nuclear risk reduction efforts even in times of global conflict and tension with the United States.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty negotiations embodied the ability of global powers to reduce risk while still competing, often extremely bloodily, in other parts of the world. The negotiations, which spanned from 1969 to 1972, focused on limiting anti-ballistic missile capabilities (which the Soviets had a slight advantage in) and offensive capabilities (where the United States enjoyed an advantage through its ability to place multiple warheads on a missile).

The diplomatic dealings resulted in both sides sacrificing their slight advantage in different areas to promote stability while also establishing several basic principles governing rules of engagement. Not bad for two sworn enemies. Their willingness to cooperate is all the more remarkable when one considers the litany of conflicts that directly, or indirectly, involved both states. Proxy wars, such as the Dhofar Rebellion (1963-76), and North Yemen Civil War (1962-70), were common and ugly—not to mention the Vietnam War (1955-75), hardly a high point in Soviet-U.S. relations.

Nearly ten years after the SALT and ABM treaty negotiations, the two states would once again look to further reduce nuclear tensions even as they locked swords across the world. From 1979 to 1989, the Soviets propped up a communist government in Afghanistan, engaging in a bloody war against the mujahideen—paramilitary groups backed by several foreign powers, including fellow nuclear powers the United States and China. The CIA funneled money and weapons to the mujahideen, enabling the groups to exact significant casualties against the deployed Soviet troops. But despite the U.S. funds going directly toward the killing of Soviet troops, constructive nuclear negotiations continued between Moscow and Washington.

After bouts of negotiation in 1981-83 and then 1985-87, with some of the Cold War’s worst moments of tension in the background, U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev successfully negotiated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The deal effectively eliminated all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with short and intermediate ranges (500 to 5,500 kilometers). These weapons, whose perceived sole purpose was to launch a decapitating strike against either side, were destroyed—even at a time when Soviet media regularly condemned Reagan as a dedicated warmonger.

Superpower status requires the ability to multitask. The bipolar nature of the Cold War is an excellent example of two powers fiercely competing while taking steps to reduce tensions and unnecessary risk in the nuclear arena. The Soviet Union believed it was a global power, but in contrast to Russia today, it had the ability to compete with the United States militarily and diplomatically. And sometimes it seemed to be winning. The launch of Sputnik was a major victory over the United States, the Soviet nuclear stockpile often evolved rapidly, and Soviet support was sought after in multiple conflicts across the globe.

The Soviets were going head-to-head with the Americans as peers, and they knew it. The goal was the spread of communism and the survival of their regime, not nuclear annihilation. Instead of leveraging its nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union dared to cooperate with the United States to reduce the threat of nuclear war and enable both sides to compete in other, safer domains.

Moscow understood that being a global power comes with the responsibility of managing relations with other powers. It also understood that sacrificing small advantages in the nuclear realm could elevate the state in the international community and better position it to pursue its foreign policy objectives.

In contrast, Russia’s current attitude toward New START and Putin’s recent announcement that Russia will station nonstrategic nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil, show Putin is searching for any distraction from his embarrassing failures in Ukraine—and any leverage he can get over a far more powerful West. While Russia takes a hatchet to the nuclear treaties that have made us all safer, the West continues to explore different avenues of cooperation. With his actions, Putin has made it clear that Russia can no longer be considered a superpower.