Is the Party Over in Nigeria?

This situation has been largely driven by growing support for personalities over parties. This isn’t necessarily new in Nigerian politics; parties during both the First (1960-1966) and Second Republics (1979-1983) were often supported because of the followership of leaders such as first President Nnamdi Azikiwe, first leader of the opposition Obafemi Awolowo and front-line opposition leader Aminu Kano.

This played a major role when these leaders decided to try their luck for the presidency on different platforms. The fact that independent candidacies are not constitutionally permitted in Nigeria is one major reason that some individuals have had to kowtow to party elders and participate in various sorts of intrigues and politicking in order to get onto party tickets to run for office at all.

Most governors have played a major role in personalizing politics at sub-national levels, often using control of the state structure to get elected to the Senate.

Obi and Kwankwaso began 2022 as members of the PDP but finished the party primary season as the presidential nominees of the Labour Party and NNPP. In an era of fanatical followership, their followers adopted the terms “Obidients” and “Kwankwassiya” to show their loyalty to their preferred candidates. These two candidates played a major role in disrupting the expected duopoly of the APC and PDP in Nigerian politics.

Kwankwaso, a former governor in Kano, was able to win the vote in the state while also ensuring that his party gained control of the state governorship of the most populous state in the country. Obi won 11 states, along with the Federal Capital Territory, and was able to defeat his former party in parts of the country it had reliably won in previous elections. The result was a very tight election, which was not without its flaws and challenges, and one that has seen the runners-up rightly challenge the outcome in court.

A key reason for this increasing personalization in Nigerian politics is the amount of power concentrated in the country’s 36 state governors. Their influence is such that, apart from the return of two former military leaders via the ballot box, all elected presidents have been former governors.

President-elect Bola Tinubu, Obi, and Kwankwaso have also followed this trend, by serving as former governors in Lagos, Anambra, and Kano, respectively. Even PDP candidate Atiku Abubakar was elected governor of Adamawa State in 1999, but did not take up the post because he was tapped as vice president to former President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999.

Most governors have played a major role in personalizing politics at sub-national levels, often using control of the state structure to get elected to the Senate after serving their constitutionally limited two terms in office. In most states, there is an acknowledged deference to a predecessor, often from the Class of ‘99 governors—the first set of elected leaders when Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999.

In recent years, governors have taken a stronger role in directing party affairs, with party chairs dismissed and new executives constituted in accordance with their wishes. This influence has often come from control of the state’s voting delegates at relevant conventions and access to the financial allocations that come from the federal purse. Where there have been challenges, they have also stemmed from predecessors still in control of key state structures, or competitive opposition politicians. However, this election cycle has also shown another side of personality politics dominating party dynamics—the punishment of certain politicians despite the strength of the political party.

Nigerian politics tend to be “up-or-out,” so term-limited governors are often faced with two options: run for president or retire to the safe abode of the Senate, with those who fail seeking control of their states or fading into political obscurity. The latter is often a safe choice, but this year, only three of the sitting 11 governors who ran for Senate were successful. This revelation of how politically vulnerable term-limited governors can be points to the last factor for this new fixation on personalities over parties—the growing disillusionment of a new, civically engaged generation.

Read More

Nigeria’s Kingmakers Are Still in Control

Divisive politics and historical power structures helped Bola Tinubu win.

Analysis |

Nosmot Gbadamosi

Nigeria’s Flawed Election Risks a Democratic Backslide

The international community cannot afford to give up on Nigeria’s vast democratic promise.

Argument |

Mark Green, Derek Mitchell, Daniel Twining

It’s Tinubu’s Turn to Fix Nigeria’s Broken System

For the president-elect to make the next four years a success for Nigeria, he’ll have to create a new political ethos for his country.

Analysis |

Howard W. French

One of the biggest differences of this election cycle has been the way that young Nigerians have increased their civic engagement. This often meant that these supporters looked for an almost messianic figure to project their hopes and aspirations on, with the parties of these individuals benefiting as a result.

In addition to Kwankwaso’s influence in Kano, Obi’s surge in support can be attributed to the tacit endorsement he received from a lot of the major supporters of the October 2020 #EndSARS protests, and his party was able to win eight senators, 34 federal representatives, and a governor largely based on his personality. Both Obi and Kwankwaso won these victories despite the two major parties exercising control over most of these states.

Through marches of solidarity and active social media engagement, young Nigerians made it clear that they would be participating in this election cycle and that politicians would be wise to address them on their issues. Perhaps a lesson from the results is the fact that the so-called Nigerian Youth is not a single monolithic bloc and young voters did support different candidates for different reasons.

For those angry at the status quo, well-known politicians lost their bids as a result of lingering dissatisfaction over the economy, sociopolitical considerations, and a growing distrust of the established political elite. What remains to be seen is if the beneficiaries of this support are able to maintain their appeal for the next four years by holding the government accountable as a strong opposition while also parlaying it into credible results in the several off-cycle governorship elections before the next presidential race.

Regardless of the outcome, Nigeria’s politicians will have to reckon with what led to this outcome and what this means going forward. A major factor in the 2023 elections was the role that identity played in the contest—Obi was the only southern Christian, the expected inverse of the incumbent northern Muslim, among the established four front-runners, which included three Muslims and two northerners seeking to succeed the incumbent.

With a history punctuated by palace coups and a civil war along ethnic and regional lines, there have been reasons to worry when one group seems to become more comfortable with power. Parties might see the need to reflect on whether to respect unspoken conventions of alternating between leaders from the north and south, or to lean on the numerical strength that the northern Muslims have—and how that might affect candidates from other parts of the country.

A final point to note is the legacy of repeated defections and party pivots, which have often not been punished by voters. Despite the promise and potential embodied by the third-party candidates, they’ve repeatedly moved parties to further personal ambitions. Obi was elected governor in 2006 on the platform of the All Progressives Grand Alliance, moved to the PDP and became its vice presidential nominee during the 2019 elections before moving again to the Labour Party to run for president.

Since the dawn of the Fourth Republic in 1999, Nigerian parties have had largely indistinct ideologies, which is why politicians can leave and return at ease.

Likewise, both Atiku and Kwankwaso contested the presidential nomination of the APC in 2015 and the PDP in 2019, before Kwankwaso left to form the NNPP. Both candidates still performed credibly when compared to their party’s previous performances. Ironically, they might both have gotten the idea from the man they sought to succeed.

A pivotal moment in outgoing President Muhammadu Buhari’s political standing was in the 2011 elections, when he left the All Nigeria Peoples Party, a well-known opposition party, formed the Congress for Progressive Change as a personal vehicle to get elected, and was able to get 12 million votes and place second despite running on party without an experienced nationwide party structure—a similar accusation meted against Obi and the Labour Party.

Since the dawn of the Fourth Republic in 1999, Nigerian parties have had largely indistinct ideologies, which is why politicians can leave and return at ease. The lack of strong punishments by parties and voters for defections also plays a role, since supporters become followers of the person, rather than a party itself.

Nigerian politics has faced such a juncture before. In 2011, the then-ruling PDP seemed immune to losing elections, but the other major parties were able to reaffirm their popularity in some states and maintain a firm, albeit fractured, opposition. Within one election cycle, they merged and were able to wrest power from the PDP.

The first three runners-up for president in these elections were, after all, members of the same party just one year ago, and opposition members continue to litigate what might have been if they’d joined forces.

Personalities have always loomed large in Nigerian politics, and in future election cycles, there will be more former governors and senators seeking to remain relevant after leaving office. Also, as long as independent candidacies remain unconstitutional, people will still need vehicles to gain power. The way politicians navigate the next couple of years will show whether parties reassert their influence or continue a march towards possible extinction.