It’s Time for the Generals to Let Go in Pakistan

There is a dangerous confrontation playing out on the streets of Pakistan. The country’s most popular politician is locked in a battle with its most powerful institution. Last week, former Prime Minister Imran Khan was dramatically snatched by scores of paramilitary forces from an Islamabad courthouse. Supporters rampaged through Pakistan’s streets in protest, torching buildings, ransacking the official residence of a senior military commander, and even storming into the Army’s headquarters. Khan was released on bail three days later and has since escalated the confrontation—accusing the Army chief, Gen. Asim Munir, of targeting him.

A political crisis is the last thing that Pakistan needs. The country’s economy is skidding fast off a cliff. It is close to defaulting on its international debt. There has barely been a recovery since last year’s epic floods, which submerged a third of the country and displaced millions. Inflation has soared to 35 percent, while the rupee has plunged to record lows. And the threat of terrorism, which had abated over recent years, has resurfaced.

Pakistan desperately needs a reset. The unyielding confrontation between military authorities and Khan’s party threatens to tear apart the Muslim world’s second-most-populous country and sole nuclear power. There is an opportunity, later this year, when elections are due. The only way forward is for Pakistan’s generals to finally relinquish their hold on the country and let a democratic process run its course. A peaceful, free, and fair election won’t solve Pakistan’s many problems, but it could deliver a measure of much-needed stability—and make a decisive break with the past.

In many ways, the current crisis is depressingly familiar. Pakistan’s military has ruled the 75-year-old country directly for three decades and kept a grip on nominally democratic governments for the rest. No civilian prime minister has survived a full term to face the electorate again. They have been forced out of office through a variety of means and even, in one case, assassinated. The military has cynically worked backstage to help opposition leaders take their place—before they, too, suffered the same fate, in an endless cycle of dysfunction.

At first, Khan, a former star cricketeer who rose to power on a populist platform, was close to the military. When the generals thrust Khan into office, in 2018, he was more pliable than most politicians. The two sides openly shared power, inaugurating what became known as a “hybrid regime.” Decisions were taken at military headquarters and dutifully signed off on in the prime minister’s office. The intelligence agencies acted as enforcers, locking up opponents, muzzling journalists, disappearing critics, leaning on judges, and whipping parliamentary votes. The generals liked the former cricket legend’s charisma, his nationalism, and his self-styled crusade against corruption. It was all going well for the men in uniform—until he overstepped.

Pakistan’s military jealously guards its chain of command, where the top general maintains a firm sense of authority, and when Khan tried to insert his own voice, the top brass turned on him. It pulled its support, leaving Khan vulnerable to a vote of no confidence last April. By any measure, if he had been allowed to complete a full term in office, Khan would have struggled to get reelected. His politics were divisive, his policies ineffective. But now he has become a magnet for sympathy, skillfully casting himself as an embattled hero fighting for his people’s “real independence.”

Khan was ostensibly arrested on corruption charges. In total, he says he is facing 148 cases, including allegations of “terrorism,” “sedition,” and “blasphemy.” But the motivation behind these cases has little to do with notions of transparency or accountability. This is an attempt to eliminate him from contention in this year’s general election. Leaders of Khan’s party have been arrested and, allegedly, in some cases, tortured. More have been arrested at more junior levels, and even peaceful protests led by Khan’s supporters have been crushed by the police. The military is now threatening to prosecute the suspected rioters in its own courts, in brazen violation of international law. Anyone involved in inciting or carrying out violence should be held accountable, but through fair trials in civilian courts.

By pursuing its vendetta against Khan, the military is putting its own standing at risk. His supporters aren’t found in remote rural areas. They are concentrated in Pakistan’s main towns and cities. They include members of the elite and the assertive and social media-savvy middle classes, with vast numbers of people whose relatives are serving in the military or have done before. Rarely has hostility toward the military seeped so deep into its own heartlands. There is even open talk of splits among the Army’s own high command.

The generals may not realize it now, but a permanent withdrawal from politics would be in their best interests. Their hybrid experiment didn’t just fail—it disastrously backfired. The military can only assert its will now through force, shedding support in the process. By stepping aside, much of the hostile attention would fade. They would also have space to heal internal rifts and rebuild their much-damaged public image.

There are only two plausible alternatives to a free and fair election in Pakistan this year: a tainted one, or a military coup. If Khan isn’t allowed to take part, the elections will lack legitimacy in the eyes of many Pakistanis. The results won’t be accepted, and the crisis will endure. Moreover, any government that emerges from such a process will be weak and constantly vulnerable to the manipulations of the military—much like the current coalition government. It could be swept aside at any moment, triggering a fresh crisis.

A military coup is unlikely, but not impossible. But if the generals grab power for themselves, they won’t deliver stability. Instead, they will plunge Pakistan deep into the abyss—it will be isolated globally and ruined economically.

The choice between the military and Khan isn’t an appealing one. There are fears that if Khan wins the coming election, he may leverage his popularity to build a civilian autocracy around him. He is vain and erratic. He doesn’t like to play by the rules. But eliminating him and his party through sheer repression isn’t the answer. Crucially, an election that sees him voted in could also be followed by an election that sees him voted out.

The important thing is that the Pakistani voters finally get to make those decisions—not the men in uniform.