A German-U.K. Defense Deal Can Strengthen NATO

The United Kingdom and Germany must enhance defense cooperation to strengthen European security after the illegal invasion of Ukraine. That is the conclusion of a landmark report from Germany’s Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) foundation and Britain-based think tank the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) that was published last week.

We strongly welcome this report and want a far-reaching U.K.-German defense and security agreement struck within six months of the next U.K. general election, as a joint initiative between U.K. Labour Party leader Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

This will increase jobs, strengthen NATO, and keep both countries safe.

While Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has made the case for greater collaboration much stronger, we commissioned this FES-RUSI program of work in autumn 2021, before the war.

The report outlines 19 recommendations to enhance U.K.-German defense cooperation, including how the U.K. and Germany could develop a bilateral treaty, work together more on joint procurement projects, and increase collaboration between the U.K. Armed Forces and German Bundeswehr on operations and training.

The two nations have compatible forces, collaborative industry, and common values. The U.K. Armed Forces and German Bundeswehr have a long history of operating and exercising together and a deep common understanding through British bases in Germany.

But we believe collaboration remains underdeveloped, especially compared to other major allies.

The U.K. and France signed the Lancaster House Treaties in 2010, to increase defense cooperation with technology sharing, joint procurement, and the launch of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force. Germany and France are likewise committed to wide-ranging cooperation through the 2020 Aachen Treaty (an update to the 1963 Élysée Treaty). But there’s no such treaty-based security relationship between the U.K. and Germany.

Without one, collaboration has been ad hoc rather than systematic. For example, there have been 40 years of cooperation between the U.K. and Germany on fighter jets, and both countries have operated together in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and to counter the Islamic State. In March this year, the Royal Air Force and German Air Force started flying together as part of NATO’s joint air policing missions in Estonia for the first time, intercepting Russian planes.

Yet just 28 German personnel are currently training in the U.K.; and only six U.K. personnel are training in Germany, including a single Brit with each of the German Navy and German Air Force.

Industrial collaboration via joint procurement programs is one of the most visible and important forms of military cooperation between allies. Just as Tornado and Eurofighter jets—the products of multinational collaboration—have helped keep Europe safe in recent decades, so the British Army’s Boxer armored vehicle program is seeing vehicles built in the U.K. and benefitting from German expertise. However, there is currently only one bilateral defense procurement program between the U.K. and Germany, set to upgrade “wide wet gap crossing” capability, plus just eight multilateral procurement projects that involve both nations alongside others.

Allies are a strategic strength. We believe closer U.K.-German defense, security, and foreign-policy cooperation can greatly strengthen the two countries’ abilities to respond to shared challenges and protect their citizens.

As the RUSI-FES report says, the U.K. and Germany are currently the top two European defense spenders and supporters of Ukraine in volume of military, economic, and humanitarian assistance. Transatlanticism and NATO are at the core of both country’s policies.

Cooperation is needed now more than ever after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. NATO’s 2022 report said the invasion “shattered peace and gravely altered the security environment” in Europe.

The German Social Democratic Party’s Olaf Scholz described the moment as a Zeitenwende, or epochal shift; Scholz overturned decades-long German defense policy just days after Putin’s forces entered Ukraine. Meanwhile, the U.K. Labour Party has given its fullest support to military help for Kyiv and reinforcing NATO allies.

Labour and the Social Democratic Party’s commitment to NATO is unshakeable. This alliance of democracies is the cornerstone for defending Europe, and European NATO nations must shoulder greater responsibility for European security, particularly as U.S. strategic concerns grow in the Indo-Pacific. Germany, as part of the EU, and the U.K. should sit together at the heart of a stronger European pillar in NATO.

Defense industries need to respond quickly to this new security environment, with increasing demands from governments that themselves face tight economic constraints. Zeitenwende creates new areas for industrial cooperation between the U.K. and Germany. The two countries can work together to take advantage of these opportunities, sharing costs, reducing risks, and creating a steady stream of demand. This would help drive standardization and interoperability and expand industries into new domains.

The EU has also proven that it has much to contribute to defense and security, with its sanctions against Russia and its humanitarian, economic, financial, and military supplies for Ukraine. That’s why NATO describes the EU as “a unique and essential partner for NATO.”

For Germany, the EU is core to its national interest; and having a functioning partnership with the EU, based on trust and deeper cooperation in areas such as security, is also clearly in Britain’s national interest after Ukraine. Closer bilateral defense cooperation could support more complementary EU-NATO collaboration.

The U.K. Labour Party has argued since the invasion that the U.K. must also reboot defense planning and spending. This should be seen within the context of the Social Democratic Party and Labour’s deep commitment to international rules and multilateral institutions.

There is good reason to believe Germany and the U.K. could develop a distinctive security agenda together. Security threats posed by inequality, climate change, and a lack of food, water, and healthcare have to be recognized; efforts to combat these threats must go hand-in-hand with proper investment in armed forces and military cooperation. One of NATO’s three core tasks, alongside defense and deterrence and cooperative security, remains crisis prevention, with the alliance committed to becoming “the leading international organisation when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change.”

We want the RUSI-FES report to stimulate wide debate about an ambitious U.K.-German agreement on defense, security, and foreign policy. Its recommendations provide a solid basis for this, with objectives focused on building a European pillar of NATO, developing interoperability, and expanding defense industrial cooperation.

For Labour, the report is a reminder that reconnecting with European allies is vital to U.K. national security. Labour accepts Brexit, and will not be rejoining the European Union or the single market; but to make Brexit work, Britain must rebuild relationships with key European allies that have been damaged—often deliberately—by the U.K. government’s actions in recent years. A U.K.-German security treaty would be a significant step in this process.

To make this happen, we need new leadership and a relationship founded on reliability and respect between Berlin and London to strengthen wider European security. As Ukraine has shown, allies and alliances matter. Germany and the U.K. can be a stronger force for good in the world when they work more closely together.