Thai Vote Spells Danger for Junta and Monarchy

When Thailand held elections for its 500-member House of Representatives last Sunday, it was only the second national election since the return to military rule in 2014. An estimated 75 percent of eligible voters turned out to deliver a resounding victory to the political opposition and particularly for the Move Forward Party (MFP). The opposition victory is largely symbolic: The Thai military junta and monarchy have maintained a monopoly on power through the unelected Thai Senate, whose members are proposed by the junta and appointed by the king and whose decisions severely constrain those of the elected lower house. While the election results are certainly a blow to the ruling elite, it remains to be seen whether the sheer scale of the opposition’s victory will enable it to upend the status quo.

The MFP is the newest incarnation of the Future Forward Party, which was dissolved by the Thai Constitutional Court in February 2020 after the 2019 elections—a verdict that sparked months of student-led street protests that were only suppressed by strict COVID-19 restrictions on public assembly. A crackdown on dissent followed: According to Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, between July 2020 and April 2023 at least 1,902 people—including 284 minors—were charged or prosecuted for political activism.

For the 2023 elections, the MFP ran on a progressive platform of institutional reform and social policies. This made the party especially attractive to a younger generation of Thais dissatisfied with the old guard and the monarchy, as well as with working-class moderates seeking an end to corruption, oppression, and military-backed rule. More than 3 million first-time voters showed up to vote for the MFP and its fellow opposition party Pheu Thai. Altogether, the two opposition parties are projected to hold 293 out of 500 seats in the elected lower house, soundly defeating the current military-backed government of Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha and the parties representing it.

Public enthusiasm to participate was unprecedented. Thai civil society organizations played a key role in galvanizing voters and delivering a competitive election: An alliance of nongovernmental organizations mobilized a nationwide effort to independently verify the election results through systematic observation. Civil society and volunteer networks across all of Thailand’s 77 provinces participated in what may have been the country’s biggest crowdsourcing event to date. In a remarkable display of civic participation, some 27,500 photos of results forms were submitted to participating organizations to verify that results announced by Thailand’s Election Commission were credible.

Observers reported that the overall process was an improvement from 2019, though significant problems remain. Election day was calm and orderly, and citizen observers were accredited in a timely manner. Civil society organizations reported better coordination with the Election Commission than in the past. For the first time, the Election Commission attempted to address misinformation and disinformation by creating an internal committee to combat inauthentic news. Some international observers were able to see the first stage of collation at vote tabulation centers, but they were turned away during the aggregate tabulation—a move that increased suspicion that the Election Commission had something to hide. Reports of vote buying were prevalent. The constituency ballots confused voters by lacking candidate names or logos, only listing parties. When interpreting ballots and tallying votes, election officials prioritized penmanship over voter intent, which led to higher numbers of invalid ballots than necessary. For a country as technologically sophisticated as Thailand, it was remarkable that the Election Commission failed to release the full list of polling center locations. These anomalies added to the trust deficit between voters and administrators, heightening public perceptions that the commission is not independent.

Despite the opposition’s clear electoral victory, it faces numerous obstacles to actually governing. If a coalition is formalized, the MFP and Pheu Thai have the 251 seats needed to pass a budget in the lower house. Together with other allies, they are projected to hold at least 313 out of 750 seats in the all-important National Assembly, which combines the elected House of Representatives and the appointed Senate. To attain the decisive 376-vote majority of the two combined houses—and thus overcome Senate objections to legislation—the coalition will have to bring additional members of parliament into the fold.

Complicating the union between the MFP and Pheu Thai is their divergence on military and monarchy reform. Pheu Thai favors preserving the monarchy but reforming Thailand’s archaic lèse-majesté law—which stipulates harsh penalties for any negative comment on the monarchy. The MFP proposes to abolish both. Some scholars believe the opposition should not push for too many reforms too soon if they are to avoid another military coup. But public optimism and momentum for reform are extremely high. The MFP will need to balance compromise with not disappointing its supporters.

The 2017 junta-initiated constitution with an appointed Senate was conceived as a tool by political elites to ensure their power, including over the popularly elected lower house. In 2019, the Senate readily voted in favor of Prayuth as prime minister to lead a conservative, pro-royalist coalition instead of backing the nominee for Pheu Thai, which won the popular vote but failed to form a coalition after a series of setbacks. In 2023, will senators back a nominee who delivers more than 50 percent of the lower house? Or will the Senate once again acquiesce to the junta responsible for the senators’ ascension to power?

Given the overwhelmingly popular support for change, any overt move by the junta to dismantle the opposition or restrict its ability to govern would be extremely risky, in all likelihood leading to another wave of nationwide protests. Notwithstanding the risk, the ruling government has already raised the possibility of disqualifying the MFP’s candidate for prime minister, Pita Limjaroenrat, by once again weaponizing one of Thailand’s many obscure laws to oppress its political rival.

The fact that nearly two-thirds of the House of Representatives will be dominated by parties opposing the military is a clear signal that the Thai people want meaningful change. It remains to be seen if and how senators will handle this new challenge to the status quo and whether the country’s elites will seek to curtail this movement. Whatever the outcome, the 2023 elections in Thailand are already a significant development in a region dominated by authoritarians: They demonstrate that democratic aspirations in Thailand are stronger and more resilient than ever.