Did German Pilots Just Pass NATO’s Tactics to China?

There is a long history of German military pilots helping the Chinese air force. In the 1930s, Nazi Germany dispatched military advisors to help build and train the air force of the Republic of China, which was simultaneously fighting communist insurgents under Mao Zedong and the invading Imperial Japanese Army. Chinese-German relations soured a few years later, when Berlin allied with Tokyo in the Tripartite Pact. By then, however, Chinese pilots had not only been trained by the formidable German air force—the Luftwaffe—but were also flying German-made bombers and fighter aircraft to attack the communists and Japanese.

German fighter pilots are helping train China’s air force once again. According to a report published last week in Der Spiegel, several former Luftwaffe pilots have been training Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) pilots over the past decade. The report quotes unnamed German security officials warning it is “very possible that the pilots have passed on military expertise and confidential operational tactics, and even practiced attack scenarios, such as an offensive against Taiwan.” For example, Luftwaffe pilots, even retired ones who haven’t flown recently, could teach Chinese pilots about planning and executing effective suppression and destruction of enemy air defense (critical operations known by their military acronyms, SEAD and DEAD), which was a Luftwaffe forte during and immediately after the Cold War. It is also a critical skillset for the Chinese air force to acquire in order to gain air superiority in any fight over Taiwan. Indeed, the Luftwaffe’s only combat mission since World War II was in 1999, when four German Tornado fighter aircraft—outfitted with electronic warfare capabilities and anti-radiation missiles capable of following incoming radar signals to their source—took part in a NATO SEAD campaign against Serbian air defenses.

German pilots could have taught their Chinese counterparts other crucial details about planning air operations. For example, they could have shared information about NATO military doctrine on composite air operations, which is essentially how the alliance groups various types of aircraft together for specific operations. Any Chinese SEAD campaign against Taiwanese air defenses, for example, would require a mix of different aircraft working together—all integrated into a wider Chinese strike campaign that would include ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as drones of various types. Planning, let alone executing, such an operation is challenging and full of complexities. Chinese officers would certainly be grateful for any practical insight into how potential adversaries are going about it.

The German episode follows revelations last year that “at least 30” former pilots of the British Royal Air Force had similarly been advising the PLAAF, teaching Chinese aviators about NATO tactics and Western military doctrine. That these German and British pilots were able to serve the Chinese military in such a sensitive area for so long once again underlines European naivete about dealing with Beijing—especially in the military realm. While it’s not just European pilots teaching their Chinese adversaries advanced skills—a former U.S. Marine Corps pilot has been accused of training Chinese pilots to land on aircraft carriers—the sheer number of cases in Europe is a symptom of a larger, more systemic problem. Europe needs to stop underestimating the threat to its security posed by China’s burgeoning military power, particularly when combined with Beijing’s revisionist view of the existing global order, on which Europe’s security and prosperity depends. Europe’s lax approach needs to change rapidly if it is to remain at peace and secure.

Europe should bury its naivete regarding Chinese military power, even if no Chinese missiles will likely rain down on Paris, London, or Berlin.

Europe’s nonchalance towards Chinese military ambitions is easily explained. First, the most likely military confrontation—a conflict over Taiwan, possibly culminating in a high-intensity war in East Asia—is primarily seen as a fight between the United States and China. Second, Europeans’ perceptions of China as outside their military remit is reinforced by what U.S. defense policymakers have been telling them: Europe should commit more military resources to its own defense, rather than making minor military contributions to a potential fight against China over Taiwan. In other words, U.S. military planners see a division of labor in which Europeans are finally able to defend themselves against a resurgent Russia with minor U.S. support, while the United States focuses on Asia to stem the tide of Chinese aggression. This is not only the division of labor that Washington wants, but also likely the one Europe wants—even if Europe could certainly dispatch combat troops to Asia in the event of a Taiwan conflict. German and British military pilots training Chinese aviators undermines that division of labor.

But perhaps the biggest reason for Europe’s lack of sufficient concern about its citizens spreading military secrets to Beijing is many European governments’ general lack of seriousness about military threats. This should not be surprising. European industry has directly or indirectly helped Russia’s military buildup over the years by supplying military equipment, dual-use technology—including the precision manufacturing technologies used to make sophisticated weapons—and other support to Russia until at least 2020. The war in Ukraine finally forced Western Europe to get more serious about Russia, but it remains naive about the threat from China. Europeans passing on military secrets to the Chinese will not only make any war in Asia harder to fight and win for the United States and its allies; strengthening adversaries and letting them know one’s own tactics also makes the job of deterring future wars in any region harder.

That’s why Europeans are wrong to worry about Russia but not China. The military hardware the United States needs to fight a potential war against China in East Asia is precisely the military hardware Europe needs to maintain adequate deterrence against Russia. This includes precision-guided munitions; long-range air defense systems; uncrewed aerial vehicles; aircraft for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), electronic warfare, early warning, and air-to-air refueling; cyber reconnaissance capabilities; and space-based ISR platforms. Washington simply does not have enough of these high-end platforms and capabilities to go around, and anything the Europeans do to help the Chinese means the United States needs to shift more equipment to Asia. Notwithstanding their wake-up call in Ukraine, European countries, especially Germany, have been slow to reinvest in such high-end capabilities.

And it will take many years for most European militaries to become proficient again in high-intensity warfighting, including, for example, complex SEAD and DEAD campaigns. This is exactly what the Russian air force has been struggling with in Ukraine, and no doubt what the PLAAF is struggling with at the moment.

German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, in a meeting with his Chinese counterpart, asked Beijing to stop hiring former Luftwaffe pilots to train Chinese fighter pilots. Obviously, a polite plea to an adversary is not enough. As an immediate first step, European governments should pass legislation to ban their citizens and companies from aiding the People’s Liberation Army in any way. Changing the broader mindset in Europe about China’s military threat, however, will be much harder. Still, Europe would do well to bury its naivete regarding Chinese military power, even if no Chinese missiles will likely rain down on Paris, London, or Berlin. Given the likely scale and level of destruction of an Asian conflict between the superpowers, even a victorious United States would need many years to rebuild its armed forces, leaving little to spare for Europe. Europe should avoid such a military interregnum at all costs—by taking military deterrence, including by the United States against China, much more seriously than in the past. It’s time to end European naivete: The direct and indirect consequences of Chinese military aggression in Asia would be disastrous for European security.