The Middle East Might Be Moving Toward Stability

Several foreign ministers gathered in an Asian capital to negotiate an end to regional turmoil. One of the countries represented at the meeting brokered an agreement to end hostilities between the others.

This could be the 2023 Beijing agreement to normalize relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. But it could also be Bangkok in 1967, when Thailand’s foreign minister helped forge an agreement to end hostilities between Indonesia and Malaysia. It was at this meeting that the concept for one of the world’s most successful regional organizations was born: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

By the late ‘60s, it was clear to Southeast Asian states that without cooperation they would be unable to thrive economically. Nor would they be able to provide for their own security, particularly from a rising China. Transformative events in the region and world were equally important in ASEAN’s formation.

As war raged in Vietnam and concerns about the spread of communism from China-backed movements abounded, underperforming economies threatened to delegitimize governments across Southeast Asia. Britain was on the cusp of withdrawing from the region; globally, two decades later the Cold War ended. These factors contributed to the formation—and later the membership expansion—of ASEAN.

Recent de-escalations suggest that the regional awareness evident in Southeast Asia in the 1960s might be taking hold in the Middle East. Talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia started in April 2021 in Baghdad, went to Muscat, Oman, and ultimately arrived in Beijing, where they culminated in an agreement that holds promise of being sustained. Other developments, such as the Abraham Accords and the emerging rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt, also suggest a trend toward normalization.

It is easy to be skeptical about the prospects for diplomacy in the Middle East. This is particularly true of the Iran-Saudi normalization, where questions about lopsided benefits for one side or another raise concerns about how long it will last. But as with Southeast Asia in the 1960s, there are forces at work in the Middle East and the world today that should temper our skepticism.

For example, Israel and Saudi Arabia are showing considerable independence from the United States on issues ranging from energy policy to approaches toward Russia’s war in Ukraine. Iran, in the context of its role in supplying drones to Russia for the Russia-Ukraine war, is also feeling more confident.

Moreover, while the United States is not withdrawing from the Middle East, its allies in the Persian Gulf have come to question its reliability as a security guarantor and partner. This is having the effect of drawing them closer to, not further away from, Iran. The final straw for Saudi Arabia was the 2019 drone attacks on two oil refineries, Abqaiq and Khurais, owned by state company Aramco. These attacks were widely believed to be Tehran’s work, yet U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration did very little to respond despite its ongoing bluster toward Iran. For the Saudis, the Carter Doctrine, formulated in 1980 as a U.S. commitment to use force to defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf, had expired. This development no doubt propelled the Saudis towards amenability to negotiation with Iran. And by 2021, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman, too, were in full swing to broaden their dialogues with Iran.

There has been a belief in Washington that the Middle East can’t stabilize without U.S. involvement. But in the current environment it is clear the primary impetus to stabilization needs to come from the regional powers. As these recent moves toward dialogue demonstrate, a view is taking hold in the region that stabilization and de-escalation—from the civil wars in Yemen and Syria to problems in Lebanon and Iraq—require cooperation among the regional actors, with or without the United States’ involvement.

Several Iranian sources have highlighted China’s emerging critical role as a regional stabilizer. Iranian state-run media reported that after Iran attacked Saudi petroleum assets in 2019, China warned Tehran that such acts undermine its interests, given Beijing’s energy security policy is based on unhindered import of Saudi and Gulf oil.

Beijing is the largest trade partner for both Iran and Saudi Arabia, although Chinese-Saudi trade is about six times larger than Chinese-Iranian trade. Given that China receives half its oil from the Persian Gulf, its energy security necessitates it push for policies that reduce the likelihood of a conflict between the Iranians in Tehran and the Saudis in Riyadh. It remains to be seen whether China has the heft and political will to help Iran and Saudi Arabia pursue economic integration, the sort that the European continent saw at the end of the Second World War. This will be a big test for China.

Perhaps counterintuitively, China’s diplomatic forays in the Middle East could push Washington toward diplomacy too. China’s moves might have served as the impetus for recent talk of an informal deal between Iran and the United States on the nuclear issue. Reputationally, the White House now must fight the narrative of China as a peacemaker and the United States as a warmonger that only wants to sell weapons to the Middle East.

On balance and in the short term, Riyadh stands to gain the most from China’s involvement. Riyadh wins if China can press Tehran to force the Houthis in Yemen to reach a political agreement with Saudi Arabia and stop threatening to target Saudi infrastructure, trade, and economic plans. The Saudis also win if the Iranians fail to do so, as Riyadh can then showcase to Beijing that it is the Iranians who are not serious about de-escalation.

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The diplomatic resumption also has another benefit for Riyadh: In the event of a military conflict between Iran and the United States or Iran and Israel, the Saudis have now made it far less likely that Saudi Arabia will become a target of Iranian retaliation.

The short-term win for Tehran is that this agreement with Riyadh might push Saudi Arabia away from Israel, at least for now. More importantly, at a minimum, the deal can signal a new era of “cold peace” between Tehran and Riyadh, during which both sides cease to interfere in each other’s internal affairs. Both sides consider this promise of non-interference as pivotal, a message that was repeated during the June 17 visit of Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud to Tehran.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, the agenda of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman is one of massive transformation of Saudi society. Above all, the leadership in Riyadh is convinced that the best national strategy for the country’s future is one that focuses on economic development at home, including a commitment to the crown prince’s Vision 2030 platform.

On the other side, the arrival of hardline Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi might also have pushed Tehran and Riyadh toward each other. Following the 2021 departure of Hassan Rouhani’s so-called pragmatic government, the Saudis faced an Iranian regime in which all power rested in the hands of the hardline faction. Meanwhile, this hardline faction in Tehran was under pressure to deliver results. Hence, the likelihood that Iran could deliver on its promises—particularly on adjusting its regional policies—increased, given that Tehran’s regional agenda was in the hands of the hardline Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Meanwhile, in Tehran, the regime could see no way out of its stalemate with Washington. Instead, it could seek a new policy toward its Arab rivals with an aim to circumvent U.S. sanctions. Policymakers in Tehran realized the utility of immediate neighbors as conduits for global trade.

This is how the UAE, Iraq, and Oman have recently emerged as among Iran’s biggest trading partners. At the very least, the regime in Tehran hopes that détente with Riyadh will reduce anti-Iran actions by the Saudis, including financial support for opposition media operations in the large Iranian diaspora, an issue of urgency for Tehran since protests erupted in September 2022 over the death of Mahsa Amini in regime custody.

There is also the factor of power succession in Tehran. For now, though, it is fortunate for Raisi that the 84-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s agenda overlaps nicely with his political needs.

Sustained regional stability could benefit from a trifecta of local, regional, and global forces pulling in the same direction. One thing to watch for is whether the Abraham Accords and the Iran-Saudi rapprochement will complement or conflict with one another. While there is little possibility that there will be any formal cooperation between Israel and Iran, it is possible that the Abraham Accords could run parallel to the Saudi-Iran rapprochement. China’s more neutral stance could just about allow for this. The bellwether will be whether Saudi Arabia eventually joins the Abraham Accords, which could in a way provide an informal bridge between the two initiatives.

While it is healthy to question the motivations behind Iran and Saudi Arabia’s recent normalization of relations and to test the two countries’ political will toward de-escalation, cynicism could blind us to the possibilities for a better future for this troubled region.