A Saudi-Israeli Peace Deal Isn’t Worth It

The New York Times reports that the Biden administration is making a “long-shot bid” to get Israel and Saudi Arabia to normalize relations. Among other things, this step requires overcoming Saudi concerns about Israel’s continued maltreatment of its Palestinian subjects and getting Israel to accept Saudi Arabia’s desire for an advanced civilian nuclear program. You’d think Biden and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken have enough on their hands these days—the war in Ukraine is not going that well, reestablishing constructive relations with China is a challenging task, and they’re apparently trying to reach some sort of informal bargain over Iran’s nuclear program too—but nobody ever accused U.S. foreign policymakers of lacking hubris—oops, I mean, ambition.

At first glance, pushing Saudi Arabia and Israel to normalize relations seems like a no-brainer.  U.S. leaders have long wanted Israel’s neighbors to accept its existence and reach a permanent peace. That impulse (and the related goal of reducing Soviet influence in the region during the Cold War) helped inspire the Carter administration’s shepherding of the 1978 Camp David Accords and subsequent Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, as well as the later U.S. effort to broker peace between Israel and Jordan in 1994. Unfortunately, subsequent efforts to achieve a “two-state solution” within the framework of the Oslo Accords were dismal failures, in good part because the United States was not an evenhanded mediator and acted as “Israel’s lawyer” instead. Even so, given the long history of Arab-Israeli enmity, it’s easy to assume that normalization between Riyadh and Tel Aviv would strengthen peace and facilitate regional economic development. Why shouldn’t Washington try to get two of its closest regional partners to come to terms with each other?

In fact, there are two big reasons why this sudden push makes little sense right now.

First, the danger of a serious conflict between Israel and any Arab states is already vanishingly small. The days where Israel had to worry about being surrounded by large, hostile, and more populous Arab coalition—with some members armed and trained by the Soviet Union—are long gone. Let’s not forget that the supposedly outnumbered and vulnerable Israeli David won every one of the wars fought against the mostly mythical Arab Goliath. Today, Israel has the most powerful military in the region, and it is the only country in the Middle East with nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia isn’t going to attack Israel under any circumstances, and neither are Jordan, Iraq, or Egypt. Syria is still technically a belligerent, but the battered Assad regime won’t lift a finger against Israel either. Indeed, most of these states have been collaborating with Israel against mutual foes—including Hamas in Gaza and of course Iran—for a long time.

Don’t get me wrong: Full normalization would be nice—especially for Israel—and arranging it would probably win the Biden administration some plaudits from groups such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee . But normalization wouldn’t be a sea change in regional politics; it would merely codify and make a situation that already exists more visible. The open secret is that Saudi Arabia (and some other Gulf states) tacitly accepted Israel a long time ago, even if they haven’t been willing to admit it in public. The bottom line is that even if Biden’s long-shot bid were to pay off, the strategic benefits for the United States will be minor.

Second, in making this push, Biden and Blinken are spending scant political capital on two of the least grateful clients in America’s portfolio. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has a history of treating U.S. presidents with contempt, and his relationship with Biden has been frosty. He now heads the most hard-line government in Israel’s history, one that is streamlining the colonization of the West Bank and facilitating an increasingly violent campaign against its Palestinian subjects (including some U.S. citizens). The Biden administration isn’t happy about these developments, not to mention Israel’s drift away from democracy, but it has confined itself to the usual limp and ineffectual protests. Meanwhile, Israel has remained steadfastly neutral over the war in Ukraine while continuing to receive generous U.S. military and diplomatic backing. Netanyahu and company are just acting in what they think is Israel’s best interest, of course, but their conduct should be a wake-up call for Biden & Co.

Saudi Arabia is no more deserving of U.S. diplomatic solicitude. Even if one ignores the 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi agents, Saudi Arabia has been a prickly and unhelpful ally of late. Its military campaign in Yemen was a humanitarian disaster and a blow to America’s image, insofar as U.S. support facilitated a destructive and largely pointless war. Riyadh has also stayed on the sidelines over Ukraine, and it continues to feed the Russian war machine by purchasing Russian oil at bargain prices while exporting more of its own production at a premium. Moreover, the Saudis angered the Biden administration last fall by coordinating a production cut with Russia to keep prices up, despite direct U.S. requests that they not do so. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has moved steadily closer to China, too, and Saudi officials have made it clear that they welcome alternatives to U.S. patronage, especially in the economic realm.

Here too: One can argue Saudi Arabia isn’t doing this to spite the administration; its just following its own interests. From Riyadh’s perspective, the fate of Ukraine is not a vital issue, and it makes good strategic sense to reach out to China and reduce dependence on U.S. protection. Fair enough, but then why is Washington wasting time, effort, and potential leverage trying to broker a deal between Riyadh and Tel Aviv?

To be clear: If those two states think it makes sense to normalize their relationship at this point, the United States would not and should not object. But why should it expend any effort at all trying to persuade them?

It’s possible that Biden and Blinken are worried about declining U.S. influence in the region and alarmed by China’s recent diplomatic achievements. Convincing Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel would show that the United States could still deliver tangible diplomatic results, even if the strategic significance of the move were modest. Convincing the Saudis to shelve their nuclear ambitions as part of the deal would be a genuine achievement, but that’s not very likely.

There’s one more big downside to this endeavor, and it might be the most significant. By pushing Israel and Saudi Arabia to normalize relations, Biden and Blinken are in effect helping make the world safer for Israeli apartheid. The Saudis were never going to do very much to oppose the emerging one-state reality, of course, but normalization would be tantamount to their saying that permanent subjugation of the Palestinians is OK by them. Biden and Blinken aren’t going to do anything to halt or reverse this process either, even though it makes a mockery of their claims to take human rights seriously and makes their opposition to Russia’s annexation of Ukraine or China’s treatment of its Uyghur minority look hypocritical in the minds of independent observers.  If you’re wondering why much of the world no longer sees the United States as an inspiring beacon of progress, there’s part of your answer.

Given all the other items on the State Department’s to-do list, I can’t quite fathom why this long-shot bid is even being attempted.  And for those who believe that it’s at least worth a try, I’d remind them that trying and failing to broker a deal makes Washington look ineffectual, and all the more so when its entreaties are rejected by two states with whom the United States supposedly has a “special relationship.”