China Can’t Catch a Break in Asian Public Opinion

China has a soft-power problem—especially among its neighbors in Asia. New data collected by my organization, the Eurasia Group Foundation, demonstrates that many people in Singapore, the Philippines, and South Korea have unfavorable views of China’s soft power. While about three-quarters of people surveyed reported favorable views of U.S. soft power (a composite measure of views of the United States, its culture, its system of government, and its influence over the past five years), just over one-third said they had similarly favorable views of Chinese soft power. This is a concrete problem for Beijing, because in the Philippines and South Korea, it contributes to policy changes that conflict with China’s objectives.

While many in the U.S. foreign-policy community focus on China’s growing military power and reach, its inability to win new friends and allies though the power of example requires more focused attention. China’s soft-power deficit presents the United States with an opportunity to rebuild its own soft-power assets in Asia. Based on our data, the United States should build networks of cooperation on issues such as economic development, economic disparities between the rich and poor, political instability, and climate change.

Soft power is a country’s ability to attract. It includes ideology, values, domestic politics, technology, culture, and influence in international institutions. Put differently, it is a country’s ability to get others to want what it wants, without recourse to military force or other forms of coercion. It helps countries achieve their national security objectives by influencing allies and partners and obviates the need to forcibly change what they do. It helps reduce the threat of conflicts occurring and contributes to balancing the threat of great-power competition.

China’s efforts to build soft power are fraught. The countries in which China invests in soft-power assets are increasingly concerned about China’s global ambitions. Chinese economic, cultural, educational, and research investments are scrutinized regularly, and are received with caution. Indeed, China’s attempts to build soft power are repelling other countries more than drawing them in because China can seem like a bully.

At the end of the Cold War, U.S. soft power was evident across countries emerging from communism in the thriving black market for Levi’s jeans in Germany, the popularity of Bruce Springsteen, the hourslong lines outside of Russia’s first McDonald’s, and the ability to bring countries such as China into multilateral financial institutions. In the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was the paragon of soft power.

As successive U.S. presidents squandered soft power in post-Sept. 11th military misadventures and ill-advised trade wars, the concept entered China’s political discourse. At the 17th Party Congress in 2007, then-President Hu Jintao said that in “the present era, culture has become a more and more important source of national cohesion and creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength.” China’s national rejuvenation required thriving Chinese culture.

In 2011, at the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, an entire plenary session was devoted to culture and developing China into a cultural superpower. After President Xi Jinping took power in 2013, China began investing heavily in soft power globally. The resulting policies included the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); reorienting China-led international institutions; investments in Confucius Institutes for education; and funding for regional think tanks, public diplomacy, and media operations in the global south. Today, Chinese state media outlets regularly publishes pieces touting soft power.

Xi’s attempt to build nonmilitary influence in South Korea through “neighborhood diplomacy” began in 2013. He worked to integrate regional neighbors into a China-led network of economic, political, cultural, and security relations. This led to high-level China-Korea dialogues and a new free trade agreement, and Seoul joined the AIIB.

But for soft power to work, a country must be attractive to others—and China’s own frequent fits of pique were more alienating than alluring. First, in 2016, Seoul announced it would deploy the U.S.-made Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system to intercept North Korean missiles. China said the THAAD system would be used by the United States for spying, and Beijing leveled sanctions on Seoul. Bilateral relations with China cratered.

Another contributor is China’s impact on regional pollution—specifically fine and yellow dust, which many Koreans believe comes from China. This transboundary air pollution caused domestic uproar in South Korea, further increasing bilateral tensions.

Recent research linked transboundary air pollution to negative Korean attitudes and more hawkish foreign-policy toward China. Our data buttresses these findings. It indicates that the recent history of poor relations between China and South Korea is the primary driver of negative attitudes toward China.

Similarly, in the Philippines, Chinese soft-power investments in promoting Chinese language, educational exchanges, pro-Chinese media, or promises of BRI investment offer China little in return. Former President Rodrigo Duterte made an effort to move his country closer to China, but Philippine society didn’t follow.

In exchange for the promise of $24 billion in BRI funding, Duterte set aside a 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling invalidating Beijing’s claims to the South China Sea. He publicly espoused anti-U.S. views and cursed then-U.S. President Barack Obama for criticizing his killings of alleged drug dealers. And yet, our data demonstrates that Filipinos have a generally unfavorable view of Chinese soft power. Two-thirds of Filipinos have unfavorable views of China’s system of government and its influence on their country in the last five years.

Most Filipinos we surveyed said their negative views of China were the result of China’s military destabilizing their region. China’s persistent harassment of the Philippine Navy, Coast Guard, and fishermen outweighs Chinese cultural investments and Duterte’s attempts to move his country further into China’s orbit.

Even in countries that don’t have direct quarrels with China, its record is poor. For decades, Singapore has wielded significant diplomatic influence in Asia while assiduously avoiding being caught in competition between larger powers. Today, it trades with both the United States and China, and engages in security cooperation with both superpowers.

Three-quarters of Singaporeans identify as ethnically Chinese. And China invests heavily in influence operations in the city-state through business associations, kinship and family networks, grassroots organizations, think tanks, and media. The goal of these operations is promoting a vision of a so-called Greater China.

Our data suggests that this effort to elicit popular support for China produced mixed returns. A little more than half of Singaporeans reported favorable views of China. Older Singaporeans have the strongest affinity for China. These views are linked to perceptions of historically good relations and liking Chinese culture. But Chinese influence operations, through Chinese-language media, academia, business association-funded scholarships, sparked internal backlash focused on improving Singaporean systems for defending against these activities. And the United States continues to be more influential in the city-state than China.

China has a bad reputation, and its effort to improve popular perceptions shows few lasting effects. Its soft-power ventures often conflict with its military objectives. China has been unable to build a compelling popular culture because its stars and media personalities are expected to toe the Communist Party line. The party goes as far as regulating celebrity fan clubs.

During the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, China’s vaccine diplomacy showed mixed results. It sold vaccines and donated little, and the efficacy of its vaccine was limited. While global medical supply chains depended on Chinese production, the Communist Party was accused of hoarding vital medical supplies. With its economy slowing and unemployment for 16-24 year-olds hitting a record high of 20.8 percent in May (double the pre-COVID-19 figure) China’s capacity to further invest in soft power abroad may be constrained in the near term.

China’s economic downturn presents the United States with opportunities to build trust and stronger bonds in the region though new soft-power investments. Our data shows that expanding regional cooperation to address growing climate change concerns is an important place to start. Climate change is one of the most pressing national concerns in the countries we surveyed. Clearly defining, operationalizing, and expanding the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) is another area for U.S. influence to gain traction. Since many people are worried about their economies and disparities between rich and poor, the United States should leverage IPEF to address these issues.

Investing in soft power is not zero-sum. China can benefit, and if it chooses, participate in U.S.-led soft-power initiatives. Nor does  this investment preclude countries in the region from continuing to cooperate with China. Rather, it supports the U.S interests: staying involved in Asia without further aggravating tensions with China.