The EU Isn’t Ready for Ukraine to Join

Ukraine is in the waiting room to join both NATO and the European Union. NATO leaders meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania, disappointed Kyiv last week with only a vague statement on a future invitation to join the alliance when “conditions are met.”

But at least NATO is being honest in signaling that there are still obstacles to overcome among the allies. That stands in stark contrast to the EU and its messaging on Ukrainian membership. If you think Ukraine’s path to NATO is a struggle, wait until what happens when Ukraine’s EU accession gets serious.

With its grand rhetoric on Ukraine’s future in the EU, Brussels is talking as if Kyiv joining the bloc were a done deal. When Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited Brussels in February, EU leaders elbowed each other for a photo-op with the wartime leader. European Council President Charles Michel greeted Zelensky with a tweet: “Welcome home, welcome to the EU.”

When EU membership is discussed in detail with Ukraine, the focus is on what Ukraine needs to do to join. Deeply united by the war, Ukrainians are pressing ahead to do their part, adopting new laws and implementing regulations required for EU membership. The Ukrainians are checking more and more boxes on the long EU membership to-do list, from reforming their judiciary to developing a new media law to cracking down on corruption.

Ukraine, together with Moldova, attained EU candidate status in June 2022, drastically shortening a byzantine process that has taken years for other countries on the waiting list. Kyiv  will get the first written progress assessment from the European Commission in October. To keep up the momentum, Ukrainian officials are pushing for the official start of accession negotiations by the end of this year, possibly at a European Council meeting scheduled for December.

Were the EU’s budget and redistribution process to remain unchanged, Kyiv would immediately suck in a vast part of the EU budget.

But while Ukraine is working at pace to join the EU, Brussels and the bloc’s member states are not doing nearly enough to be ready to absorb Ukraine. EU leaders’ high-flying rhetoric on Ukraine’s membership therefore does not match their actions. To absorb a country with the size, population, low income level, financing, and reconstruction needs of war-torn Ukraine, it would require a major reform of EU institutions, policies, and budget processes. At the very least, this will set off vicious conflicts between current members about the distribution of EU funds.

Therefore, if EU leaders were really serious about membership for Ukraine, efforts to reform the bloc should already be underway. At the heart of the issue is the EU budget, which is dominated by two major elements: agricultural subsidies and development projects in poorer regions, which combined account for roughly 65 percent of the EU’s long-term budget. For both these issues, prospective Ukrainian membership is explosive. Ukraine is one of the poorest countries in Europe, with a per capita income of barely one-tenth of the EU average and less than half that of the EU’s poorest member, Bulgaria. Ukraine also now has vast infrastructure and reconstruction needs. To all of this, add one of the continent’s largest agricultural sectors that would suddenly be eligible for EU subsidies.

Were the EU’s budget and redistribution process to remain unchanged, Kyiv would immediately suck in a vast part of the EU budget, including funds now going to the bloc’s less affluent members in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Many countries currently benefiting from EU funds would turn into net contributors overnight. If you think any of this will be a smooth process, then you don’t know much about European politics.

Given the current redistribution of funds within the EU, it’s no surprise that the biggest cracks in support for Ukrainian membership have come in Eastern Europe, where the EU’s net recipients are concentrated. In fact, the battle over giving Ukraine access to European agricultural markets has already started, long before a single euro in EU farming subsidies is reallocated: Following the invasion, Brussels supported Ukraine by allowing its grain and other agricultural products to enter the EU’s single market. Cheaper Ukrainian goods undercut farmers in neighboring Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. Even though Ukraine was desperate for revenue, Poland violated EU rules and unilaterally blocked Ukrainian grain from entering Polish territory. The EU intervened with a compromise, allowing Ukrainian produce to enter the EU but requiring it to bypass five Eastern European countries most affected by the unwelcome competition.

It is also no surprise, then, that some of these Eastern European countries—which count among Ukraine’s biggest military and diplomatic backers—also oppose any serious effort to undertake the EU reforms that are a prerequisite for Ukraine to join. Not only do these countries potentially stand to lose substantial funds, but EU reforms to prepare the way for Ukrainian membership will also likely include streamlining EU decision-making rules, which could reduce individual members’ power, especially countries such as Hungary and Poland that have made liberal use of their veto power to influence EU decisions.

EU enlargement is one of the most successful political, economic, and social policies in history, peacefully expanding the union to incorporate 450 million people in 27 countries. For new members, entering the bloc has often set off an economic miracle—a combination of market access, EU funding, the bloc’s rules on good governance, and the confidence that comes with having a secure future. Yet for the past decade, further enlargement has been on ice, largely because the redistribution involved when new, usually poor, members join has been so politically wrought.

Since Zelensky submitted an official application for EU membership on Feb. 28, 2022, just four days after the start of the Russian invasion, the question of further enlargement has been back on the table. Besides membership for Ukraine and Moldova, EU leaders are increasingly aware that other countries not yet in the EU—specifically, in the Western Balkans—will also have to be brought on board if European security and stability is to be ensured.

The explosive impact of Ukraine’s membership on the EU budget will force a discussion about the EU forging a fiscal union. In essence, that would mean a large increase in contributions by wealthier members, such as Germany, France, and some of the smaller rich countries; EU-wide income and other progressive taxes; a big increase in the EU’s ability to issue its own debt; or all of the above. Obviously, this is no minor discussion.

Further enlargement would also strain the EU’s already handicapped ability to make decisions and adopt new laws and policies. Reaching unanimity—needed in foreign policy, for example—among 27 sovereign member states is already a Herculean task, complicated further by the presence of an illiberal, Russia-friendly state such as Hungary. Adding Ukraine and other countries patiently waiting to join could push the EU to well past 30 members. There is a long history of  members weaponizing their veto power, which explains why other member states hesitate to add more countries to the decision-making mix without changes to the EU’s functioning.

Germany, for example, is pushing for the expansion of qualified majority voting to new policy areas, such as foreign policy. No longer requiring unanimity would significantly streamline the ability of the EU to make foreign-policy decisions. Smaller countries fear that losing their veto would mean losing their voice in the EU—a debate familiar to any student of constitutional history. Other potential concerns relate to the distribution of member of the European Commission—currently one commissioner per member—or seats in the European Parliament. Enlargement would require reform in these areas, too.

Enlargement would also spotlight the unresolved issue of rule of law and democracy. The EU defines itself as a union of democracies and has strict rules on civil rights, and there are deep concerns over democratic decline and the rollback of the rule of law in Hungary and Poland. Western European governments, in particular, are very wary of enlarging without strengthening the EU’s ability to act against democratic erosion. This concern is especially acute since not a single country on the candidate list is rated fully free in Freedom House’s 2023 Freedom in the World index.

Ukraine could be the catalyst to jump-start a new wave of enlargement. The prospect of its membership requires reform, which in turn would remove many of the obstacles that have similarly held up the accession of Western Balkan countries. Russia’s brutal attack on Ukraine has already been a catalyst for the EU in another way—by demonstrating to Europeans that their bloc is indispensable to their security. When it comes to defense, in survey after survey, Europeans want the EU to play a much greater role. Critically, support for Ukraine among EU citizens remains incredibly high. Even after a year of sanction packages, millions of refugees, energy decoupling, and a cost-of-living crisis, 74 percent of EU citizens approve of the bloc’s support for Ukraine, according to a Eurobarometer poll.

Ukrainians are fighting for their European future. EU leaders now need to do their part to be ready to bring in Ukraine. If they pursue the long-overdue reforms of EU institutions and processes that will be required to make Ukrainian membership work, they will not just make the EU larger. They will make it stronger as well.