‘The Return of the Taliban’ Makes Sense of Afghanistan’s Misery

The Return of the Taliban: Afghanistan After the Americans Left, Hassan Abbas, Yale University Press, 320 pp. $26, May 2023

Nearly two years since the United States withdrew from Afghanistan, the Taliban are still firmly in charge. Despite initial predictions of a civil war, there is no substantial resistance challenging their power, although the nation grapples with an ongoing humanitarian crisis. Its fledgling aid-dependent economy has severely contracted but not yet imploded, and while food inflation is declining, it remains a slow-moving trainwreck with no apparent long-term solutions in sight. While terrorism remains a concern, Afghanistan is not quite the epicenter of transnational jihadists it once was.

Yet tragically, for women and those Afghans who want a more inclusive society, the worst-case scenarios have truly unfolded. The international community has cautiously engaged with the new Taliban-led Afghanistan, but without full commitment, resulting in a state of limbo. The Taliban’s series of draconian measures have made the lives of Afghans and diplomacy exceedingly challenging. Their latest action was the closure of beauty parlors, one of the few places where women could gather freely outside their homes. The Taliban cabinet members who meet with concerned foreign diplomats appear to serve more as liaisons than actual decision-makers, with their statements frequently being contradicted by the decisions of authorities back home.

At a time when numerous authors and commentators reflect on the failed American project in Afghanistan, conducting analytical autopsies to uncover its causes, Hassan Abbas’s latest book, The Return of the Taliban, adopts a distinct approach. Rather than extensively dwelling on past events, the book briefly glances in the rearview mirror, placing its primary focus on the potential for a more pragmatic and hopeful future.

The book begins with a scathing critique of the state of the Afghan republic during the months leading up to the U.S. withdrawal and its simultaneous collapse. President Ashraf Ghani had surrounded himself with young sycophants and fostered an institutional culture where “[d]issent was deemed crime.” By the time U.S. special representative Zalmay Khalilzad engaged in direct negotiations with the Taliban, “Afghanistan had no legs of its own to stand on, and ultimately Ghani was in no position to think he could make decisions about Afghanistan independently,” explains Abbas.

In the months prior to the republic’s collapse, openly criticizing Ghani within the Beltway was still taboo. Any criticisms were made quietly, for fear of being accused of undermining the Afghan government or, worse, sympathizing with the Taliban. Whispering cautiously about uncomfortable truths—such as high rates of corruption, nepotism, and a gradually failing war effort—was a constant of the two-decade U.S. war in Afghanistan.

Abbas provides a play-by-play review of the Doha process, which culminated in an agreement for complete U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Then-President Donald Trump demonstrated a clear understanding of the futility of indefinitely continuing the failed U.S. project in Afghanistan and displayed the political courage to engage in negotiations with the Taliban. However, any clarity from the administration ended there. The subsequent peace process was consistently undermined by Trump’s impatience and outbursts. It is impossible not to contemplate what might have been achieved had Trump’s decisiveness been coupled with former President Barack Obama’s tact. In reality, both undermined efforts in Afghanistan due to domestic political considerations. Obama’s announcement of a certain end date for the surge allowed the Taliban to bide their time, while Trump hastened the Doha process in hopes that the withdrawal would coincide with the 2020 presidential election.

Khalilzad found himself in a challenging position, torn between his primary task of ensuring a safe U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and his genuine belief that he could achieve a diplomatic Hail Mary through an intra-Afghan peace process. In hindsight, this latter endeavor appears futile; most peace deals aimed at ending civil wars tend to unravel anyway without a clear victor. When questioned about Ghani’s criticism of his efforts, Khalilzad replied, “I was representing the United States to carry out the president’s direction.” However, he has also claimed that his “Afghan-ness” made him “very much in touch with the feelings of the Afghan people.” Khalilzad’s dual Afghan-American identity, which enabled him to effectively negotiate an agreement with the Taliban, also led to him being perceived as a villain by many Afghans outside of the Taliban and in the diaspora. They ultimately view him as an Afghan who sold out his country, rather than a U.S. diplomat assigned a nearly impossible task by an erratic president.

However, his hubristic and at times nonchalant remarks about the situation have not helped him garner any support or goodwill. He deleted four years of tweets from November 2018 to January 2023, including numerous threads that angered many in the Afghan diaspora. He insists that a transitional government could have been formed if Ghani had not fled Kabul and continues to argue that the full implementation of the Doha Agreement, including intra-Afghan negotiations, is possible. This seems disconnected from reality, as it ignores clear indications that the Taliban have shown little interest in compromising with other Afghans.

As the United States focused exclusively on its withdrawal, without much concern for its former interpreters and partners, and the Ghani administration remained paralyzed by its own delusions, the Taliban prepared to take over. Like a boa constrictor suffocating its prey, the Taliban began by taking the countryside, then moved to the north, which particularly demoralized the Afghan government, and then captured border crossings to starve the Afghan government of revenue. Ultimately, the Taliban simply walked into Kabul.

One of the notable aspects of this book is the valuable insights into the backgrounds and interpersonal dynamics among present-day Taliban figures. It highlights the various divisions within the Taliban, such as the generational gap between the young and old members, the contrasting experiences of those who spent considerable time in Pakistan or urban areas versus the field commanders, and the distinctions between the “Doha Taliban” and those in Kandahar who are closely associated with the supreme leader.

Abbas asserts that possessing strong religious credentials and ideological purity remains the primary factor for exerting influence at the highest levels of the Taliban. Mullah Abdul Baradar, much like his counterpart, Khalilzad, has faced a similarly disappointing fate since Doha. Despite potentially being the key figure responsible for the Taliban’s return to Kabul, his pragmatism is now considered less valuable since power has been restored, and he has been relegated to economic and development affairs.

Nevertheless, Baradar seems to tackle this role with enthusiasm, frequently appearing alongside infrastructure projects. So far, the edicts of hard-liners aligned with Akhundzada, such as Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani and Mohammad Khalid Hanafi, the minister for the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice, seem to be prevailing over the efforts of pragmatists engaged in essential tasks like aid procurement and infrastructure repair and development. However, it is the latter group that will ultimately play the most crucial role in shaping Afghanistan’s long-term future, regardless of whether the Taliban remain.

Another notable contribution of the book, which is seldom accessible to English-speaking readers, is its exploration of Deobandism and the Taliban’s distinctive version of it. Deobandism, initially a theological response to colonialism in 19th-century South Asia, underwent a transformation within the Taliban, becoming a more rigid and extreme variant. Like its inception, this shift was influenced by outside forces, including the Soviet and U.S. military interventions, Islamist influences from Saudi Arabia and Arab Salafi movements, and the ideological incubators within Pakistan’s madrassas.

​​The author dedicates a significant portion of the text to emphasizing the prevalence of Sufism in Afghanistan and the syncretic nature of Islam in South Asia prior to the influence of violent strains of Salafism. However, at times, this comes across as exaggerated and potentially equating Sufism with moderation, while portraying the more rigid and legalistic interpretations of the faith as inherently extremist. Despite their reverence for Sufi shrines, certain Barelvi movements in Pakistan have demonstrated the capacity for extremism. This point is not overlooked by Abbas, as he frequently adds the caveat that Deobandism should not be equated with violent extremism—although some readers may miss this nuanced distinction.

This highly readable and accessible book concludes with an exploration of how Afghanistan’s neighboring countries prepared for what they perceived as an inevitable future Taliban takeover. The control of Afghanistan by the Taliban poses a significant concern for all neighboring nations, particularly Pakistan, which has witnessed increased violence from the Taliban’s protégé, the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan. It is crucial for the international community to avoid whitewashing the Taliban’s actions, as they have implemented policies that can only be described as gender apartheid. However, as Abbas highlights, condemnatory statements are often primarily directed at Western audiences. In March, in this publication, I cautioned against calls to isolate the Taliban, impose new sanctions, or support the Taliban’s political opposition, as these measures would yield limited benefits for the U.S. or Afghan people. I emphasized that no amount of criticism or statements would alter the Taliban leaders’ stance on their social policies. Abbas similarly argues that engagement is the sole viable path forward.

Productive engagement will also require the Taliban to abandon their own delusions. Abbas illustrates how the Taliban perceive themselves as a triumphant David who emerged victorious against the formidable Goliath of the U.S. military. However, the truth is that Washington was not defeated by the Taliban so much as it simply moved on and washed its hands clean of the country. Grandiosity and Afghanistan’s perceived significance to the West are not exclusive to the Taliban; these same factors contributed to the downfall of the republic.

While Afghanistan may be regarded as the “heart of Asia” in the celebrated prose of the revered poet Allama Mohammad Iqbal, its geopolitical importance is limited. But this does not mean Washington should abandon the inroads it made with the Afghan people over two decades and the Taliban over the last several years. The United Kingdom and European Union have sent their diplomats to meet with Taliban figures inside Afghanistan, and India is taking steps to reopen its embassy. Why not the country that invested the most resources and lives?