Erdogan Has No Choice but to Reconcile With Assad

“Terrorism in Syria is made in Turkey.” These are the words of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in a recent interview with Sky News Arabia, and they are largely representative of the contempt Assad holds for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

For more than a decade, since Syria descended into civil war in 2011, Erdogan was singularly focused on toppling the Syrian dictator—even prioritizing it over Ankara’s commitment to fighting the Islamic State. Now, Russia is trying to push the two leaders to meet and sort out their differences. But doing so won’t be so easy. That’s because Assad has a precondition before any meeting can take place: that all Turkish military forces leave Syria.

By 2022, it became clear that Assad would continue to govern Syria, largely thanks to the material assistance Russia and Iran have provided him. This unwelcome reality was confirmed with Syria’s readmission into the Arab League this May. And it has put Erdogan in an uncomfortable position of having to reconcile with the man he tried so hard to overthrow. Why? Mainly because Russia is urging the two sides to make peace and because Erdogan has no choice.

Erdogan is in a weak position to dictate the terms of what the new normal between Syria and Turkey will be. He has a big Syria problem, and if he wishes to make headway, he needs to work with Assad.

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Millions of Syrian citizens continue to reside in Turkey as refugees, and most Turks, regardless of their political views of Erdogan, think that it’s high time for their Syrian guests to return to their home country. Turkey’s fragile economy is plagued by high consumer inflation, falling wages, and an increasingly disgruntled population.

The Syrian refugee issue lies at the center of this anger. Many blame Erdogan and his policy to admit millions of refugees, who they believe are siphoning scarce national resources that should instead be allocated to Turkish citizens. Whether this is an accurate perception or not, the fact remains that since Turkey’s May elections, which gave Erdogan another five years as president, citizens have been demanding that Erdogan act on his promise to solve the refugee problem.

This is a point of leverage for Assad. If he’s going to cooperate with Erdogan over the return of refugees, then it is going to come at a price: the removal of Turkey’s military presence from northern Syria.

Throughout the Syrian civil war, Ankara has backed and provided material assistance to a motley group of militias and armed opposition groups loosely collected under the banner of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The FSA began as a coalition dedicated to fighting the Assad regime, but over time—and in part because of Turkish support—its main purpose shifted to undermining and militarily degrading the Syrian Kurds and Syrian Democratic Forces—key U.S. partners that have fought relentlessly to eliminate the Islamic State but that Turkey sees as a terrorist threat on its border. This is an additional policy area on which Erdogan will want to secure Assad’s help: how to contain the Syrian Kurds.

To be clear, even though Turkish citizens are largely unaware of this, the vast majority of Syrian refugees will likely never return to Syria. They have made lives for themselves in Turkey, and some have even acquired Turkish citizenship. An entire generation of Syrian children, some in their early teens, are growing up in Turkey, and it is the only home they have ever known.

That said, if Erdogan is interested even in what is likely to be a publicity stunt to return a token number of refugees, he will need to remove troops from Syria and withdraw his support from the FSA. This may appear to be an easy choice. After all, removing Turkish forces from Syrian territory is a matter of time. Under no circumstances will Turkey be permitted to keep a military presence on foreign soil without the acceptance of the Syrian government. If Erdogan agrees to do this now in consultation with Assad, this may allow Ankara to work out some sort of deal that will see the repatriation of a symbolic number of refugees.

But doing so would be an explicit admission that Turkey’s entire Syria strategy is one giant failure. The opposition at home would hit Erdogan hard and raise some difficult questions, mainly on what was actually accomplished in Syria. Even so, not removing troops from Syria will mean that Assad won’t even meet with Erdogan. This is largely reflective of the comfortable position that Assad knows himself to be in. There is not much motivation for Assad to please Erdogan, and the latter has very little by way of leverage.

Indeed, Assad is not the only one who has a problem with Turkey’s behavior in Syria. The U.S. government recently sanctioned two Turkish-backed militia groups. In an Aug. 17 statement, the U.S. Treasury Department designated “two Syria-based armed militias and three members of the groups’ leadership structures in connection with serious human rights abuses against those residing in the Afrin region of northern Syria.” Without naming Turkey, the U.S. government sent a strong signal that it is growing tired of Ankara’s continuing actions in Syria.

All of this means that Erdogan’s hand will most likely be forced to backtrack on his ill-conceived and fruitless Syria policy. The number of actors beckoning Erdogan to back down from his militarily assertive posture is growing. Russia would like Syria and Turkey to work out their differences. The United States would like Erdogan to stop backing militias in Syria. Finally, Erdogan would like to be able to tell his home crowd that he has acted on the refugee issue and neutralized the Kurdish threat. The only way that all of these desires can come to pass is for Erdogan to militarily abandon Syria and eat a sizable slice of humble pie.