Did New Delhi’s G-20 Summit Succeed?
India will tout the meeting as a victory, but the bloc remains deeply divided.
The annual meeting of the G-20, which loosely brings together the world’s leading economies, concluded in New Delhi last weekend. When the group was established in 1999, it aimed to serve as a forum for the discussion and coordination around global economic growth and financial stability. Its agenda has since expanded considerably, encompassing issues including trade, climate change, and international migration. But cooperation around these issues suffered during the Trump administration, as the United States at the time had little interest in multilateral diplomacy.
The annual meeting of the G-20, which loosely brings together the world’s leading economies, concluded in New Delhi last weekend. When the group was established in 1999, it aimed to serve as a forum for the discussion and coordination around global economic growth and financial stability. Its agenda has since expanded considerably, encompassing issues including trade, climate change, and international migration. But cooperation around these issues suffered during the Trump administration, as the United States at the time had little interest in multilateral diplomacy.
As leader of the G-20 this year, the government of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was determined to make the most of the summit. Modi had two distinct audiences in mind for the event: domestic and external. The Indian leader and his ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) are approaching a national election next year with confidence, given the state of the country’s anemic political opposition. But Modi wanted to capitalize on the G-20 fanfare with the presence of some of the world’s most powerful leaders in New Delhi to highlight India’s importance in the emerging global order. He was also determined to cement what he and other Indian leaders see as India’s status as a leader of the global south.
India’s leadership sees the New Delhi summit as a success because it steered the members toward consensus on a host of issues, including increased funding for the World Bank aimed at the global south. Coming on the heels of India’s recent lunar landing, the meeting was another soft power win for New Delhi. But despite the celebratory mood among Indian officials, the G-20 is still at an inflection point. To start, both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping skipped the summit. Putin likely chose to miss it due to the awkwardness of having to encounter his European counterparts, not to mention U.S. President Joe Biden. Xi, on the other hand, seemed to stay away to snub Modi; China and India have been at odds since a deadly military clash on their disputed border in 2020.
These tensions are unlikely to abate easily or soon. Russia’s war in Ukraine shows no signs of ending, and Putin’s hope that Western support for Ukraine would wane was mostly proved wrong. Meanwhile, China-India ties remain deeply troubled, likely for the foreseeable future. These two major fissures call into question the G-20’s ability to boost cooperation on global challenges, from tackling climate change to promoting global trade. Even in the absence of such divisions, the bloc had made limited progress on many of its stated objectives; the likelihood of it achieving its high-minded plans now appears shakier than ever.
Although the G-20 members were able to forge a consensus declaration at the summit in New Delhi, it papered over many differences. The final document said states should “refrain from the threat or use of force to seek territorial acquisition,” but there was still no explicit condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This was no doubt a compromise among parties with varying views on the war. This contrasted with the declaration in Bali, Indonesia, last year, when China and Russia acquiesced to a leaders’ statement that contained a forthright condemnation of the invasion.
Probably at India’s urging, the communique also included language about easing the debt vulnerability of the global south and emphasized the need for promoting sustainable development strategies and meeting the climate goals set out by the 2015 Paris Agreement. The document affirmed the previously agreed-upon targets and urged members to commit an initial tranche of $100 billion to this endeavor; it also set a goal of achieving net zero emissions by 2050. India’s political leadership of course heralded these developments as a sign of its newfound status as a leader on the global stage.
At the initiative of the United States, the G-20 members signed a memorandum of understanding to pursue the ambitious India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. If realized, the continent-spanning project would involve undersea cables to facilitate telecommunications, create clean energy grids, and ensure secure internet links. Equally soaring in scope was the proposal for a global partnership designed to leverage public capital to mobilize private sector investments in quality infrastructure. Given the focus of each of these projects, it seems they collectively represent an effort to offer an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
These targets and projects are laudable, but none amounts to any binding commitments. Nor did the communique spell out any possible pathways toward implementing its objectives—including on climate mitigation issues. Still, there is little question that Modi’s government will benefit electorally from the summit’s apparent success. It will also likely add some luster to India’s global stature—a long-standing goal that cuts across the country’s political spectrum. That said, it is far from clear that the $120 million that the Indian exchequer shelled out to host this event will result in ameliorating the policy problems that continue to plague India. Despite Modi’s public commitment to a “vision of inclusiveness,” his government is responsible for pursuing divisive policies at home, marginalizing the country’s 200 million-strong Muslim minority.
As India hands over the presidency of the G-20 to Brazil, many of the objectives highlighted at last weekend’s summit will be dutifully reaffirmed and even expanded. But given the enduring structural differences that trouble the bloc, no amount of frippery and fanfare will cover up its limited tangible accomplishments.
Sumit Ganguly is a columnist at Foreign Policy and visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He is a distinguished professor of political science and the Rabindranath Tagore chair in Indian cultures and civilizations at Indiana University Bloomington.
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