In Eurasia’s Great Game, Players Are Reconsidering Their Bets

As Russia continues its protracted war in Ukraine and China eyes Taiwan, other tensions rise in the spaces between the two superpowers. The South Caucasus and Central Asia are witnessing concerning security risks as well as unprecedented diplomatic developments, most recently in the long-disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.

In the Caucasus, Azerbaijan’s months-long blockade of a critical supply route for the isolated Nagorno-Karabakh is a source of further clashes between two bitterly opposed nations. Azerbaijani forces launched on Sept. 19 what Baku calls an “anti-terror operation” in the region. Amid Soviet collapse, Azerbaijan and Armenia fought a war over the territory from 1988 to 1994, ending in Armenian victory and the creation of a breakaway republic in Nagorno-Karabakh, recognized by almost nobody except Yerevan. Azerbaijan revenged itself in November 2020, when a brief conflict enabled them to regain some territory it had previously lost in and around Nagorno Karabakh. Since then, the two countries have not been able to come to terms on the implementation of the Russian-mediated agreement that followed the conflict.

Azerbaijan’s primary aim has been to use its military victory in 2020 to facilitate regional economic development and connectivity, namely by securing road and rail access to its Nakhchivan exclave and beyond to Turkey. This requires transit of Armenian territory, and negotiations between Baku and Yerevan over this and related political issues. such as security guarantees for this access, have experienced ups and downs without a concrete resolution. Even when some humanitarian supplies were allowed into Nagorno Karabakh on Sept. 18, this was a limited measure which has yet to resolve the underlying crisis.

Further complicating this is the position of Russia, whose interest in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been to preserve its role as the dominant regional power and not necessarily to guarantee peace. This explains why, despite the deployment of 2,000 Russian peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh following the 2020 war, ceasefire violations between Armenia and Azerbaijan continue. Armenia, a longtime ally and member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), has been increasingly frustrated with Moscow’s position, recently backing out of hosting CSTO exercises and opting to conduct joint military drills with the United States instead from Sept. 11 to 20.

Armenia’s moves do not necessarily signal a broader shift away from Russia, since the economic, security, and political linkages between the two countries are simply too ingrained. Yet it does show that Moscow’s position in the region has become more tenuous. Russia’s war in Ukraine has not only concentrated the vast majority of Russian military forces in that theater, but it has also challenged Moscow’s diplomatic position, which looks to maintain the status quo in Karabakh on its own terms.

In the meantime, players like Turkey, which favors Azerbaijan, and Iran, which favors Armenia, have become more active in shaping regional dynamics, while the United States has sensed an opportunity to leverage Armenia’s disappointment with Russia into an increased (albeit limited) form of security engagement.

From an American perspective, a more hopeful set of geopolitical shifts is taking place in Central Asia. On Sept. 19 and 20, U.S. President Joe Biden will attend a head-of-state summit with each of the five presidents of the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. While the format of this gathering, the C5+1, has existed since 2015, this is the first time that it will be held with the participation of the U.S. president.

Central Asia is now seeing more dynamic economic competition. China has emerged as a major economic player in Central Asia, which has been a key focal point of its Belt and Road Initiative on account of the region’s energy and mineral resources and geographic proximity to China. Beijing has become the region’s largest trade and investment partner, fueling the construction of vast oil and natural gas pipelines and road and rail infrastructure throughout the ’Stans.

China’s increased economic penetration in Central Asia has spurred growing political and security linkages as well, including its own C+C5 engagement and the construction of military facilities within Tajikistan. Beijing’s emergence has until now been carefully coordinated with Moscow, as China is conscious of Russia’s position as the primary external power in the region. The two countries have established a division of labor of sorts, with Moscow remaining as the dominant security player (as seen in the Russian-led CSTO intervention in Kazakhstan in January 2022), while Beijing is able to continue to build economic connections into Central Asia. China has been a major factor in enabling Russia to stay afloat economically and continue waging its war in Ukraine, while Moscow could potentially do the same for Beijing in the event of a Chinese intervention (military or otherwise) in Taiwan.

But Moscow’s position has been under pressure in recent months, as Russia’s war in Ukraine has been met with a tepid response from some of Moscow’s traditional partners in Central Asia. None of the Central Asian states (nor those of the Caucasus) have supported Russia in its war efforts, while some regional leaders have called for the importance of maintaining territorial integrity. This, however, should also not be seen as a sign of a major strategic shift away from Russia. Many of these states have their own political interests in mind in taking such a position, and have notably not joined the West’s efforts in isolating Moscow and have either maintained or increased their economic ties with Russia, in some cases taking advantage of Moscow’s greater need thanks to Western sanctions.

Nevertheless, the Central Asian states, just like their neighbors across the Caspian Sea, have indicated a greater willingness to diversify their foreign policy ties in an effort to manage the significant geopolitical dynamism that is taking place both within the region and outside of it on the opposite ends of Eurasia. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and increasingly Armenia have been open to a “multivector” foreign policy.

This creates opportunities, which the United States is clearly attempting to seize, but it also highlights the risks of what is becoming a fiercer and faster-moving arena of competition. Given Russia’s connection to both theaters and the growing linkages between the Caspian states themselves, instability in the Caucasus can quickly spill over into Central Asia and vice versa. Such potential security risks must be carefully calibrated into Washington’s engagement strategy in the Caspian region as its contention with Moscow and Beijing spreads throughout the Eurasian supercontinent.