Ursula von der Leyen Is Europe’s Ruthlessly Efficient Machine

During her annual State of the Union speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on Sept. 13, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen made a little slip of the tongue. Halfway through the speech, she wanted to say “Honorable Members of Parliament.” Instead, she said “Honorable Member States.” Everybody laughed. So did she, briefly.

Yes, it was funny. And, in a way, also revealing. The Strasbourg speech marked the beginning of the fifth and last year of von der Leyen’s mandate. It is generally assumed that she will seek a second mandate. In order to get it, she needs to not only please as many political families represented in Parliament as possible but also, crucially, secure the support of all 27 European Union heads of state or government. Ultimately, it is Europe’s national leaders—elected to run the “Honorable Member States”—who will decide her fate once the results of the European Parliament elections next June are known.

That is still nine months away, and maybe more, as not only must the commission president be appointed but also several other top European officials—including the new NATO secretary-general and the European Council president. Usually, filling this carousel is a complicated balancing act between capable men and women from different political groups and regions. In Europe, after all, everybody needs to get something. Since many agree that von der Leyen, whatever her flaws, has turned out to be one of the most effective presidents the commission has ever had, her ambitions will be important to set the carousel in motion next year.

One reason why policymakers in Brussels and other European capitals carefully watched her speech last week was to find some clues about her ambitions. In the European corridors of power, hopefuls are already warming up. But first, all need to know: Will von der Leyen run, or won’t she?

The commission president did not answer the question directly in her 60-minute speech, which under her tenure became a ritual of sorts in the European political arena. But the longer-term priorities she outlined for Europe were so carefully balanced between farmers and investors, between green activism and industry—some called it a “Christmas tree” with presents for everyone—that it is safe to say she is keeping her options open.

This is something von der Leyen has been good at since the start: trying to be a service provider to a wide range of stakeholders in the EU. The main stakeholders, the 27 member states that hold most of the power in Europe, broadly seem to agree. Usually, permanent representatives from the 27 member states in Brussels are critical or even dismissive of the commission president—whoever it is. With her, it is different. Many ambassadors praise von der Leyen because they find her useful.

After a weak start, the former German defense minister quickly became Europe’s top crisis manager. With her somewhat formal, wooden appearance, von der Leyen initially won few hearts and minds, but during the COVID-19 pandemic and even more since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, she has won credit as someone who gets things done in Europe. She made sure all member states got affordable COVID-19 vaccines at the same time so all could start vaccinating simultaneously, avoiding border closures on the single market. Under her watch, a raft of the strictest climate laws in the world—the European Green Deal—was adopted. She also oversees the $850 billion NextGenerationEU grants and loans program, aimed at helping European economies to get back on their feet after the pandemic.

It is interesting to see how the commission has grown into a new role. It used to make proposals for new European legislation and implement them once member states (and sometimes Parliament) had approved them. “Now, this lawmaking institution is becoming a service provider, too,” a high-ranking EU official recently told me.

This change is perhaps more due to broader circumstances than to the commission president herself: The world has become a more turbulent place, where Europe’s self-perception—as a relatively open market and a peaceful, values-based community uninterested in showing geopolitical muscle—is rudely being tested and requires fast adjustment. Nowadays, member states want quick solutions for common problems they don’t manage to solve on their own.

To von der Leyen’s credit, she understands this. Instead of claiming the moral high ground, she is a pragmatist who sees no bones in providing member states with added value—European “goodies,” as some call them. “The commission president is a machine,” someone who knows von der Leyen well told me. “She’s tough, focused, and extremely efficient.”

With Russia waging an economic and information war against the EU, China trying to squeeze political capital out of economic dependencies, and now also the United States outcompeting European companies with huge state subsidies, Europe’s successful model based on connectivity and openness needs protection. “Security-proof” and “de-risk” are rapidly becoming the buzzwords in Brussels—whereas 10 years ago, during the eurocrisis, the prism was mostly financial. Spurred on by a mercantilist world, Europe’s leaders are taking many steps toward “more Europe” that they were previously unwilling to take. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, they procure weapons and gas together, beef up common security and border control, welcome millions of Ukrainian refugees, and have restarted the EU’s stalled enlargement process.

In general, European governments never like to “Europeanize” national competences—unless, as EU founding father Jean Monnet once said, there is a crisis and national leaders “do not know what to do.” Now is such a moment. In von der Leyen, they do not just find someone willing to help with legal and other expertise; they find someone who accepts that they manage the solution together. In a Europe where there was always a sharp distinction between the “common,” European method (run by Brussels, such as for agriculture or trade) and the “intergovernmental” method (run by member states, such as for foreign policy), some sort of mix of the two methods is now emerging.

National leaders may nowadays agree to Europeanize issues that are sensitive to citizens, such as security, health, or migration. But they do this on one condition: They want to keep their implementer—the commission—on a short leash and keep the responsibility partially in national hands. The procurement of vaccines and the management of the economic recovery fund are good examples; national capitals remain involved in the implementation. The recent migrant deal with Tunisia is another. The commission and two prime ministers (from Italy and the Netherlands) jointly promised Tunisian President Kais Saied European funds to shore up the country’s economy, in exchange for more efforts to prevent migrants from going to Europe.

So, on the one hand, member states constantly ask the commission to prepare proposals for new European laws and regulations. On the other, they weaken European institutions—and often bypass Parliament, as with the Tunisia deal—by cutting budgets and keeping control of the implementation of policies. Some warn that a “renationalization” of EU policies is underway, while others argue member states need more “ownership” of European policies. But it is clear that one reason member states are generally rather content with von der Leyen is that she accepts their growing involvement in European affairs and is not too religiously defensive of the commission’s turf.

Still, as of late, some have started to criticize her, too. Her strong pro-Ukraine stance and the fact that she was one of the first to support Kyiv’s EU candidate status were not appreciated by all. Her relentless advocacy of the European Green Deal ran into a wall in Parliament, where her own political family—the conservative European People’s Party—alarmed by farmers’ protests in the Netherlands and elsewhere, nearly managed to kill the so-called nature restoration law in July. Since then, von der Leyen has not backtracked on her policies (she needs support from the European Greens and progressives for a second mandate) but offers olive branches to conservatives who say she has moved too far ahead of the troops. In her State of the Union speech, she reached out to farmers, promising to listen more to them and offering them a “fair transition.”

With the EU becoming a big bazaar for national governments, complete with the haggling and dramatic walkouts, it will however become increasingly difficult for the commission president to maneuver. She is starting to get pushback from many directions. Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia unilaterally blocking grain transports from Ukraine after the commission decided to allow those transports again is a slap in her face. Moreover, European compromises are becoming more byzantine and complex and less transparent and accountable. The relentless pressure in some quarters on von der Leyen to release her text messages on vaccines with the CEOs of pharmaceutical companies shows that while she may be able to operate in such a bazaar, public watchdogs will have none of it. Yet others find her too flexible with the EU’s strict common state aid rules when member states—mostly Germany and France—demand the right to heavily subsidize national energy or car companies.

Von der Leyen’s own staff is also increasingly critical of her. In order to answer governments’ multiple demands all the time, von der Leyen runs the commission like a slave driver. She sleeps in a windowless space next to her office, regularly asking staff on Friday evening to prepare reports for Sunday morning policy meetings. She also tends to work with a small coterie, keeping everything close to her chest, often even leaving commissioners in the dark. Vacancies tend to stay open for months because von der Leyen has not had time to decide on appointments. With member states constantly asking for “more Europe” but not willing to pay for more staff (and in the European External Action Service, even cutting staff), many employees are overworked. Some reproach her for catering to the whims of national governments without ever asking them to fund more staff. “I want my life back,” said one commission employee who recently suffered a burnout. “More is heaped on my plate every month. She cares about governments and her legacy, not about us.”

Governments, of course, appreciate this. In their view, von der Leyen does deliver. She steers them only occasionally, as in the old days when the commission was more powerful, toward strong, principled decisions they abhor—for instance, to cut more than half of Hungary’s European funds for violating the EU’s rule of law conditionality. This principled stance earned von der Leyen much respect in Parliament, whose members had started the first procedures against Hungary years ago and were keen to see them bear fruit.

Many things can happen between now and next summer, when the 27 national leaders decide who will head the European Commission. But if the conservative family remains Europe’s largest political grouping, it may very well be von der Leyen—if she wants it. And she probably does.