The U.S. Cannot Afford to Lose a Soft-Power Race With China

Outside the halls of the United Nations and the G-20 summit in New Delhi, it’s been a busy month of diplomacy. Earlier this month, U.S. President Joe Biden wrapped up a quick trip to Hanoi, where he met with Vietnamese President Vo Van Thuong, while Chinese President Xi Jinping welcomed the leaders of Venezuela, Cambodia, and Zambia to Beijing. This flurry of activity is not without purpose; in our strategic competition with China, photo ops, influence in multilateral institutions, and bilateral relationships have become just as important as ballistic missiles and aircraft carriers. Washington is in a soft power race—and it needs to win.

Soft power, a concept first popularized by Joseph S. Nye Jr. in Foreign Policy in 1990, describes the ability to exert influence through culture, values, and foreign policy—and it touches every part of U.S.-China competition. As the ranking member of the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the U.S. and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), I’ve seen the importance of improving and exercising our soft power, a common refrain in every hearing and briefing. We can win a soft-power competition through three key actions: by making soft power a key part of pursuing our strategic interests, protecting critical funding from partisan politics, and focusing on the United States’ strengths and recognizing our weaknesses.

First, when it comes to making soft power an integral part of U.S. strategy, we simply cannot do it without allies and partners. For example, it is in U.S. interest to strengthen security and stability in the Indo-Pacific by deterring Chinese aggression in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. The Biden administration has made incredible progress toward this goal through a series of soft-power moves, such as upgrading relations with Vietnam, boosting the trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, strengthening the U.S.-Philippines alliance, and expanding  our diplomatic presence in the Pacific.

Similarly, it is essential for the United States to diversify its supply chains and protect the American people from an overreliance on China and its increasingly risky and unpredictable business environment. Again, the Biden administration has made great strides in employing soft power to advance this aim. Biden’s visit to Vietnam launched a new partnership to explore semiconductor supply chain opportunities. The U.S.-led Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, the G-7’s flagship infrastructure initiative, is mobilizing $30 billion in infrastructure financing while bringing new private-sector leaders to the table and creating the conditions to unlock billions more in investment. In addition, the United States is working with allies and partners to ensure we have the critical materials necessary to secure sustainable, next-generation technologies through efforts such as the Minerals Security Partnership.

Taking a multilateral approach to a bilateral competition has worked so far—and we need to build on it. We can do this by finding common ground when it comes to outbound investment approaches to China, human rights enforcement in the face of the ongoing Uyghur genocide, and on global rules for data and privacy—all of which are important not only to counter China’s actions, but also to raise global standards and set the pace for the future.

The U.S. Congress can play an important role here by increasing our engagement with parliaments around the world to better coordinate and advance areas of common interest. This year, I was proud to join the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, and members of my committee participated in the Australian American Leadership Dialogue and the Reagan Institute’s inaugural Reagan-Jackson Security Dialogue, which also hosted leaders from the U.K.

Second, to effectively win this soft-power competition, we need to ensure that everyone on the front lines is fully supported by opposing draconian budget cuts that would undercut our own ability to lead. Every year in Congress, the National Defense Authorization Act, which authorizes our military programs, is considered a “must pass” bill. In fact, the appropriations bills that pass to fund the act often exceed the requested limit by the president. In short: We treat hard power like the priority it is. Unfortunately, soft-power programs run by agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and the U.S. Agency for Global Media do not get the same treatment by some members of the Republican Party, and are too often seen as political pawns up for grabs in the negotiating process.

As we get closer to the prospect of a House Republican-led government shutdown, the United States’ soft power cannot become a political bargaining chip. This is why every Democrat on my committee signed a letter to the House Appropriations Committee showcasing the debilitating impact that cuts—as high as 31 percent to the State Department and foreign operations budget—would have on our ability to project U.S. soft power.

From leading people-to-people exchanges to running programs to combat the climate crisis, our diplomats, trade officers, development leaders, and so many others represent our greatest soft-power assets in competition with China across the Indo-Pacific, Africa, and Latin America. Kneecapping them to score some political points in a budget negotiation does nothing but give China an opening to criticize the U.S. democratic system.

If we want to win this competition, we need to keep our team on the field. To do that, we have to fight against these kinds of cuts.

Finally, to win this soft-power competition, we should focus on our strengths. A recent survey by the Pew Research Center of people from 23 countries across the globe, including India, Indonesia, and Nigeria, shows that U.S. leadership, innovation, and culture are incredible strengths. The United States is seen as a force for good, with 61 percent of those surveyed answering that it contributes to “peace and stability around the world.” The United States is seen as an innovation mecca, with approximately 70 percent of respondents saying that U.S. technological achievements and universities are the best or among the best in the world. And the United States is still a cultural force—more than 70 percent of those surveyed said that its culture and entertainment are among the best in the world.

We have the power to fully leverage each of these strengths as part of a broader strategy to win the competition with Beijing. We can start by simply showing up. Biden’s participation at the U.N. General Assembly and the G-20; Vice President Kamala Harris’s presence at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit; and the increase in U.S. cabinet-level involvement throughout the Indo-Pacific, Africa, and Latin America are all important, but we can do more to show the world that U.S. leadership is truly here to stay.

We can leverage our innovation advantage by better connecting the world with U.S. innovators and investors. The Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment has gotten off to an impressive start with investments such as the Export-Import Bank’s financing of solar projects in Angola and the DFC’s effort to help finance data centers in Ghana. We should build on this momentum by supercharging the DFC and working with USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy to improve governance; fight corruption; and establish public-private partnerships globally in key sectors such as high technology, critical minerals, and green energy.

And we can use our cultural reach to remind the world that the greatest thing about the United States is the American people. We should increase people-to-people exchanges—including restoring our Fulbright exchanges with China—to create better understandings across cultures and countries. We should ensure that programs such as American Music Abroad and TechCamp have the resources they need to build bridges between people. In addition, we should strengthen support for independent journalists abroad so that truth outshines propaganda.

All of these steps are within our grasp, but if we let them slip through our fingers, we can easily lose this race. China increased its diplomatic budget by more than 12 percent this year. The Belt and Road Initiative is a decade old, and while it is grappling with Beijing’s waning willingness to fund massive legacy infrastructure projects, it is still adapting by focusing on smaller projects. Even with Xi skipping the September meetings of the G-20 and the U.N. General Assembly, the CCP rolls out the red carpet for world leaders on a regular basis.

Keeping pace or falling behind are not options we can accept. We’ve got to be bigger, faster, and bolder in our approach. We’ve got to play to win. We know how; it all starts with a handshake.